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Introduction
Globalisation consists of many small components and every component entails dif-
ferent effects. The main part of globalisation is international integration of goods, service,
nancial and factor markets. This integration is accompanied by international trade in
goods, services and nance. According to the WTO Trade Report (2008), the increase in
international trade exceeded the growth in global output in the year 2007 by 2 percentage
points. A further prominent aspect of globalisation is the increase and composition of inter-
national capital ows. Foreign direct investment increased during the 1990s by more than
20 % and thereby exceeded international portfolio ows (WTO 2008). Both integration
processes have lead to more efcient allocation of economic resources and greater levels
of output. However, an additional result of the international trade integration is higher un-
certainty due to intensied production specialization, increased competition and economic
cross-country spillovers. Various groups of individuals such as workers, rm owners and
political leaders are differently affected by these risks. Yet, nancial integration offers the
possibility to diversify these new arising risks. Again, the affected groups benet differ-
ently from these diversication possibilities.
One of the rst historical links between trade liberalisation and nancial liberaliza-
tion can be found in 1846 in the repeal of the English Corn Laws. In course of the -
nancial liberalization English landowners were able to diversify their portfolios away from
agricultural goods and thus reduced their opposition to protection of the English agricul-
tural industry (Schonhardt-Bailey (1991, 1996)). Following these arguments, Eaton and
1
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Grossman (1985) analyse whether trade protection can serve as a social insurance or trade
liberalization reduces this insurance. Hence, the need for new diversication possibili-
ties increases. According to these authors, liberalization leads to higher competition and
enforces imports. This entails higher uncertainty for workers in the import competing in-
dustries. Hence, for working individuals tariffs have an insurance task. Feeney and Hillman
(2004) support these results. They indicate that a free access to asset markets might be a
substitute for trade protection. With proceeding asset market liberalization the demand and
political support for trade protection decreases. All these studies take the nancial liberal-
ization as exogenous and trade liberalization as consequence of it. Yet, empirically there is
no denite evidence for the direction of this argumentation. Various empirical studies also
conrm the possibility of nancial liberalization as a consequence of trade liberalization.1
Aizenman (2004) and Tamirisa (1999) both present theoretical arguments for trade
liberalization as a cause for nancial liberalization. Increasing trade and imports offer
possibilities to bypass capital controls. The impact of such controls and repressions is
diluted and if enough pressure is built up, nancial markets will be adjusted to free capital
ows and activities. Still, the cutback of capital controls and nancial repressions does not
necessarily stimulate individuals to take part in nancial markets activities and portfolio
diversication. This thesis tries to close this gap by generalizing these approaches.
The rst part of the present work links the two views of the literature. Analogue to the
rst strand of arguments, we consider tariffs as insurance for workers in the import com-
peting industry. Trade liberalization and increasing imports are the source of additional
1 See for example Svaleryd and Vlachos (2003).
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uncertainty of labour income. In contrast to these studies, we endogenize nancial mar-
ket activities and take different trade regimes (different levels of protectionist trade policy
and free trade) as exogenous government actions. Furthermore, as expansion of the second
argument we generalize our study away from specic capital controls towards individual
activities on the asset market. We analyse whether and how a working individual exhausts
its nancial diversication possibility as a consequence of different trade regimes. Thus,
the working individual takes the trade regime as given and adjusts its portfolio according to
the existing tariff. For the individual portfolio decision it is crucial whether the individual
receives its labour income from the import competing or the exporting industry. The re-
sults imply that trade liberalization increases individual activities on nancial markets for
individuals working in the former protected industry and tends to decrease asset market ac-
tivities for individuals in the unprotected industry. Thus, the argument that tariffs serve as a
social insurance may be conrmed also with exogenous trade regimes and even according
to this more generalized approach.
Not only workers are affected by increased uncertainty due to globalization. Firm
owners are also faced with challenges caused by higher competition, a greater variety of
location choices and different environmental conditions in each possible production loca-
tion. One main question is whether a rm chooses to sell its products internationally or
just to serve the home market. If a rm decides to engage in the international market then
the next consideration is whether it should export or undertake direct international invest-
ments to capture international market shares. Again the decision to invest internationally
can be broken down into whether to build a complete new rm or to place only specic iso-
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lated production steps abroad. Melitz (2003) indicates that the decision which markets to
serve - home or home and foreign - depends mainly on rm size and productivity. He con-
cludes that in a setting with heterogeneous rms according to rms' size, only large rms
serve the home and foreign market. Small rms with low productivity do not engage in
international exports. Grossman et al. (2006) extend this analysis and derive the optimal
international strategy of rms with respect to the rm's productivity. According to Gross-
man et al. (2006), lowest productive rms only serve the home market and, with increasing
productivity, rms start to export and even invest in international direct investments. These
results are rened by Grossman et al. (2005). They analyse the location choice and seg-
mentation of the production process for a multinational rm in dependence of the location
conditions.
The existing research on international direct investment concentrates on the direct
investment and the decisive factors for this investment. They neglect the possibility of
combining the direct investment with different investment possibilities such as for exam-
ple portfolio investment. Allowing rms to combine various investment instruments offers
them the possibility to prop up short term variations of the international direct investment.
This in turn may facilitate the direct investment. The second part of the present work adds
these considerations to the existing research. The international investment decisions of
a representative rm are analysed in a dynamic setting. In contrast with recent studies,
the rm can choose between isolated direct investment, isolated portfolio investment or a
combination of both international investments. We assume that rms want to undertake in-
ternational direct investment for sure. The research question is what kind of investment
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strategy would be the best. Our results indicate that the combination of both international
investments is preferred by the rm. According to the results, the rm uses portfolio invest-
ment to diversify the short-term variations of the direct investments and the rm is able to
engage in the international market with a lower productivity in comparison to the isolated
direct investment.
The results of both the rst and the second part of the present work emphasize the
impact of the economic environment such as the countrie's industrial landscape and condi-
tions on the respective individual portfolio or the rm's investment decision. On the other
hand, international trade and the increased possibilities for rms to produce and invest in-
ternationally have impacted the industrial patterns of different countries. The consequences
from industrial concentration or the offshoring of several production steps might not only
impact the industrial landscape of a country but also its total economic environment includ-
ing nancial markets and business cycles. There are different opinions about the impact and
its direction from trade on business cycles. The most prominent ones are Krugman (1993)
and Frankel and Rose (1998). Krugman (1993) states that international integrated coun-
tries are more diversied than unintegrated countries due to industrial specialization and
trade. In contrast, Frankel and Rose (1998) conclude that demand shocks dominate and the
economic environment of trading countries converges. The ambiguous results are not clar-
ied yet. Thus, the risk-sharing literature offers no denite statement either. For example,
Crucini (1999) states that regions of a similar country share more risk among each other
than internationally. Hess and Shin (1998), on the other hand conclude that the U.S. states
share less risk with each other than with other countries.
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Obviously, there are different transmission channels through which countries can be
affected by international integration and various impacts on the risk-sharing within a coun-
try group. Additionally, it seems that these effects are not only working in one direction but
there may be mutual impact of specialization, trade and nancial integration. The third part
of the present work analyses these transmission channels for three different country group-
ings. In contrast to the existing literature, we apply different measures of risk sharing in a
simultaneous equation system. The simultaneity allows to capture mutual impacts between
trade, specialization and nancial integration. Thus, we can identify different transmis-
sion channels for the respective country groups and the impact on intra- or inter-group risk
sharing.
Generally, the present work analyses the diverse impact of international integration
on workers, rm owners and on country patterns. In particular, the consequences of pro-
ceeding international integration on risk sharing for the respective groups are emphasized.
The rst chapter emphasizes the inuence of trade policy on the investment deci-
sions of working individuals. In the investment behaviour of individuals the uncertainty
of future income is considered. The optimal portfolio-decision of a representative working
individual is analysed in comparison to a non-working shareholder.
Chapter 2 concentrates on rm behaviour with different international investment pos-
sibilities. We show in a dynamic investment setting whether rms choose FDI or inter-
national portfolio investment (FPI) in the presence of stochastic productivity taking into
account differences in exibility of both investments.
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We explore the impact of different trade patterns on industrial specialization and con-
sequently on business cycle co-movements between and within different regions in Chapter
3. In particular, we emphasize industrial specialization as a result of intra- or inter-industry
trade. Ultimately, the purpose is to clarify direct and indirect channels between trade, spe-
cialization, business cycle co-movements and risk sharing.
I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Carsten Hefeker and PD Dr. Matthias Busse for their
review on this thesis. Thanks to Prof. Dr. Karl-Josef Koch for valuable comments and to
Lola Garcia-Suarez for her unconditional proofreading. I express my gratitude to Jens and
my parents for all the support they gave me.
Chapter 1
Trade Policy and Risk Diversication
1.1 Introduction
Since the mid 1960's, we have witnessed an overwhelming and continuing trend towards
globalization and free trade (Wei and Wu (2002)). Among many other institutions, the
Doha round of World Trade Organizations has recently reiterated the call to lower trade
barriers. Despite the numerous benets of free trade, this kind of liberalization carries
with it a loss of protection caused by sudden increasing competition and higher imports.
Subsequently higher prot risk for many sectors and their associated workforce arises.2
Conversely, we can also observe an almost unbridled expansion of speculative -
nancial markets.3 Deregulated nancial markets can act as tools to dampen nancial and
non-nancial risk and thereby offer some form of insurance. Furthermore, trade liberal-
ization may also be linked to nancial integration, analogous to the manner in which the
novel risks introduced by trade liberalization are absorbed to varying degrees by nancial
markets. The mentioned risks which come along with trade liberalization lead to higher
uncertainty for different groups of individuals, especially workers. This increased uncer-
tainty can be reduced by diversifying the individual investment portfolio on the nancial
market.
2 See Baldwin (1982) for a detailed discussion.
3 For empirical evidence on this development see for example Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).
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Based on these considerations, we assume that the continuing trade liberalization
strengthens the desire to diversify risk  especially labour income risk  through nancial
markets. This leads to the question of whether protectionist trade policy therefore reduces
individual diversication on the asset market. Moreover, a stronger dependence on personal
labour income could result from a reduction in diversication opportunities, and we will
examine whether this is indeed the case.
To answer these questions we consider the inuence of trade policies on the invest-
ment decisions of a representative working individual. In the following analysis, a working
individual has the option to hedge his or her income risk by investing in two different risky
assets and one risk-free asset. The two risky assets are shares in the industries x and y,
respectively, with different correlations between their expected returns and varying corre-
lations with the wage risk. Moreover, the variation of the income risk is the deciding factor
in the optimal portfolio-decision. Claims on future labour income are not tradable. The in-
vestment decision of the working individual is mainly determined by the asset covariance
and labour asset covariance. Furthermore, the tariff impact on the covariance depends on
the factor intensities, the composition of the productivity shocks, and the relative prices in
the two home country industries. In this regard, we can conrm and extend the ndings of
Mayer (1984). He shows for a Heckscher-Ohlin model as well as for a model with specic
factors that under the assumption of a Median Voter Model the preferred tariff policy of a
country depends on the factor-ownership distribution. In addition, it appears in the present
chapter that variations in the total risk share can dilute the results.
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Feeney and Hillman (2004) additionally indicate that the liberalization state of the
nancial market impacts the desire for a protectionist trade policy. The authors argue that if
more risk can be diversied on the nancial market by individuals - increasing liberalization
of the nancial market - then individuals are not demanding a protectionist trade regime.
Thus, the willingness to lobby for a high tariff decreases with increasing individual access
to nancial markets. Cassing (1996) analyses the consequences of tariff lobbying in a
Principal-Agent Model. He assumes that the manager of a rm has impact on the tariff
implementation of the industry of the rm he works for. The manager's willingness to lobby
for a high tariff depends on the stakes he owns in the rm. Cassing implies that a tariff
introduction leads to additional gains in the protected industry and hurts the unprotected
industry. As a consequence of the tariff introduction, there is an investment concentration
by shareholders - not managers - in the protected industry.
Both papers indicate that there is a link between trade integration and nancial inte-
gration. However, they neglect possible mutual effects of a tariff between the industries.
Furthermore, it is not empirically proven that the only direction of the impact is that nan-
cial integration pushes trade liberalization.4 This is where the present chapter adds to. We
generalize the arguments of Feeney and Hillman (2004) as well as Cassing's (1996). Addi-
tionally, we analyse whether trade integration impacts nancial integration. Therefore, we
study individual investment behaviour in dependence of different tariff settings. Further-
more, we allow for mutual effects between the industries and emphasize their impact on
the individual investment behaviour as well. Finally, we indicate whether nancial markets
4 See for example Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) or Aizenman (2008).
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and tariffs are substitutes for individual insurance needs. The introduction of an import tar-
iff substantially impacts the utilization of the asset market. Although the asset market does
not lose its role as an insurance instrument completely, risk diversication via the asset
market diminishes considerably as a consequence of the implementation of a tariff. In con-
trast to Cassing (1996), we see no denite investment concentration in the protected sector.
On the contrary, we nd a weak portfolio bias towards the unprotected industry.
This chapter is organized based on the following sub-topics. The next section pro-
vides a brief overview of relevant literature. Section three discusses the production side,
and section four derives the individual portfolio decision. Section ve analyses the optimal
asset allocation of a working individual under a protectionist trade regime and the possible
labour income risk hedge. Section six concludes Chapter 1.
1.2 The Literature
To model individual portfolio-choice, we will focus on the model elucidated by Campbell
and Viceira (2003). Furthermore, we extend their model by a second risky asset. The
standard portfolio-theory analyses the portfolio decision between one risky and one risk-
free asset. Correlations between the expected returns of risky assets are often neglected.
In our analysis a second risky asset is very important to emphasize the effects of the trade
policy and possibilities of the income hedge. With the second risky asset we can explore
whether the tariff implementation causes a rebalancing of the portfolio composition and
how the asset allocation changes between the protected and the non-protected industry.
Furthermore, the second risky asset allows combining two different views of capital income
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as an alternative income source for a working individual and thus leads to literature dealing
with the correlation between wages and capital income.
Bodie et al. (1992) and Viceira (2001) provide more general approaches of portfo-
lio decisions with labour income. Bodie et al. (1992) illustrate the portfolio decision for
an individual with non-tradeable labour income. In contrast to the present chapter, they
analyse the portfolio decision with riskless labour income. The main result of their paper
is that with a higher non-tradeable share of income the individual will shift an additional
proportion of nancial wealth in the risky asset. The underlying assumption is that total
wealth is constant. On the other hand, Viceira (2001) examines a dynamic model of port-
folio decision with background risk. He distinguishes between investors with and without
uncorrelated background risk. These investor types can be reinterpreted as young and old
investors. The main nding of this analysis is that young investors are endowed with less
nancial wealth and more background risk, uncertain human capital income, than older
investors. Hence, younger investors should decide to hold a riskier portfolio than old in-
vestors. In the present chapter, we do take into account the non-tradable character of the
labour income. Furthermore, we also analyse how uncertainty of the labour income inu-
ences the individual portfolio choice. In our examination, the different levels of uncertainty
of the labour income do not arise through different age stages but tariff choices. Yet, we do
not distinguish between young and old investors as our analysis emphasizes the impact of
risky labour income on the individual investment decision. Hence, we also allow possible
variations in the capital income to affect the individual investment decision.
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The effects of a positive correlation between wage and capital income were rst
shown byWeitzman (1984) and further developed by Renström and Roszbach (1995). They
nd positive effects on productivity, ultimately resulting in prolonged employment, when
workers hold shares of the company they work for. Harms and Hefeker (2003) analyse
the effects of an alternative capital income that is negatively correlated with labour income
of workers (union members) on employment. They conclude that if capital and labour
income are negatively correlated then the workers become more independent of labour in-
come. As a consequence, the additional income source weakens union wage demands.
Harms and Hefeker conclude that this results in an increased rate of employment as well.
In the present chapter, we consider a positive as well as a negative correlation between
labour and capital income. The various results of additional capital income in the literature
justify the variation of the income risk correlation. We will examine which of the invest-
ment alternatives will be preferred by the representative individual given the different trade
regimes. Furthermore, we compare poor workers with wealthy workers. This means the
poor individual is not willing to bear a high amount of risk in his portfolio in order to ob-
tain a high return. The wealthy individual on the other hand allows a high share of risk in
his portfolio if a high return is possible. The present chapter shows that the wealthy indi-
vidual does not depend as much on the industry return he works for as the poor individual.
This nding supports the already existing results that additional capital income may loosen
the dependence on labour income.
A further aspect discussed in the literature nally links trade liberalization and as-
set market development. Eaton and Grossman (1985) and Cole and Obstfeld (1991) make
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a case for nancial openness enforcing the trade liberalization for goods. They argue that
risk diversication via nancial markets substitutes the insurance effect of protectionist
trade policy. Additionally, Cassing (1996) analyses the portfolio allocation of sharehold-
ers and the lobbying behaviour of their rm managers in dependence of the trade regime.
Both actors have only capital income and no working income. Feeney and Hillman (2004)
advance this approach and show in a political economic approach how increasing risk di-
versication over asset markets reduces the demand for protectionist trade policy. Again,
the individuals gain only capital and no working income. Feeney and Hillmann demon-
strate that complete capital markets offer diversication of risks and decrease the demand
for a protectionist trade policy. However, this impact of the joined development of capi-
tal markets and trade liberalization is not unambiguous, as the opposite argument is valid
as well: trade liberalization raises the need for risk diversication over the capital mar-
ket. As a consequence, the increased insurance demand enforces the development of the
capital-markets. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) demonstrate a signicant linkage in their
empirical study of nancial development in conjunction with trade liberalization. At the
time, the authors were unable to conclusively determine a clear direction or propose an ex-
planation for this dependency, a number of approaches have since been developed to offer
insight into the forces jointly affecting trade liberalization and nancial integration. For ex-
ample, Aizenman (2008) offers an explanation for commercial openness driving nancial
openness. He shows that the pressure to open the nancial system is a by-product of suc-
cessful trade integration. Restrictions on nancial markets lose their impact in the presence
of increasing trade liberalization. On the other hand, Tamirisa (1999) explores empirically
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the dependency from the opposite direction. Following her ndings, exchange and capital
controls can act as non-tariff-barriers (ntb) to trade. The nal impact of these ntb depends
on the relation between trade in goods and factors and the economic pattern of the country.
In order to build on the existing literature, especially on the previously discussed
strand, we will examine whether and how a protectionist trade regime changes the invest-
ment behaviour of a working individual and inuences its willingness to invest in the capital
market. Therefore, we reverse the statement of Feeney and Hillman (2004). Feeney and
Hillman study the positive impact of asset market development on proceeding trade liber-
alization. We examine whether trade policy affects the individual decision to invest in risky
assets. Our second contribution is the observation of the portfolio-decision of a working
individual with a risky wage. Therefore, we allow for positively and negatively correlated
capital and working income. Furthermore, we compare the portfolio decision of a worker
in the protected industry to the decision of a worker in the unprotected industry. Contrary
to the previously mentioned literature, we will look at trade policy as exogenous and endo-
genize the individual diversication decision on the asset market. Emphasis will be placed
on the effect of increasingly uncertain levels of future income on individual investment be-
haviour. To assess how globalization inuences the portfolio choice, we will explore the
inuence of exogenous trade policy on portfolio optimization. In addition, we will evaluate
if a labour income risk hedge is still possible under a protectionist trade policy.
All in all, we use a more general approach than the mentioned literature with exoge-
nous trade policy and endogenous investment decision. Our results differ from the literature
in the following way: we can not conrm a general statement about a stimulating effect on
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the asset market caused by trade liberalization. Specically, we show that the respective
country pattern (which industries are hosted in the country and how they are related) and
the position of the representative investor (willingness to bare risk and where he works)
are decisive for the nal impact of trade liberalization on asset market activities in different
countries.
1.3 Production
The analysis is based on a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, where a small open country
trades with the rest of the world at exogenous terms of trade. The industry in the home
country produces two nal consumption goods x and y. Both goods are consumed at home.
Furthermore, y is also exported and x is the import-competing good. The production of
good x is labour intensive and that of good y is capital intensive. The world price of good
x at time t is given by px;t = PxPy . The government in the home country implements a tariff
 on good x. Hence, the relative price for good x in the home country is px;t(1 + x;t).
Each industry in the home country consists of n identical domestic rms using the
same technology. The production function of one representative rm is:
Fi;t (Li;t; Ki;t)= i;tK
i
i;tL
1 i
i;t with i = x; y (1.1)
Ki;t is the amount of capital and Li;t the amount of labour employed in the produc-
tion process in industry i at time t. Production in both industries is affected by stochastic
productivity shocks i;t realised in period t. There are many different possible realizations
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of i;t and they occur with probability qi;t. The values of these shocks are strictly positive
and iid. In particular a positive productivity shock is realised if i;t > 1 and a negative
one if i;t < 1; if i;t = 1, there is a shock free situation. Moreover, the occurrence of a
specic productivity shock in sector x can be positively or negatively correlated with the
appearance of a specic productivity shock in sector y and vice versa. Hence, the joined
probability of shocks in both sectors is: qxy;t 6= qx;tqy;t.
As a consequence the factor income is stochastic too. With perfect competition on
product and factor markets, the domestic income for labour and capital respectively is:
wi;t = pi;t (1  i)i;tKii;tL ii;t (1.2)
ri;t = pi;tii;tK
i 1
i;t L
1 i
i;t . (1.3)
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1.4 Portfolio Decision of the Worker
We consider a risk-averse individual throughout the complete analysis. The optimization
problem of the individual is closely linked with the aim to hedge future income risk from
labour. We derive the optimal asset choice for different constellations of risk. To analyse
the hedging problem more clearly it is necessary to dene the different available income
sources in more detail.
1.4.1 Income sources
The representative individual contributes a xed fraction of his time to work. Li;t is nor-
malized to one and thus labour income wi;t is dened as in (1.2).
In addition to the labour income the individual has the possibility to generate capital
income in period t + 1. The individual is endowed with an initial amount of xed wealth
Vt. The capital endowment consists of Vt = rp;tVt 1 + (wt   Ct). The rst term on the
right hand side is the capital income from the investment in the previous period. The
second term constitutes the current labour income wt reduced of the amount the worker
spends for current consumption Ct. Vt can be invested during period t in two risky assets
i;t (industry-shares) with return ri;t+1 and in the risk free asset with constant return rf .
Therefore, the total portfolio return in t+ 1 will be
rp;t+1 = x;trx;t+1 + y;try;t+1 + f;trf , (1.4)
where
1 = x;t + y;t + f;t.
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Assuming that there are no short-sales i;t  0, and that i;t refers to a proportionate share
in the total available wealth, the portfolio return in t+ 1 can be rearranged as5
rp;t+1 = x;t (rx;t+1   rf ) + y;t (ry;t+1   rf ) + rf . (1.5)
The risky asset returns and the portfolio return are assumed to be lognormally dis-
tributed.6 Thus dening i;t+1  ln (1 + ri;t+1) and f  ln (rf + 1) the modied portfolio
return in t+ 1 is
p;t+1 = x;tx;t+1 + y;ty;t+1 + ff . (1.6)
Dening ui and 2i as mean and variance, the expected log excess return of the risky asset
i is dened by
Et (i;t+1   f ) = Et (i;t+1)  f  i. (1.7)
The labour income is also lognormally distributed and li;t+1  lnwi;t+1 is the log
labour income generated in sector i with expected mean l and variance 2l .
1.4.2 The Worker's Problem
To derive the investment decision of the working individual, we use an one horizon in-
vestment decision model. We consider a risk-averse individual with constant relative risk
aversion coefcient  > 1 close to Campbell and Viceira (2003).7 The individual has an
5 The short-sale constraint is justied by the impossibility to trade claims against future labour income.
Additionally, without short-sale the income effects on the capital market are isolated from possible wealth
effects.
6 A lognormal distribution results if the variable is the product of a large number of independent, identically
distributed variables, in this model i;t. Therefore, the lognormal distribution is usually used to demonstrate
asset return distribution. For further details see Aitchison and Brown (1973) or Paumer, Heine and Hartung
(2001).
7 Heaton and Lucas (2000b) use a similar life cycle model but with more than two periods. They set  at 5
and 8 for a sufcient risk averse investor. On the other hand, Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) consider  to take
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initial endowment of wealth Vt in period t including the realised labour income in this pe-
riod. In period t the individual decides which share of Vt to consume and which share i to
invest in which industry. In particular, the realisation of the portfolio return in period t+ 1
in addition to wi;t+1 is supposed to maximize the consumption of this individual with time
preference parameter  in period t+ 1:8
max
x;t;y;t
Et
"

C1 t+1
1  
#
: (1.8)
subject to the budget constraint and referring to (1.5)
Ct+1 = Vt (1 + rp;t+1) + wi;t+1: (1.9)
The worker chooses his asset allocation today to maximize his consumption tomorrow. He
chooses his optimal portfolio to yield the highest possible return with respect to his risky
labour income and the prevailing trade policy.
To obtain an analytical solution it is necessary to apply the log linear solution methods
analogue to Cambell and Viceira (2003), and to extend them properly to the underlying
model. Therefore, all involved quantities are assumed to be positive. We assume Ct+1 is
positive. In addition to the denitions already noted above, the following lowercase letters
refer to the log of the uppercase variables.
the value 3 for their benchmark life-cycle model without bequest. Furthermore, Heaton and Lucas (1997)
derive different levels of risk aversion for CRRA investors.
8 For the motivation to use this kind of utility function and its specic reaction to background risk see
Gollier (2001).
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First the log linearized portfolio return on wealth is computed from (1.5). Rearrang-
ing (1.5) and taking logs on both sides yields
p;t+1   f = ln [1 + x;t (exp (x;t+1)  1) + y;t (exp (y;t+1)  1)] . (1.10)
Further implementing a second-order Taylor expansion with two variables around the
point p;t+1   f = 0 results in 9
p;t+1 = x;t (x;t+1   f ) + 1
2
x;t (1  x;t)2x + y;t (y;t+1   f )
+
1
2
y;t (1  y;t)2y + x;ty;tcov (x;t+1; y;t+1) + f . (1.11)
The next step is to log linearise the budget constraint. Hence both sides of (1.9) are
divided by wi;t+1 and logs are taken
ct+1   li;t+1 = ln (exp (vt   li;t+1 + p;t+1) + 1) . (1.12)
Thus the log optimal consumption can be derived
ct+1  g + ! (vt + p;t+1) + (1  !) li;t+1 (1.13)
with g and ! as log linearization constants.10 !  exp(p+v li)
1+exp(p+v li) < 1 can be inter-
preted as the consumption elasticity with respect to nancial wealth whereas (1  !) can
be seen as the consumption elasticity with respect to labour income.
The log optimal future consumption is a weighted average of future nancial wealth
and future labour income, each weighted with the consumption elasticity with respect to
nancial wealth and labour income respectively. These weights are important for the further
decision process because they also affect the importance of the different risk sources. For
9 For general discussions on this topic see Campbell and Viceira (2001) and Hardy and Walker (2003).
10 g is a constant resulting from the linearization process and consitutes the consumption level.
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instance, with ! > 0; 5 variations in the labour income have only a very small effect on
consumption changes. On the other hand, changes in the nancial wealth then have a big
impact on the consumption decision. This can be a very interesting distinction for cases
where nancial wealth and labour income are negatively correlated in the nal portfolio
decision.11
To reach the optimal portfolio decision the rst order condition of the problem has to
be considered:12
Et
 
C t+1 (ri;t+1 + 1)

= Et
 
C t+1 (rf + 1)

. (1.14)
The rst order condition implies that the expected total return of the investment from
the value of C t+1 in industry x during period t has to be the same as the investment from the
value of C t+1 in industry y or the risk free asset in t. Precisely, foregone consumption in t
must be compensated through an additional gain in nancial wealth in t+ 1 independently
of the chosen investment alternative. The rst order condition is also log linearized and a
second order Taylor expansion is implemented around the conditional means of ct+1 and
ri;t+1. Substituting (1.13) for ct+1 and rearranging results in
i +
1
2
2i = 

!
 
i;t
2
i + j;ti;j

+ (1  !)i;l

: (1.15)
Equation (1.15) is the logarithmic expectation about the excess return of asset i. The right
hand side shows the different parts of it. Firstly, it depends on the risk of asset i itself and
11 This impact of ! on the consumption decision gains even more on interest if the labour decision is endo-
genized, by Jermann (2002).
12 This rst order condition is conrmed by the general consumption decision model under uncertainty by
Drèze and Modigliani (1972).
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the joined risk of asset i and asset j. This is weighted by the consumption elasticity with
respect to capital income. The second part is the effect caused by the joined risk between
asset i and the labour income. This part is weighted by the consumption elasticity with
respect to labour income. Furthermore, the risk aversion of the investor weighs both parts
additionally.
For simplicity, we analyse investment decisions in industry x. These results are ana-
logue for investment decisions in industry y. Solving (1.15) for x;t leads to the asset
allocation in industry x
x;t =
1
!
x +
1
2
2x
2x
  y;tx;y
2x
  (1  !)
!
x;l
2x
. (1.16)
In (1.16) the optimal decision x;t is a simultaneous decision with y;t. Substituting
y;t by using (1.4) this can be rewritten as
x;t =
1
!
x +
1
2
2x
2x   x;y
  fx;y
2x   x;y
  (1  !)
!
x;l
2x   x;y
. (1.17)
Equation (1.17) is the share of asset x the worker chooses to hold in his portfolio. Here
f  (1  f;t). Hence, f indicates the total proportion of risky assets in the portfolio.13
Obviously the optimal asset allocation for investments in industry x can be divided into
three components. The rst term on the right corresponds to the decision of an investor in
the standard mean-variance analysis.14 To see this connection more clearly it is important
13 In turn, 1  f states the proportion of the risk free asset in the chosen portfolio.
14 For a detailed derivation of the mean-variance method see Markowitz (1987).
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to recall an important property of a lognormal distributed variable, namely
logEt (ri;t+1 + 1) = Et log (ri;t+1 + 1) +
1
2
var log (ri;t+1 + 1) . (1.18)
The isolated portfolio decision - in this case given a specied risk-aversion - depends
mainly on the mean and variance ratio of the log excess return of asset x: In the present
case, the second risky asset and the labour risk affect x;t too.
The impact of the second risky asset - the second term on the right hand side of equa-
tion (1.17) - is not unambiguous. Under the assumption of a positive correlation between
the risky assets in the rst term, the joined risk of the two risky assets mitigates the pure
risk of asset x (positive direct impact). With negative correlations between the risky as-
sets the joined risk enforces the risk effect of asset x (negative direct impact). This joined
risk effect also impacts the labour risk hedge component of the optimal asset allocation for
asset x.
The additional risk through the implementation of a second asset y does not neces-
sarily lead to a rebalancing of the portfolio between asset x and y. Independent from the
correlation of the two risky assets, the additional risk may also decrease the shares in x and
y and raise the share invested in the risk free asset. Gollier and Schlee (2006) show that
in a two-risky-asset case the increase of the expected dividend of one asset does not nec-
essarily always cause an increase in the demand for this asset. Therefore, the correlation
between the two risky assets is irrelevant.
The third part in equation (1.17) constitutes the impact of the labour income and risk
in the asset choice. Analogue to the joined asset risk, the correlation between the asset x
and the labour income determines this effect. If the worker works in industry x the third
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component of equation (1.17) reduces the asset demand. A negative correlation between
industry x and the worker's income increases the demand of asset x.
1.5 Risk Diversication under Protectionist Trade Policy
In this section we introduce an exogenous tariff in industry x. Further, we derive the portfo-
lio decision of the worker and analyse a possible hedge of the labour income risk. Following
Feeney and Hillman (2004), an unrestrained access to asset markets lowers the individual
demand for a protectionist trade policy. If individuals have unrestricted access to complete
asset markets then their demand for other security provisions as protectionist trade policy
diminishes. Furthermore, they show that even in a state of an imperfect asset market, and
therefore partly restricted risk diversication, the demand for a protectionist trade policy is
reduced. In this situation, lobbying for a tariff only occurs if the import competing sector
is sufciently large. Conversely, the introduction of a protectionist trade policy is supposed
to lead to less use of asset markets.
With negatively correlated prot of the industry sectors, Cassing (1996) nds that
the introduction of a tariff in one sector induces a concentration of the investments in the
protected sector. In contrast to the present analysis, he considers an investor who only owns
capital income.
To analyse these results we introduce an exogenous trade policy in the model above.
In period t+1 a positive tariff on import goods is imposed in industry x, x;t+1. Hence the
relative price in the home country for goods produced in industry x changes from px;t+1 to
px;t+1(1+x;t+1) and for goods produced in industry y from py;t+1 to py;t+1(1+x;t+1) respectively.
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The means of the log excess return of the risky assets depend on the prices of the respective
goods. Consequently, the variances and covariances are also affected by trade policy. Thus,
the portfolio shares depend indirectly on trade policy.
To analyse the tariff impact on the asset allocation of the worker in detail we derive
the total differential of the asset demand. It shows that the impact of trade policy on the
asset demand for asset x is not unambiguous15
@x;t
@x;t+1
=
@x;t
@x
(+)
@x
@x;t+1
(+)
+
@x;t
@2x
( )
@2x
@x;t+1
(+)
+
@x;t
@x;y
( )
@x;y
@x;t+1
( )
+
@x;t
@x;l
( )
@x;l
@x;t+1
. (1.19)
In (1.19) the tariff impact on the mean and the variance as well as the demand reaction
of these two variables can be signed unambiguously. The effects on the asset covariance
and the asset labour covariance can go either way. Thus, the sign of the reaction cannot
be determined. Obviously, the rst two components of x;t both depend positively on the
tariff. In the case of the mean this direction of the dependency might be expected but for
the variance of the return of asset x this is somewhat surprising and will be discussed later
on.
The positive impact of the tariff in industry x on the mean of asset x
@x
@x;t+1
= qx
rx;t+1
rx;t+1 + 1
> 0 (1.20)
results in a higher capital payment out of a higher prot. This is intuitive as the protected
industry faces higher output prices on the market for consumption goods. Precisely, the
tariff impact on x depends on the weighted ratio between the capital income without a
tariff and the capital wealth in case of a tariff. This in turn leads to a higher return for the
15 Analogue for asset y.
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capital for every x;t+1. However, the marginal impact of a rising tariff on x decreases.
Referring to (1.17) x;t increases unambiguously in the mean. Hence, the cumulative effect
of the trade policy and the expected mean of asset x on the asset demand for asset x is
positive.
The tariff impact on the variance of asset x is
@2x
@x;t+1
= 2qx (1  qx) rx;t+1
rx;t+1 + 1
x;t+1 > 0. (1.21)
Since qx is always lower than one inequation (1.21) is always fullled. The tariff
impact is similar to the impact on x. It is weighted with the log dividend paid in industry
x in the state of tariff and (1  qx). So the variance for asset x rises with the tariff in sector
x. Again the marginal impact of x;t+1 on 2x decreases. To understand this relation it is
important to keep in mind that the economy is open and small. The only variations in the
home country result from the productivity shocks x;t+1 and the introduction of a tariff in
industry x which reinforces the existing productivity shock.
Actually, the impact of the asset risk 2x on the share of asset x in the portfolio x;t
is not always unambiguous. The size of the covariance and the risk aversion determine the
sign of the reaction of x;t on 2x.16 As we assume a highly risk averse investor, the cases
with an increasing asset demand in 2x are ruled out.17 Thus, in the following analysis a
decreasing x;t in 2x is assumed.18
16 All possible constellations are summarized in table 1.1 in Appendix 1.7.
17 This assumption is justied mathematically. A high  rules out a positive reaction of the asset demand as
a result of an increasing variance.
18 Here the empirical evidence is rather interesting. Regardless of the correlation between the asset returns
Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) nd empirical evidence for investors' behaviour in the opposite directions.
These investors reduce their total portfolio risk by adding more risky assets to their portfolio. In particular,
Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) use different measures of diversication. One of these measures, the nor-
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For a complete solution of (1.19) the impact of the trade policy on the covariance
@x;y
@x;t+1
= 2x

ry;t+1
ry;t+1 + 1
y;t+1
  
q2y   qy
  2y  rx;t+1rx;t+1 + 1x;t+1
  
q2x   qx

? 0
(1.22)
is needed. It consists of the difference between the weighted log excess returns of both as-
sets. The weights are the respective shock probability and the variance of the respective
opposite asset. In particular, this effect depends on the relation of the variances of the as-
sets, on probability of the productivity shock in each industry, the relative prices of the two
goods and nally on the factor intensity in the respective industry. However, with the un-
derlying assumption most of these inuences are determined. Good x is assumed to be the
labour intensive good. Hence, the factor intensity ratio is biased towards asset x. Never-
theless, the relation of the productivity shocks can turn the tariff impact on the covariance.
The underlying assumption of the Heckscher-Ohlin Model is that the industry with a pro-
ductivity advantage will be the exporting industry. Consequently, the productivity-shock
relation can be determined more denite. As industry y is the exporting industry, we only
analyse the states with a higher productivity shock for industry y than for industry x. Thus,
the probability qy for a positive productivity shock for industry y is supposed to be higher
than the probability qx of a positive productivity shock in industry x. Furthermore, the vul-
nerability of the industries to economic shocks is a crucial impact factor too.19 Industry y
malised version of the portfolio variance, shows two possibilities to reduce the risk of an individual portfolio.
The rst possibility of risk reduction is to increase the number of assets in the portfolio; the second is to
choose assets according to their negative correlations.
19 The shock vulnerability is high if the probability for one specic shock is low. Hence, there are many
possible shocks to occur and the realization of one specic shock is rather uncertain. Additionally, both asset
variances increase in the shock probability as long as the shock probability is lower than 0:5. As soon as the
shock probability is higher than 0:5 the asset variances decrease in the shock probability. However, for any
given shock probability the asset variances do not vary.
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is taken as benchmark. The shock exposure for industry y is low and does not change for
this analysis. Variations of the shock exposure in industry x are measured against indus-
try y. The ratio between these vulnerabilities determines the direction of the tariff impact
on the asset covariance. Diverging shock vulnerability, especially a low one for industry y
and a high vulnerability in industry x enhance a negative tariff impact on the covariance.
In this case, the decreasing risk caused by tariff impact in industry y is weighted higher
than the additional risk increase in industry x. This effect diminishes and switches com-
pletely for converging shock vulnerability in both industries. All these considerations are
valid with a positive correlation of the industries. A negative correlation between the two
industries turns the effects in the opposite direction. The size of 2x and the total risk share
in the portfolio f inuence the demand reaction on the asset covariance.20
Lastly the covariance of asset x and the labour income is analysed
@x;l
@x;t+1
= 2l
rx;t+1
rx;t+1 + 1
x;t+1 + 
2
x
1
1 + x;t+1
lx;t+1 ? 0. (1.23)
As long as the labour income is generated in the protected industry the tariff impact on x;l
is always positive. This might be surprising, but when referring to the tariff impact on the
risk of asset x and the labour income respectively the positive impact on x;l is conrmed.
Both separated risks increase in the tariff. Hence, if they are positively correlated it is obvi-
ous that the covariance is also positively affected by the tariff.21 Moreover, the tariff impact
on x;l is affected by the same factors as the asset covariance: correlation between the as-
sets, productivity shocks, relative prices and factor intensity. The asset demand reaction
20 See table 1.2 in Appendix 1.7 for possible outcomes of @x;t@x;y .
21 Krebs et al. (2005) instead nd empirical evidence that in an economic boom the labour risk decreases
with a reduced tariff rate. But the overall evidence for this risk behaviour is rather weak.
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on x;l depends further on the correlation between the asset return and the labour income.
Thus, a positive correlation between these variables reduces the respective asset demand
and a negative correlation enforces it.
Above all, the appearance of an idiosyncratic labour income risk reinforces the demand-
dampening effect of the variance if a risk-averse investor is assumed. Based on the chosen
utility function this coincides with the statement from Gollier (2001) that an independent
background risk raises the aversion against the other risk source if the absolute risk aversion
is decreasing and convex. Empirical evidence for these ndings, especially with uncertain
labour income as the additional risk source, is found by Heaton and Lucas (2000a) and
(2000b).
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1.5.1 Poor Worker
In this, section two different scenarios with two respective variations are analysed. Because
the two risky assets - and therefore the two industries - are positively correlated, the analysis
of labour income generated in the non-protected industry y is neglected. As our main
interest is the working individual, we assume the portfolio risk to be low. A worker who
depends strongly on his working income is not willing to bear a huge amount of risk.22
Hence, the total risk share in the portfolio is f < 1
2
.
Positively Correlated Sectors
Scenario Ia: worker in protected industry, similar shock variation for
both industries
We assume a positive correlation between the two industry sectors.23 Furthermore, a low
total risk share in the portfolio f < 1
2
is given. As a result of the assumptions for this
scenario, three more derivations can be signed and (1.19) changes to
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At rst glance it might be surprising that the asset demand reacts positively to the as-
set covariance, but on a closer look it shows that this reaction results from a common
22 See for example Bodie et al. (1992) for the willingness of risk bearing in dependence on the possibility
of labour supply variation.
23 In particular, the positive correlation of the asset returns in the two different industries can result from
country shocks and a stronger sensitiveness of both assets to these shocks than to industry specic shocks.
Thus, the returns in both industries are synchronized to a certain level. The signicance of different shocks
(industry, country, global) and their impact on the return for different industries are analysed for example in
Brooks and Del Negro (2004) and (2005). For concrete examples see Costello (1993). She nds positive
production and shock correlation between manufacturing industries for different countries.
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portfolio-allocation motive. The worker has similar preferences concerning nancial and
labour income. Hence, with a sufciently high industry risk he reduces his portfolio risk
by increasing the number of assets in his portfolio.24 In particular, a worker with a low risk
share f < 1
2
in his portfolio wants to substitute increasing risk in industry x by shares off a
more stable industry.25,26
The asset covariance is negatively affected by the tariff in industry x. This effect is
caused by a relatively predictable development of industry y and a high shock vulnerability
in industry x. With the given shock probability the demand for asset x decreases in the asset
covariance. The tariff affects the asset-labour covariance positively. As the worker works in
industry x, his labour risk is closely connected to the industry risk. Thus, if the risk for the
whole industry increases then his labour risk goes up too. All in all, there are three demand
decreasing effects and one demand increasing effect. The increased expected excess return
of asset x enforces the asset demand. However, with a high shock exposure the dampening
impact of the asset risk 2x obviously compensates this positive effect. Consequently, the
demand for asset x decreases in the tariff.
In the next step, the share y is analysed. A direct hedge of the labour risk is not pos-
sible as a positive correlated labour income risk is assumed. As a consequence, analogue
to industry x, the asset-labour covariance increases in the tariff. So a hedge can only take
place if the asset covariance effect impacts the demand for asset y positively. Thus y;t
24 For empirical evidence of this investment behaviour see for example Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) or
Massa and Simonov (2006) for the familiarity motive. Additionally, Juillard (2004) shows this investor
behaviour in a dynamic model of international portfolio diversication.
25 See table 1.3, column three in Appendix 1.7.
26 An additional preference bias towards labour income supports this result.
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should also rise in the asset covariance.
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Again, three demand decreasing and one demand increasing effects arise in industry
y. Firstly, we analyse the intra-industry effects. In contrast to the demand for asset x, the
decreased mean now compensates the decreasing risk in industry y. Given that industry y
is already relatively stable, a further decrease in risk drives the asset demand much weaker
than an increasing expected excess return. Both inter-industry effects decrease the demand
for asset y. The worker neglects the labour risk hedge motive because both assets are
positively correlated with the labour income. Based on the given shock vulnerability of
both industries, the tariff reduces the common volatility of both industries. These two
inter-industry risk sources compensate the remaining demand increasing effect caused by
the reduced volatility in industry y. As a consequence, the demand for asset y decreases in
the tariff.
The worker in industry x faces a stronger risk than without a tariff. He reduces his
share of asset x in his portfolio. In industry y the risk is damped. Usually, one might
expect an increase in his share of asset y. Yet, the industries are positively correlated.
Thus, a hedge of the industry x risk is not possible by rebalancing the portfolio towards
asset y. Therefore, in the scenario with low total risk, positive asset correlation, labour
income generated in the protected industry and a high shock exposure in industry x, we
nd a decreased exploitation of the asset market. Moreover, there is no possible hedge of
the labour risk even though there is no investment concentration.
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Scenario Ib: worker in protected industry, diverging shock variation for
both industries
A change in the shock vulnerability of industry x alters the tariff impact on the asset co-
variance. A decreasing shock vulnerability reduces the volatility of industry x. Thus, with
an unchanged exposure in industry y the tariff impact on the asset-covariance shifts from
negative to positive. Precisely, the introduction of a tariff in industry x increases the asset-
covariance. The asset-labour covariance compensates the asset covariance impact. With the
still higher shock exposure in industry x the intra-industry variations are stronger drivers
for the asset demand than the inter-industry variations. Hence, the demand for asset x is
more sensitive to the risk increase and the variations in the labour income than to the re-
duction of the risk in industry y and the increasing mean in industry x. The remaining
effects caused by the tariff introduction stay unchanged. Overall, this scenario leads to
weaker results. Even though there is a tendency towards an increase in the asset demand, a
denite reaction of the demand for asset x is not possible to determine.
Let us turn to the tariff impact on the demand for asset y. Similar to the demand for
asset x, the reaction of the asset covariance changes and all other effects stay unchanged.
Unlike in industry x, both covariances now represent inter-industry effects. Nevertheless,
the tariff impact on the asset covariance compensates the impact on the asset-labour covari-
ance. Obviously, the demand for asset y cannot be determined in case of a positive tariff
impact on the asset covariance.
Repeating the analysis with a stronger decrease in shock vulnerability for industry x
leads to more denite results, at least for industry x. With relatively insensitive industry
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x the demand for asset x increases in the tariff. The tariff of the expected excess return
compensates the impact on the industry risk. The other effects do not change for any
industry.
The total asset demand cannot be determined unambiguously. There is a slight ten-
dency towards a portfolio bias in favour of asset x. This can be justied by the reduction of
the portfolio risk by increasing the number of assets. Though the concentration statement
of Cassing (1996) is conrmed only warily, at least it can not be rejected. In addition, the
results do not support decreased asset market exploitation as might be assumed by follow-
ing Feeney and Hillmann (2004). Finally, there is no possible labour risk hedge found in
this scenario either.
Here, the additional risky labour income changes the results slightly. Without the
labour risk the demand for asset y also increases in the tariff. So there is no investment
concentration to be found. Furthermore, the labour risk diminishes the exploitation of the
asset market slightly.
To conclude, we can say that independent from the total risky share f in the port-
folio a hedge of the labour income is hardly possible as the two industries are positively
correlated. Though an investment concentration cannot be conrmed yet, the asset mar-
ket exploitation shows a slight tendency towards a reduction, as a tariff is implemented in
industry x.
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Negatively Correlated Sectors
In the case of negatively correlated sectors, a change in the labour income correlation is
very interesting. The following two scenarios with two respective variations are discussed.
Scenario IIa: worker in protected industry x, similar shock variation for
both industries
Here a demand decreasing effect arises for asset x. This is very intuitive as it does not
matter whether the exposure to the intra-industry effects is higher than for inter-industry
effects. The tariff introduction boosts the joined variation of both industries.
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Consequently, the tariff impact on the asset covariance as well as on the labour asset co-
variance dampens the demand for asset x. Furthermore, the tariff impact on the industry
risk exceeds the increased expected excess return for industry x. The overall effect of a
tariff introduction in industry x decreases the demand for the share of industry x.
In the case of a positive tariff impact on the asset covariance, the demand for asset y
decreases.
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The impact on the labour asset covariance in industry y does not change. Similar to industry
x, both covariances decrease the demand for asset y. As the overall conditions remain
unchanged, y;t decreases in the total inter-industry effect. However, the total intra-industry
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effect is the same as above. The tariff introduction in industry x reduces the demand for
asset y.
In the scenario with a high volatility industry x, the total asset demand is diminished
by the tariff implementation in industryx. The worker reduces the share of asset x in his
portfolio as a consequence of the strengthened risk in this industry. With the stronger co-
variance (less negative), the hedging possibility diminishes. Thus, the worker also reduces
his share of asset y. Therefore, we conrm a denite loss on hedging possibilities for the
labour risk, accompanied by a reduction in the asset market exploitation. It is clear that
there is no investment concentration as both asset demands decrease in the tariff. In this
last case, the additional labour risk does not change but strengthens the results.
All in all, for scenario IIa with a low total risky portfolio share we nd a loss of di-
versication possibilities caused by the tariff introduction. As a consequence of the higher
risk in both industries, the labour risk hedge possibilities are reduced and the total asset
demand decreases by the tariff introduction in industry x.
Scenario IIb: worker in protected industry, diverging shock variation for
both industries
Now the hedging motive becomes more important. Hence, with a rather high shock expo-
sure of industry x, two demand increasing and two demand decreasing tariff effects face
each other. At rst, the three intra-industry effects are analysed. Two of them are demand
decreasing and only the effect of the increased expected excess return pushes the demand
of asset x up. This effect is slightly weaker than the increased industry risk. As long as the
volatility of the industry x is high, the increased industry risk caused by the tariff introduc-
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tion outweighs the increased expected excess return. Accordingly, the total intra-industry
effect decreases the demand of asset x.
The demand reaction on the asset covariance changes is high as long as the total risky
portfolio share still exceeds 1
2
1
!
. However, with the low total risk share this weight is very
small. Nevertheless, the demand for asset x reacts more sensitively to changes in the labour
asset covariance than to variations in the asset covariance. The labour risk becomes more
important as the correlations of labour risk with asset x and industry y with asset x are
contrary. Additionally, as we assume a working individual, we implicitly assume a slightly
higher consumption elasticity referring to labour income rather than to nancial income.
Consequently, in the present scenario the worker weighs labour effects more than the inter-
industry effects.27 The labour asset covariance increase in the tariff is stronger than the
asset covariance decrease. Hence, the total effect from the two covariances on the asset
demand is negative. Thus, a tariff introduction in industry x reduces the demand for x;t.
Assuming a decreasing volatility for industry x dilutes the tariff impact on x.
Under the assumption of a high shock exposure in industry x and a relatively invul-
nerable industry y, the labour asset covariance as well as the asset covariance are negatively
affected by the tariff. In contrast to industry x, the tariff effect on the labour asset covari-
ance is weaker than on the asset covariance. The direct link between the two industries
inuences the demand decision more strongly than the additional labour risk.28 So the
27 See Juillard (2004) for a similar argumentation. He nds that a high liquid wealth-labour income ratio
inuences the portfolio allocation towards a nancial hedge, and with a low ratio, a labour risk hedge gains
on weight.
28 Shock invulnerability is interpreted as a relatively low shock probability in combination with a small
variance of the respective industry return.
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tariff boosts the inter-industry variations. Therefore, these inter-industry effects cause a
raising demand for asset y.
Analogue to the scenario with positive correlated industries, the effect of y compen-
sates the effect of 2y. As the total risk share falls below one half, the strength of the variance
effect diminishes and the decreasing mean effect rises again. Hence, the intra-industry ef-
fect is negative. Consequently, the overall reaction of y;t in x;t+1 is ambiguous.
To sum up, in a scenario with a low total risky portfolio share, negative asset correla-
tion, risky labour income generated in industry x and a high volatility industry x, we nd
a very slight tendency towards a decreasing total asset demand. Therefore, the conclusions
of reduced asset market use, no possible labour hedge and no investment concentration are
rather weak. In comparison to a situation without risky labour income, the tariff impacts
on the total asset demand and therefore the consequences are reverted.
Scenario IIIa: worker in unprotected industry y, similar shock variation
for both industries
In the following, the reaction of the asset demand to a tariff introduction for a worker who
works in the unprotected industry is analysed. This scenario shows the tariff impact with
similar shock vulnerability for both industries. First, we analyse the impact on x;t:
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Hence, both covariances in this industry increase in the tariff. Again the asset covariance
dominates the labour asset covariance, and therefore the total inter-industry effect of the
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tariff is negative. In contrast, the intra-industry effect remains unchanged. So the demand
for asset x in dependence of the tariff in industry x goes down.
In industry y the asset covariance increases in the tariff and the labour asset covari-
ance shows the same effect as before.
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Again, the labour asset covariance dominates the effect of the asset covariance. Thus, we
nd a demand increasing effect. Similar to industry x, the low total portfolio risk distorts
the demand dependency towards the mean variations. Hence, there is a negative intra-
industry impact on the demand for asset y. Again, a denite overall tariff impact on the
demand of asset y cannot be determined. Only a small increase might be possible. Now the
hedging possibility is diminished and we nd no denite reaction in the asset allocation of
the worker.
Referring to the tariff impact in industry x and industry y with a low portfolio risk
and a stronger risk increase in industry x than risk decrease in y, no unambiguous direction
of the total asset demand is determined. An income hedge is not clearly possible. Above
all, we can neither conrm nor reject any statement about asset market exploitation and
investment concentration.
Summarising for the scenario with low portfolio risk, negative asset correlation and
labour income generated in the unprotected industry, we nd that a sufciently strong risk
increase in industry x can diminish the asset market exploitation and therefore reduces the
diversication possibilities. This in turn leads to reduced hedge of the labour risk.
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Scenario IIIb: worker in unprotected industry y, diverging shock
variation for both industries
This variation of scenario IIIa assumes diverging shock vulnerability for the two industries.
As the tariff impacts on the respective components of the asset demand remain unchanged,
we start analysing the compensation effects between the components.
The analysis emphasizes the tariff impact on the two covariances. The remaining
effects stay unchanged. Under the assumption that only small shocks hit industry x, both
covariances are negatively affected. The tariff impacts balance each other. However, as the
labour risk and asset y are both negatively correlated with asset x, the compensation effect
changes in comparison to the previous scenario. Thus, the asset covariance dominates
the labour asset covariances by inuencing the demand of asset x. Hence, the total inter-
industry effect increases the demand for asset x. As a second step, we analyse the intra-
industry effects. The low total risk share in the portfolio inuences the compensation effect
signicantly. Therefore, the demand reacts more strongly to changes in the industry risk
than to changes in the expected excess return. The intra-industry effect on the asset demand
is negative. Thus, a denite determination of the reaction of x to a tariff introduction in
industry x is not possible. Nevertheless, with a converging volatility of industry x tending
towards less shock exposure enforces these results. The expected excess returns gains on
weight. In this case, a tariff introduction implies an increasing demand.
Similar to the asset demand in industry x, the signs for the labour income risk cor-
relation change in industry y. The tariff impact on the asset covariance as well as on the
labour asset covariance is negative. Even though the tariff impact on the expected excess
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return is negative, the demand of asset y increases in x;t+1. Especially with a relatively
stable industry x, asset x works as a hedging instrument now. The negative tariff impact
on the covariance even enforces this effect. Hence, the worker increases his share of as-
set x because of the increased return and as a result of the hedging improvement. Then
the worker increases his amount of asset y. The risk reduction in all three risk components
compensates the decreased return of this asset y. Therefore, he can reduce his portfolio
risk by increasing the number of asset y. Thus, the total effect of the tariff increases the
overall asset demand slightly. In a scenario with low total risk, negative asset correlation,
labour income generated in the non-protected industry and a negative tariff impact on the
asset covariance, a hedge of the labour income is denitely possible. We nd an increas-
ing total asset demand which is accompanied by a marginal investment concentration in the
unprotected industry.
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1.5.2 Wealthy worker
In the previous scenarios, the underlying assumption was a worker who depends strongly
on his labour income. Additionally, he was unwilling to bear a huge amount of risk in his
portfolio. Now these assumptions are loosened. For the following scenarios, the worker is
considered to be wealthy and willing to handle a high risk share in his portfolio.
Positively Correlated Sectors
Scenario IVa: wealthy worker in protected industry x, similar shock
variation for both industries
In this scenario the total risky share is high f > 1
2
and x;t decreases in x;y. This leads to
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It is obvious from (1.17) that the derivation of the asset demand for asset x with respect to
the covariance between asset x as well as to the labour income is negative as long as the
correlation between the two industries is positive. Thus, an increase in the labour income
risk reduces the demand for asset x. Furthermore, with a positive correlation between
the labour income and asset x the labour asset covariance is positively affected by the
tariff: @x;l
@x;t+1
> 0.
Therefore, the total direct effect of the risky labour income on the demand for asset
x is negative. This can be explained through the additional risk source argumentation
by Bodie et al. (1992) and Gollier and Schlee (2004). This argumentation will even be
enforced by the positive correlation between the labour income and the return of asset x.
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With the total risk above one half
f >
1
2
1
!
(1.31)
is satised. Hence, the demand for asset x reacts more sensitively to changes between
the industries (x;y) than to intra-industry changes (x) and the decreasing x;y stimulates
the demand for asset x more than the increasing risk of asset x decreases it. However,
the demand decrease caused by the enforced labour income variations exceeds the demand
raising effect through the decreased common industry risk. Additionally, the increased
expected excess return is compensated by the reduced isolated industry risk.29 Overall,
the tariff introduction in industry x implies a rather decreasing demand for asset x. If
one allows for a decreasing volatility of industry x with respect to economic shocks, the
demand for asset x reacts positively to a tariff introduction. In this case, the increased
expected return gains on weight and exceeds the diminished industry risk.
As long as the two risky assets are positively correlated there is also a positive corre-
lation between the risk of asset y and the labour income risk. Hence, a direct hedge is not
possible. However, a risk reduction in terms of Goetzmann and Kumar (2002) is possible
by increasing the number of the shares contained in the portfolio. So the demand for asset
y does not necessarily decrease in the tariff
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29 Assuming a strong consumption elasticity referring to wealth would strengthen the observed result. As
this section studies a relatively wealthy worker, the assumption of high consumption correlation with respect
to wealth is justied. This worker is willing to bear a high risk share in his portfolio. Thus he does not
depend as much on his working income compared to the worker in the previous section with a low portfolio
risk share.
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The lower direct risk of this asset and the decreasing effect on the asset covariance
can enforce a higher asset demand. In contrast to asset x; the expected mean of the log
excess return of asset y decreases in the tariff. So, in comparison to the asset shifting
in the state without x;t+1, the risk reduction has to compensate not only the labour risk
but also a lower expected asset return. Analogue to the impact on the asset covariance, the
decreased risk in industry y also induces a reduction in the asset labour covariance referring
to industry y. Thus, all three risk effects pull in the same direction and they compensate for
the reduced expected excess return of asset y. So, in spite of the positive correlated labour
risk and the tariff introduction, the demand for asset y increases with a tariff introduction
in industry x.
Consequently, in a scenario with high total risk, positive asset correlation, risky
labour income generated in industry x and a stronger risk decrease in industry y than risk
increase in industry x, the introduction of a tariff in industry x does not cause a rebalancing
of the portfolio towards asset x. In particular, there is no investment concentration in the
protected industry as Cassing (1996) states. Furthermore, there is a possible hedge of the
labour income in terms of Goetzmann and Kumar (2002). However, we nd no conrma-
tion of decreased asset market exploitation as a result of the tariff-introduction as Feeney
and Hillman (2004) would suggest. By assuming an exogenous state of the asset market,
they neglect the inuence between the two industries on the individual investment behav-
iour. The authors consider only the state of the asset market and the corresponding tariff.
We take mutual relationship between the two industries into account and allow the worker
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to adjust his portfolio according to the present tariff and the caused variation in the two
industries.
Scenario IVb: worker in protected industry x, diverging shock variation
for both industries
For the sake of completeness, a positive tariff impact on the asset covariance is considered.
In this case, the demand for both risky assets decreases in the tariff. Again, the risky labour
income has no signicant inuence on the results.
Negatively Correlated Sectors
Scenario Va: worker in industry x, similar shock variation for both
industries
Now the scenarios are analysed with negatively correlated industries. The impact of the
tariff on the asset risk and the expected excess return remains unchanged.
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The tariff impact on xy turns positive with the higher volatility of industry x. Even though
the inter-industry variations gain on importance, still the exposure to increasing risk in the
own industry x exceeds this demand enhancing tariff impact. Even though the effect is
weak, the demand for asset x decreases in the tariff.
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The tariff impact on the asset covariance and on the labour asset covariance deter-
mines the effect on the demand of asset y:
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Moreover, as y;l now increases in x;t+1 the demand for asset y decreases in the tariff too.
The two demand increasing effects are not compensated by the decreasing effect resulting
from the reduced risk in industry y. Hence, the tariff introduction in industry x boosts y;t.
With the stronger risk in industry x, the worker reduces the shares of industry x in
his portfolio. He reduces asset x as the risk effect compensates the increased return. The
hedging property of asset y still works but is reduced with the weaker impact of the asset
covariance on the asset demand.
Again, a denite statement about a change in the total asset demand is not possible.
Referring to the symmetry between the two risky assets in the model does not reject the
assumption of a stable total asset demand. Yet, the concentration result of Cassing (1996)
cannot be conrmed. In Cassing (1996) the tariff introduction benets one rm and hurts
the other. Countereffects between these rms are neglected. The present paper considers
these possible countereffects not between rms but industries. Thus, we enable the investor
not only to adjust to the tariff itself but also to variations in the other industry. Hence, in
contrast to Cassing (1996), there is a rebalancing of the portfolio towards the unprotected
industry. The wealthy worker exploits strongly the diversication possibilities on the asset
market.
Scenario Vb: worker in unprotected industry x, diverging shock
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variation for both industries
In this variation of the previous scenario, the changed tariff impact on the asset covariance
implies one asset demand enhancing effect facing three asset demand decreasing effects.
The asset demand reacts more sensitively to the additional risk than to the increased ex-
pected excess return in industry x. Consequently, x decreases with the tariff introduction
in industry x.
Allowing for a high consumption elasticity for wealth and a relatively low one for
labour income yields
1

> (1  !) . (1.35)
The assumption of a high risk share implies a relatively wealthy worker with low depen-
dence on his labour income. This justies the elasticity relaxation. Based on these con-
siderations, the expected excess return in industry x would gain on weight and dilute the
negative tariff impact on the asset demand. However, this effect is still not strong enough
to completely compensate the three decreasing risk effects.
In contrast to the demand for asset x, the demand of asset y increases in y;l. Pre-
cisely, when the risk of asset y and the labour income are negatively correlated, asset y
represents a hedge possibility for the labour risk. Moreover, there is the possibility for a
change of the tariff impact on the asset labour covariance because the two sources of risk
are differently affected by the tariff. Firstly, the tariff impact on the asset covariance is con-
sidered to be negative. It is peculiar that the direct effect of the asset covariance on the asset
demand be positive but could easily turn negative. A relatively high consumption elasticity
with respect to nancial income causes this switch. However, we proceed with the initial
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assumption of a moderate consumption elasticity towards labour as well as nancial in-
come. Thus, the direct demand reaction towards changes in the asset covariance is positive.
As the industry x shows a higher vulnerability to shocks than industry y, the overall effect
on the labour asset covariance is negative too. Hence, the total effect on the asset demand
is negative.
Comparing the intra-industry effects with each other shows that the total intra-sectoral
effect on the demand of asset y is determined by the expected excess return and is therefore
negative.
The determination of the inter-industry effect has to follow from the demand reaction
on the components. Here the asset covariance over-compensates the labour asset covari-
ance. Consequently, the total inter-industry effect increases the demand for asset y.
Finally, the total effect of the tariff on the demand of asset y is positive. The worker
does rebalance his portfolio completely towards asset y. He reduces his portfolio share of
industry x and he increases his share of asset y, as it works as a hedging instrument of the
strengthened risk in industry x:
In particular, the portfolio will be biased towards asset y. Also, we nd an investment
concentration in the unprotected industry which is in contrast to the ndings of Cassing
(1996); consequently a labour risk hedge is given. The worker increases his share of asset
y in his portfolio and therefore compensates for the higher risk in industry x. Eventually,
the results do not conrm a reduced use of the asset market.
Scenario VIa: worker in industry y, similar shock variation for both
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industries
Lastly, we analyse the constellation where labour income is generated in the unprotected
industry of the home country. Hence, the labour income and the return of asset x are
negatively correlated, whereas the correlation between the labour income and the return of
asset y is positive. Furthermore, the asset correlation is still negative. Both covariances are
positively affected by the tariff. The tariff impact on the demand for asset x is
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So the overall effect of the tariff obviously decreases the demand of asset x.
For completeness, the effects on the demand of asset y are analysed. The demand
reaction on the labour asset covariance changes and now has a negative sign. The total
tariff impact on the demand of asset y is
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The tariff effect on the asset covariance increases in the tariff while the labour asset co-
variance does not change in reaction to the tariff. With the negative asset correlation and
the positive labour risk correlation, the labour asset covariance determines the effect on the
demand of asset y of the two covariances. Hence, the positive intra-industry effect com-
pensates the negative inter-industry effect. On the other hand, the demand of asset y reacts
more sensitively by changes in the expected excess return than to the risk increase. All
effects together lead to an undetermined reaction of the asset y demand.
In this case, the worker decreases his share of asset x: A denite statement of his
shares of asset y is not possible. Clearly, there is no labour risk hedge anymore.
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However, in scenario VIa, with a high total risk share, negative asset correlation and
labour income generated in the non-protected industry we nd an investment concentration
in the neither industry. Furthermore, there is no labour hedge and no denite reduction or
increased asset market exploitation.
Scenario VIb: worker in industry y, diverging shock variation for both
industries
Now the demand for asset x depends negatively on the asset covariance and also negatively
on the asset covariance. The latter impact changes in contrast to the previous scenarios
because of the different labour correlations. Therefore, the two risks can be higher than in
the case with positive labour correlation and still the demand dependency does not change.
Nevertheless, there is a change in the demand dependency on the labour asset covariance.
The demand for asset x increases in the labour asset covariance because asset x now serves
as a hedging instrument for labour income.
Both covariances decrease in consequence of the tariff introduction in industry x.
The increased industry risk exceeds the increased excess return. Hence, two counteracting
effects face each other. The total tariff impact on x;t in the state with high total risk,
negative asset correlation and negative labour correlation is not determined.
Further to the previous section, the stronger risk decrease in industry y is analysed
and therefore both covariances are negatively affected. Obviously, the tariff in industry x
increases the demand of asset y.
The worker does not denitely rebalance his portfolio towards asset y. The industry
risk and the labour risk dilute the nancial hedging motive and the reallocation of asset x is
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not unambiguous. But the worker increases his share of asset y. As a result of the reduced
risk, he can reduce his portfolio risk by increasing the number of assets included. Therefore,
the total asset demand might increase in the tariff if the demand for asset x remains stable.
A denite statement is not possible as the direction of the demand for asset x cannot be
fully determined. So, for scenario VIb with high portfolio risk, negative asset correlation,
labour income generated in the non-protected industry and a negative tariff impact on the
asset covariance, we state a slight investment concentration in the non-protected industry -
against the expectations in the literature. But we nd no denite decreasing asset market
activities. Hence, there might be a possible labour risk hedge. In comparison to the scenario
with the labour income generated in the protected industry, we nd a weakening of the
positive tariff impact on x;t through the changed labour risk correlation. In contrast, the
positive tariff impact on y;t is strengthened by the changed labour risk correlation.
1.6 Conclusion
The aim of the present chapter is to show the effects of different trade regimes on the
investment behaviour of a representative working individual and a possible hedge of labour
income risk. Does trade liberalisation increase and trade protection decrease workers' asset
market activities?
From the present analysis four main components for possible asset market exploita-
tion and therefore a possible labour income hedge can be found. Firstly, the already existing
total risk share in the portfolio has a signicant inuence on the total asset demand. Sec-
ondly, the tariff impact on the asset covariance is decisive for the asset allocation. Further-
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more, the correlation between the two risky asset returns affects the labour income hedge
under protectionist trade policy. Lastly, it is important whether the risky labour income is
generated in the protected industry or in the unprotected industry. All these different factors
stand for a different kind of risks and these various risk sources inuence the investment
decision of the individual in different ways.
The rst three risk sources have unambiguous total effects on the investment and as-
set allocation decision of the worker. They differ in every isolated case. The most important
factor in the asset allocation decision is whether the worker works in the protected or un-
protected industry. The income source - industry x or y - determines the impact of the trade
policy on the individual investment.Especially for the worker with a low total risk share the
location of the income source effects the asset allocation decision signicantly. Trade pol-
icy diminishes the total asset demand for a worker in the protected industry. For workers in
the non-protected industry, protectionist trade policy leads to an increasing asset demand.
In particular, high shock vulnerability in the protected industry boosts the asset demand.
Consequently, trade liberalization increases asset market activity especially in those coun-
tries with a representative investor working in the protected industry, and tends to decrease
asset market activity in countries with the representative worker in the non-protected in-
dustries. These conclusions are only valid for investors with a low total risk share in their
portfolio.
For the investor group with a high total risk share in the portfolio, there is no un-
ambiguous statement about the working location effect possible. One explanation is that
investors with a high total risk share are usually relatively wealthy. With increasing wealth,
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more precisely with a high liquid wealth - labour income ratio, the labour hedge motive
becomes less important and the nancial hedge motive gains weight. Hence, the source
of the working income, industry x or y, has no crucial impact on their investment and as-
set allocation decision. The results are strengthened with a respective adjustment of the
consumption elasticity towards nancial income.
In particular, the consequences of trade policy on the individual investment decision
and thus considerations on the impact of overall employment cannot be determined in gen-
eral. The different country conditions and industry relations within this country have to be
taken into account. Furthermore, the characteristics of the different investor and employee
groups strongly determine the nal conclusion. However, it becomes clear that not only -
nancial integration does drive trade integration but trade integration is also an instrument to
increase nancial integration. Mutual effects between a country's industries are also nec-
essary to be considered for the extent of nancial activities. Hence, if a government is
interested in an increasing level of asset market activities of a specic investor group trade
liberalization might be an additional stimulating instrument. This is especially valid for
countries with a high share of poor workers in a large protected industry sector.
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Table 1.1. Impact of Asset Variance i on Demand of Asset i
In Table (1.1) labour income is positively correlated with asset i.
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Table 1.2. Impact of Asset Covariance on Demand of Asset i
In Table (1.2) labour income is positively correlated with asset i.
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Table 1.3. Impact of Asset Covariance on Demand for Asset j
In Table (1.3) labour income is positively correlated with asset j.
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Table 1.4. Impact of Tariff on Asset Covariance
In Table (1.4) industries x and y are positively correlated.
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Table 1.5. Impact of Tariff on Asset Covariance
In Table (1.5) industries x and y are positively correlated.
Chapter 2
FDI and FPI - Strategic Complements?
2.1 Introduction
The recent World Investment Report 2006 highlights that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
ows and growing FDI stocks are now at an unparalleled level with the highest share going
to industrial countries. At the same time, ows of international portfolio investments (FPI)
exceeded FDI ows twice at the beginning of the nineties, whilst more recently FPI growth
slowed down and both capital ows converged (WTO 1996). What are the motives for
rms to invest in one or the other and how are they to be explained?
Previous studies on FDI explained the motives for FDI with differential rates of re-
turn, differences in interest rates and risk diversication (Dunning (1973)). Following An-
dersen and Hainaut (1998), these determinants lost explanatory power and recent theo-
retical and empirical studies document that FDI is undertaken to exploit cost advantages
(vertical FDI) or to serve different markets locally to avoid trade costs (horizontal FDI).30,
31 If FDI no longer serves risk diversication does FPI ll the gap and are these capital
ows strategic complements rather than substitutes?32
30 Grossman, Helpman, Szeidl (2005) discuss in which states rms decide to outsource or offshore some
of their production stages. Acemoglu, Aghion, Grifth and Zilibotti show that vertical integration is more
common if the technology intensity differs signicantly.
31 See Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2003) for a detailed survey on whether rms decide to serve a foreign
market through export or FDI - horizontal FDI. Studies of complex FDI strategies can be found for example
in Helpman (2006) or Grossman, Helpmann, Szeidl (2003).
32 In contrast to the consumer theory, the cross-price elasticity of demand is not the decisive factor for the
present distinction between complements and substitutes. In the present analysis, "strategic-complements"
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We analyse whether rms choose FDI or FPI in the presence of stochastic produc-
tivity taking into account differences in exibility of both investments. As FDI requires
higher investment specic costs, it is not possible to adjust FDI to environmental changes
every period.33 In contrast, FPI bears lower xed costs and can be adjusted immediately
to short-term changes in the environment. In particular the assumption is that FDI is less
exible than FPI and this reduced exibility entails a higher rigidity of FDI. A further dis-
tinction between FDI and FPI is the possibility to exert control. FDI encloses control rights
for the investor. Thus, the investor is manager and owner in one person. He has facilitated
access to all information and has the opportunity to navigate the investment according to
his own interests. FPI, on the other hand, does not comprise control rights. In this case,
the investor and the manager are different persons with differing interests. Information
asymmetries and agency problems can arise. Consequently, the investment project is not
necessarily completely managed in line with investors' interest. Following Goldstein and
Razin (2004), as a result of the investors' control position FDI yields a higher return than
FPI. Hence, there is a trade-off between exibility and higher return for rms deciding be-
tween FDI and FPI. We explore whether as a consequence of higher investment specic
xed costs and lower exibility in the case of FDI, small rms prefer FPI and larger rms
invest in FDI.
We show that the combined investment strategy (FDI and FPI at the same time) al-
ways starts the international investment activity earlier in time than the isolated strategy
represents the conscious choice of the investor to combine both investment instruments. The decision whether
to combine both investments depends not only on the price / costs of the investment but on the risk correlation
and exibility of the respective investment instrument.
33 See Goldstein and Razin (2005) for a discussion on the different costs for FDI and FPI.
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(FDI or FPI). Additionally, with combined international investment, there is a higher in-
centive for rms to invest in research and development (R&D) and consequently rm pro-
ductivity increases faster than with isolated international investment. Depending on the
success-probability and the correlation between the various investment possibilities, even
small rms (low productivity) invest in FDI.
To model rm behaviour, we use a monopolistic competition framework with un-
certain rm productivity in combination with a dynamic investment approach over a nite
investment horizon. There are three countries, home and two foreign countries. The rms
are located in the home country and decide to invest via FDI or FPI in the foreign coun-
tries. Therefore, they face uncertainty about their future productivity and returns on the
respective investment. In particular, rm productivity is endogenous and follows a Poisson
process. The productivity of the different investment opportunities are correlated with each
other. Differences in correlation between FDI and home production account for different
forms of FDI.34
The remainder of Chapter 2 is organized as follows. In section 2, we examine the
different denitions of FDI and FPI and explain the motivations for rms to invest in FDI
or FPI on the existing literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and derives
the optimality conditions for the various investments strategies. Following this, we present
the numerical solution of the model and discuss the results in section 4. Finally, section 5
concludes Chapter 2.
34 Aizenman and Marion (2004) as well as Markusen and Maskus (2001) show that horizontal FDI is estab-
lished in countries similar in size and endowments, whilst vertical FDI is the preferred investment in countries
with different characteristics as the source country.
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2.2 Why should rms diversify their risk and combine FDI
and FPI?
The rst problem that arises is to distinguish between the two investment instruments FDI
and FPI. FDI and FPI consist of different kinds of foreign equity interests like equity shares,
securities or derivatives.35 Most of all, the explanation of FDI and the accompanying activ-
ities are not unambiguous. There is the macro view which counts FDI as a specic capital
ow between various countries. It measures FDI in Balance of Payments Statistics. On
the other hand, the micro view examines the motivations of foreign direct investment from
the investors' point of view. This view concentrates especially on the consequences result-
ing from investment for the investor, the host and the home country as well as on the rm
activities. The main emphasis is that the motivation as well as the consequences of FDI
arise from the investors' - the investing rms' - control and inuence on the management
of the foreign investment or afliate. However, the denition of FDI does not only change
with the underlying theory but also has changed in time and still changes with the den-
ing institution. A prominent and widely accepted denition is the IMF (1993) concept. It
is stated relatively vaguely that a direct investment is international investment that com-
prises a long-term interest in the relationship between the investing and the foreign rm.
Furthermore, the investing rm clearly possesses a signicant inuence on the manage-
ment or production process of the foreign rm. In addition to this rather loose concept, the
IMF exemplies a specic recommendation of 10% share-ownership at which FDI and a
35 FPI, in a broader sense, can also include bonds, money market instruments, nancial options and debt
securities.
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corresponding degree of control are identied. The IMF FDI perception complies with the
Balance of Payment Statistics view of FDI.
The micro view is more represented by the FDI denition of the United Nations
System of National Accounts. In this concept, the main emphasis is placed on the investors'
control over the foreign rm. The threshold for control and a perceptible inuence on the
foreign rm is at 10 - 50% or more of shares owned by the investing rm. The precise
share depends on the individual country denition of foreign control.36 These are only
two examples for the differing concepts and denitions of FDI. Based on these diverging
perceptions, it is difcult to distinguish explicitly between FDI and FPI. Moreover, the
ambiguous denitions do not really provide a clear cut between FDI and FPI: Lipsey (1988)
quotes an example where previous portfolios ows were converted into direct investment
ows. Hence, there is no unambiguous distinction of FDI and FPI from the composition of
the respective capital ow or by a denite control threshold. Consequently, in the present
chapter we will emphasize the various characteristics such as control and volatility of the
two investment instruments to distinguish between them. Furthermore, we will examine
what the motivations of a rm are to invest in FDI or FPI and whether there are any gains
from combining both investments.
The second question concerns mainly the motivations for a rm to invest in FPI.
Whilst rms' motivations to invest in FDI are widely explored, the reasons for FPI are
rather unexplored or just ignored. An arising strand of literature highlights the increasing
interest and necessity in rms' risk hedging. This constitutes a more than appropriate mo-
36 For a detailed discussion of this concept see Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts
(1993). For more various views on FDI and its denition, see Lipsey (1999, 2001).
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tivation for rms engaging in FPI. An accepted reason for multinational rms to engage in
risk sharing via nancial markets is exchange rate volatility. Mello et al. (1995) for exam-
ple show that the production choice and the competitive position of a rm depend strongly
on an appropriate nancial risk hedging strategy with respect to exchange rate risk. One of
the rst approaches to combine nancial hedging and corporate diversication is made by
Ding and Kouvelis (2007). Still, they justify a rms' hedging necessity solely on exchange
rate risk and price uncertainties. Lim and Wang (2007) show that operational risks arising
inside the rm, for example the uncertainty of rm-specic investments by non-nancial
stakeholders, may also require rms to engage in risk diversication. Furthermore, they ar-
gue that it is not only possible to combine nancial and corporate diversication to hedge
external and internal risks more efciently, they actually nd that the combination of the
two hedging instruments complement each other. Lim and Wang argue that nancial and
corporate diversication hedges different types of risk. Movements of the market or indus-
try as a whole can be hedged with nancial instruments but not with corporate diversi-
cation. On the other hand, it is impossible or extremely costly to reduce rm-specic risk
via nancial markets. Corporate diversication is the appropriate instrument to hedge this
idiosyncratic risk. If a rm engages in nancial risk sharing and thus reduces its systematic
risk, then the share of idiosyncratic risk increases. Consequently, reducing rm-specic
risk by corporate diversication becomes more valuable. These considerations conrm our
assumption that a combination of FPI and FDI may enhance the value of international di-
rect investment for a rm.
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A third controversial factor is the question of why a rm should engage in nancial
hedging. The common view is that a rm should emphasize its operational activities and
risk diversication should be managed by the respective shareholder himself. However,
the empirical evidence shows that rms indeed engage in risk diversication.37 There are
several reasons why risk diversication by a rm cannot be substituted by shareholder
portfolio diversication. First of all, nancing costs can be reduced and tax benets can be
realized if nancial risk diversication is undertaken by the rm instead of each individual
shareholder.38 A further advantage of rms' risk hedging activities is the reduction of
risk for not fully diversied managers and investors. Nevertheless, a crucial point is the
protection of rm-specic investment of non-nancial stakeholders. These investments
are a function of a rms' total risk and hence nancial risk diversication enhances rm-
specic investments. Again, this supports our assumption of additional gains for rm by
combining FDI and FPI.
Additionally, we link the information based trade-off literature between FDI and FPI
by Goldstein and Razin (2005) (GR) and Albuquerque (2003) with the rm-level Export
and FDI approaches by Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006), and Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2003). GR analyse the investors' decision between FDI and FPI under asymmetric
information in a static model.39 As a result of the information asymmetry the project rev-
enue from FDI is higher than from FPI. In the case of FDI the investor is also the manager
37 See for example Bodnar et al. (1998). For more recent empirical evidence see Gates (2006) and Nocco
and Stulz (2006).
38 Stulz (1984) offers an extensive survey on the reasons for corporate risk management. Froot et al. (1993)
emphasize on the reduced nancing costs, and Graham and Smith (1999) examine the tax benets of rms
risk hedging activities.
39 See also Razin, Mody and Sadka (2002) and Razin (2002).
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of the foreign rm. Hence, he has a higher control over the production processes and can
ensure that the rm is run accordingly to the investors' interests. If the investor chooses
FPI, the investor has no control over the foreign production process and the expected re-
turn is lower. In the present chapter we use these different characteristics shown by GR to
motivate the costs, exibility and return of the different investment possibilities. Addition-
ally, we consider the ndings of Chuhan, Perez-Quiraz and Popper (1996). They provide
an empirical analysis on the different characteristics of short term and long term capital
ows.40 Furthermore, in contrast to GR, we introduce a long-term investor in a dynamic
setting. This investor has the opportunity to adjust his portfolio periodically with rigid-
ity in FDI-shares. Hence, we also account for the different grades of exibility of both
investments.
Albuquerque (2003) analyses from a country perspective the risk-sharing character of
FDI and non-FDI capital ows for countries with different degrees of nancial constraints.
Therefore, non-FDI ow adjustments arise from shocks in the receiving country. One result
is that for nancially constrained countries, FDI is less volatile than non-FDI ows. With
perfect enforcement, the difference in volatility diminishes. We modify this approach by
taking the rm perspective and consider shocks on rm level as well as on host country
level. As a matter of fact, we always nd a higher volatility of non-FDI ows (FPI) than
FDI ows in our rm-level perspective. The rm reacts to any short-term environment
change by adjusting FPI. Precisely, FPI has the main function to smooth risk whereas FDI
mainly exploits gains from technology transfers.
40 Lipsey (2001) also emphasizes differences in volatility as a distinction between FDI and FPI.
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Uncertain rm productivity is decisive for the results of our model. This leads to the
literature by Melitz (2003) or Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006). They motivate the
rms' choice to export or engage in FDI with differing rm productivity. Melitz (2003)
shows that with heterogeneous productivity only the largest rms (with high productivity)
export. Small rms serve the domestic market only. Furthermore, Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2003) expand on this and nd that rms with higher productivity use higher in-
tegrated organisational production structures. They show that less productive rms only
serve the domestic market. If rms increase their productivity, they start to export and -
nally the most productive rms engage in FDI. In all these models rms can only invest
in FDI and have no other investment opportunity. We extend these models by introducing
FPI as a new form of investment possibility. In contrast to the existing literature, we allow
rms to choose to invest in FDI or FPI or to combine both. The results show that a pos-
sible combination of both investments leads to more exibility of the rm. This means a
rm can use FPI to dampen short term environment changes to which it is not possible to
react with FDI. Consequently, rms invest in FDI at a lower productivity than in the ex-
isting models. Furthermore, in the present chapter rm productivity is endogenous. Firms
can push their productivity by investing in research and development (R&D). The success
of the R&D-investment is uncertain.
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2.3 Theoretical Framework
The dynamic methodology in the model follows roughly the models of Abel (1973) and
Holt (2003).
Firms optimize their investment decisions in a continuous-time model.41 Inspired by
Melitz (2003), the model is based on monopolistic competition with stochastic rm produc-
tivity. Domestic demand is exogenous and the consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences.
There are three countries. Two of these countries are northern countries West (home coun-
try) and East (foreign). The third country is a southern country (foreign). In the eastern
country, as a result of the factor endowments, production and cost structure are similar to
the home country. Additionally, these countries are also based on a close cultural back-
ground. Hence, we assume a positive correlation of the productivities between the East and
the home country. On the opposite, the South has different production structure, cost struc-
ture and cultural background than the home and the eastern country. We assume negative
productivity correlations between South and home or South and East.
We consider a setting in which a representative rm faces a choice between perform-
ing activities at home (production and R&D-investment) and engaging in two alternative
foreign investments: foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI).
The initial position of each rm is home production and home R&D investment. Based on
these home activities, the rm can additionally choose to invest internationally. The rm's
specic productivity  is the crucial factor for the international investment decision of the
rm. In particular, the rm can increase its specic productivity by investing in domestic
41 Time runs from 0 to T .
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research and development (R&D). Whether R&D-investment increases the rm's produc-
tivity is uncertain. The change of  through R&D-investment follows a Poisson-Process
d =

(1  ) t
Kt

tdq. (2.38)
In (2.38) t is the capital invested in R&D andKt is the total stock of capital available to the
rm in period t.42 As obsolete technologies have to be replaced, patent laws are renewed and
so forth, even in the case of successful R&D-investment, the growing rate of  is smaller
than the invested rate of capital. These costs correspond to a constant depreciation and are
depicted by  2 [0; 1]. Finally q is a random variable that equals 1 with probability  and
0 otherwise. Hence, if R&D-investment is successful,  increases by

(1  ) 
K

. With
probability (1  ) R&D-investment fails and  stays unchanged.
As every rm, no matter whether it engages in FDI, FPI or not, produces at home and
serves the home market, we start with the analysis of the home country.
42 t 2 [0; T ].
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2.3.1 Home
Production
The rm uses a single factor, capital, to produce output at home xh
xht (t) = t
 
kht
 . (2.39)
The superscript h states that these are the values in the isolated "Home"-scenario.43 Accord-
ing to (2.38), rms can also use capital to invest in R&D and increase their productivity
Kt = k
h
t + t. (2.40)
As a consequence of monopolistic competition, rms choose the prot maximising-price44
pt =
1
't
. (2.41)
Where the rent for capital is set equal to one, 1
'
is the prot maximizing mark up and 1
t
are
the marginal costs of a rm with productivity t. Furthermore, the rm has xed costs of
home production equal to fht and costs of R&D-investment equal to t. Hence, the prot
of the rm at home in period t is
t (t) = ptt
 
kht
   fht + xhtt + t

, 0 <  < 1. (2.42)
The rst term on the right hand side equals the revenue from production and sales at the
home market, rht . The second term on the right hand side summarizes the costs of home
production and R&D investment.
43 The following scenarios with isolated FPI, FDI and the combined investments are identied by the super-
scripts p, d, and c respectively.
44 See 2.6 Appendix for the demand function and the derivation of the prot function.
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The expected value of rm prots over the whole time horizon is
V h (t) = max
khs ; s
Et
TZ
t
s (s) e
 (s t)ds. (2.43)
subject to (2.39) - (2.41). Modication of (2.43) yields:
V h (t) dt = max
kht ; t
t (t) dt+ Et
 
dV h

(2.44)
which states that the mean required return of a rm equals the expected return. In period
t, the expected return consists of the maximized prot at t and the expected gain or loss of
the future prot ow.
To calculate the expected capital ow, we substitute (2.38) into dV h:
Et
 
dV h

= 

V h (tt)  V h (t)

dt (2.45)
with t  (1  ) tKt .45 Equation (2.45) is the expected capital ow. The expected capital
ow is a perpetual ow of the difference between the capital ow in case of successful
R&D investment V h (tt) and without successful R&D investment V h (t) weighted with
the success-probability. Substituting (2.45) back into (2.44) and divide by dt yields:
V h (t) = max
kht ; t

t (t) + 

V h (tt)  V h (t)
	
. (2.46)
There are two important features about (2.46) which one should keep in mind thourought
the following analysis: rstly, all important information about the past concerning current
or future decisions is summarized in . How the rm reached the present productivity does
not matter at all. Secondly, choosing the optimal production and R&D-investment strategy
with respect to the problem starting at the current productivity level  that results from the
45 For a detailed derivation see 2.6 Appendix.
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initial rm strategies, is the optimal strategy no matter what the initial strategy of the rm
was.
Optimality Conditions for R&D-Investment and Production Strategies
From (2.46) we can derive the optimality conditions for rm-strategies for R&D-investment
and home production.
R&D Investment Deriving the rst order condition for R&D-investment from (2.46)
yields46
 () + V
h
 () = 0. (2.47)
The second part of the brackets of (2.46) disappears, as V h () does not depend on the
current . Rearranging (2.47) delivers:47
V h () =
1

"
1  r
h
 ()
!
#
. (2.48)
The marginal valuation of R&D-investment is a perpetual ow equal to one minus the rev-
enue changes caused by , discounted by the probability of successful R&D-investment.
The return decreases in the additional R&D investment because available capital for the do-
mestic production is reduced. Thus (2.48) is positive. However, R&D investment increases
the productivity and so does the output produced with one unit capital. Consequently, the
valuation of additional R&D corresponds to the decreased return caused by the R&D in-
vestment.
46 For simplication, the time indices are dropped.
47 For mathematical details see 2.6 Appendix.
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Home Production Differentiating the right hand side of (2.46) with respect to kh,
we obtain the optimality condition
kh () + 

V hkh ()  V hkh ()

= 0
rkh ()
!
+ 

V hkh ()  V hkh ()

= 0
V hh () = V
h
h () 
1


rhh ()
!

. (2.49)
The subscripts unequal to t stand for the partial derivation. For simplicity, in the follow-
ing cases the derivation subscripts are shortened to h for the derivation with respect to
capital invested in home production instead of kh.48 The marginal valuation of production-
investment, in the case of successful R&D-investment equals the marginal valuation of
production-investment with no R&D investment minus the marginal revenue stream result-
ing from increased capital in production - discounted with the probability of successful
R&D-investment. It is V hh () minus the revenue stream, as the valuation of kh in case of
additional investment in R&D is examined. Capital is divided between R&D investment
and domestic production. If R&D investment is successful, the valuation of domestic pro-
duction decreases relatively to unsuccessful R&D because there is an alternative use for
capital with a high valuation. Analysing just the valuation of kh without the increased
productivity would be V hh () plus the revenue stream.
An optimal strategy requires that the marginal valuation of investment in production
equals the marginal valuation of R&D-investment. We can derive an explicit marginal
48 The subscripts will be analogue p for investment in FPI and d for investment in FDI, instead of kp and kd.
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valuation for investment in production by equating (2.49) and (2.48), namely
V hh () =
1

"
1 +
rhh   rh
!
#
. (2.50)
Similar to (2.48), the marginal valuation of investment in production equals a ow consist-
ing of one plus the difference between the revenue change caused by the two investment
decisions. Again, this ow is discounted by the probability of successful R&D invest-
ment.49
Equation (2.50) reects the trade-off between investing in R&D or not. First of all,
investing in R&D reduces the capital available to invest in domestic production. This effect
is negative. But secondly, R&D-investment increases productivity and higher productivity
enforces the output of the employed production-capital and decreases the variable produc-
tion costs x

. Hence, there is also a positive effect of R&D-investment on the marginal
valuation of capital invested in home-production. These considerations are reected in the
second part of (2.50).
49 Consequently, V () =   1 r! . The intuition is that with increased  the return decreases directly,
r < 0. The valuation of domestic production in total is positive as with foregone R&D investment kh
increases, thus increasing the additional return.
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2.3.2 Home and Foreign Portfolio Investment
Now, we analyse the investment decision of the rm and allow for an additional investment
alternative, namely foreign portfolio investment (FPI). With FPI equation (2.40) changes
to
Kt = k
h
t + k
p
t + t. (2.51)
This shows that the total capital available to a rm can be used to invest in domestic produc-
tion, R&D-investment (the same as in the scenario above) and additionally kp is the capital
invested in FPI. As the rm invests in FPI, it gains ownership of a foreign rm. But the do-
mestic rm has no - or only an innitely small - possibility to exert control over the foreign
production and management process. Thus, the domestic rm cannot directly inuence the
foreign revenue and the gained dividend
rpt = t (k
p
t ) . (2.52)
t is the return rate from FPI (or the productivity of capital invested in FPI).50 It varies
with
d

= dz (2.53)
where dz is a Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance.51, 52 Following (2.52) and
(2.53), the only impact the home rm has on the foreign investment is the decision of how
much capital to invest in FPI.
50  2 R+.
51 The assumption of the mean zero and unit variance ensures that the increments of the Wiener process are
independent distributed random variables. They follow a normal distribution (zt   zs)~N(0; z) with 0  s
< t.
52 Note that  is dened as the FPI productivity and not the mean of the Wiener process.
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Investment in FPI requires buying assets, time to select the appropriate assets, ad-
ditional administration systems and efforts etc. All these efforts are summarized as xed
costs fpt for this investment. Yet, the prot function for the rm (2.42) changes to
t (t) = ptt
 
kht
  fht + xhtt + t

+ rpt   fpt . (2.54)
Following the steps in the home-scenario, we get the multi-period optimization problem
for the rm
V p (t) dt = max
kht ;k
p
t ; t
t (t) dt+ Et (dV
p) (2.55)
subject to (2.39), (2.41) and (2.51) - (2.53). As the rm is now in the FPI-scenario, the
superscript changed to p and there is one more control variable, namely kpt . The expected
future capital ow depends on two state variables t and t:53
dV p = V p d + V
p
 d+
1
2
V p (d)
2 + V p (d) (d) . (2.56)
Thus, in the case of FPI investment, the expectation of the change in the expected capital
ow consists of three parts
E (dV p) =  [V p ()  V p ()] dt+

1
2
22V
p


dt+

V p () () 
p

dt. (2.57)
The rst part is similar to the expected capital ow in the Home-scenario. Additionally,
the variations of the foreign return impact V p. This impact occurs in the second term.
Finally, the third term accounts for common variations of home productivity and foreign
productivity that can result from global or industry shocks. The direction of this correlation
depends on p  (dq) (dz) 6= 0. If the rm invests FPI in the East, p is positive. p is
negative with FPI in the southern country.
53 For simplication, the time indices are dropped.
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In case of FPI, the present value of the rm prot ows is
V p () = max
khs ;k
p
t ; s
[p () +  [V p ()  V p ()] + "] (2.58)
with "  "a + "b, "a  1
2
22V
p
 and "b  V p () () p. The uncertain foreign pro-
ductivity inuences the present value of the prot ows twice. Firstly, the isolated variation
of the foreign productivity "a enters the capital ows and, secondly, the common variation
of home and foreign productivity "b changes the capital ows. The home productivity
change is a discrete shock and " is continuous. Similar to (2.46), all necessary information
for any decision is summarised in  and . Furthermore, any optimality of future decision
on FPI, home production or R&D-investment is independent of the rms' initial decision.
Optimality Conditions with FPI
R&D Investment With FPI the marginal valuation of R&D-investment changes to
V p () =
1

"
1  r
h

!
  
#
(2.59)
where  = @(V
p

1
2
22)
@
+
@(V p()()p)
@
. FPI does not have any direct impact on the
R&D-investment. In comparison to the pure Home-scenario, the marginal valuation of
R&D-investment is reduced by . This effect arises through the common variation of
the home and foreign productivities. If the rm invests into closely related industries or
even in the same industry (eastern country, p > 0 ) then the own risk is not reduced.
Thus  is positive and reduces the marginal valuation of R&D-investment slightly but it
never completely compensates it. On the contrary, with investment in a dissimilar industry
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(South, p < 0) the risk of R&D failure is diversied.  is negative and increases the
valuation of R&D-investment.
Home Production The direct valuation of home production is unchanged
V ph () = V
h
h () 

1

rhh ()
!

. (2.60)
Following the optimality principle, we can equate the marginal valuation of investment in
home production with the marginal valuation of R&D-investment and get
V ph () =
1

"
1 +
rhh   rh
!
  
#
. (2.61)
Similar to (2.59), the valuation changes by . Analogue to (2.59), the change depends on
the industry invested in.
FPI Optimality requires that the marginal valuation of FPI also equals the marginal
valuation of investment in home production and R&D-investment. Therefore we differen-
tiate (2.58) with respect to kp and rearranging delivers
V pp () = V
p
p () 
1


rpp + "p

. (2.62)
Valuation of FPI is lower with investment located in the East (similar production and cost
structure, "p > 0) than with investment located in the South (different factor endowment,
production and cost structure "p < 0). Obviously, the diversication of the risk increases
the valuation of the investment abroad.
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FPI vs Home
The results from deriving all optimality conditions for FDI are summarized in Table (2.6):
R&D V p () =
1


1  r
h

!   

Home V ph () =
1


1 +
!rpp rhh rh
!   + "p

FPI V pp () =
1


1 +
rhh !rpp rh
!     "p
 .
Table 2.6. Optimality Conditions with FPI
Table (2.6) shows that the effect of FPI on the marginal valuation of investment in
home production and R&D is twofold. Additional capital invested abroad reduces capital
available for domestic production and R&D-investments. A further effect arises through the
exploitation of risk diversication possibilities, . Investment into countries with closely
related industries (East) diminishes the valuation of domestic production,  > 0. Similar
sources of risks are added. Investments in dissimilar countries (South) push the valuation
slightly up,  < 0. In this case, FPI constitutes a hedging instrument for the existing
R&D-risk.
Finally, the additional variation of a further unit capital invested in FPI, "p, impacts
the valuation of home production. At the same time, "p affects the valuation of FPI in
the opposite direction. The marginal valuation of home production increases with further
FPI in the East, "p > 0 and decreases with additional southern FPI. Eastern FPI delivers
additional variation and risk. Home production is valued higher as it is a more secure source
of future capital ows.54 FPI in the South hedges existing home risk and consequently the
54 FPI valuation decreases through the same effect.
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valuation of home production decreases, "p < 0.55 Additional southern FPI dampens the
R&D risk and enforces further R&D investments. The rm withdraws capital from home
production and invests the available capacities into southern FPI.
Hence, with isolated investment possibilities the rm will engage in southern FPI.
2.3.3 Home and Foreign Direct Investment
In the case of FDI, the home rm takes ownership as well as control over the foreign rm
thus being able to inuence the prot of its direct-investment. In the present chapter, the
rm only transfers capital to the foreign rm. No intermediate goods are traded. However,
the choice of the FDI receiving country has a signicant impact on the valuation of FDI.
If the home rm decides in favour of FDI, it also transfers intangible assets, as for
example managerial skills and technology to the foreign rm. As a side effect of this asset
transfer, a part of the home productivity directly enters the return of FDI
rdt =  
2
t 
1
a
t
 
kdt

; 0 < a < 1. (2.63)
Home productivity  does not impact the foreign investment to the same extent as home
production. This can be caused by country specic conditions or incomplete mobility of
some home skills.56  is the foreign productivity which is stochastic and varies with57
d =   dz . (2.64)
55 In this case, the valuation of FPI increases.
56 With a!1, the FDI scenario would be the same as the FPI scenario.
57  2 R+
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Again, dz is a Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance. The amount of capital
invested in FDI is kd. Hence equation (2.40) becomes
Kt = k
h
t + k
d
t + t. (2.65)
Furthermore, FDI requires some specic up-front costs such as country and market re-
search, a merger or building a new plant. All these activities are costly and summarized in
fd, as the xed costs arising from FDI. Now the modied prot function of the home rm
is
t (t) = ptt
 
kht
  fht + xhtt + t

+
rdt
!
  fdt . (2.66)
It is important to keep in mind that the FDI x costs, fd, exceed the FPI x costs, fp.
The dynamic optimization problem of the home rm is
V d () dt = max
kht ;k
d
t ;t

dt (t) dt+ Et
 
dV d

. (2.67)
Equation (2.67) is a function of the state variables home productivity  as well as
foreign productivity  : The control variables are the three investment purposes, kh; kd; .
The derivation of the functional equation from (2.67) is analogue to the steps in the FPI-
scenario. Thus, we get
V d () = max
kht ;k
d
t ;t

dt + 

V d (tt)  V d (t)

+ 

(2.68)
with   a + b, a  1
2
2  
2V d  , b  V d  (  ) () d and d  (dz )(dq). Ana-
logue to the FPI scenario, the uncertainty of the foreign productivity has two impacts on
the present value of the prot ows: the variation of the foreign productivity a, and the
common variation of the foreign and the home productivity b. All necessary information
for any decision is included in  and  .
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Optimality Conditions with FDI
R&D Investment Following the same steps as in the two previous scenarios, we get the
marginal valuation of additional R&D-investment58
V d () =
1

"
1  r
h
   !rd
!
  {
#
. (2.69)
First, there is an additional impact of FDI on the marginal valuation of R&D-investment. It
is a very small positive effect through a slight increase in the foreign revenue. In compari-
son to the isolated home-scenario, this marginal change in rd again increases the marginal
valuation of R&D-investment.
Secondly, the inuence of  on the foreign productivity is included in {  @a
@
+ @
b
@
.
The sign of { is not denite. The degree ( 1
a
) of the home productivity inuence on foreign
revenue is decisive for {.
Proposition 1 If a > 1 (low control over foreign rm - low impact of  on rd) then in both
cases, eastern and southern FDI, { > 0 holds. If a < 1 and additional R&D exceeds the
revenue losses caused by reduced capital input in FDI, then with FDI in the East { > 0
and { < 0 for southern FDI.59, 60
58 Again, the time indices are dropped for the simplication of the equations.
59 If the additional R&D investment increases productivity less than it reduces the additional return by re-
ducing the available capital input for production, { changes its sign according to the respective FDI location.
However, in the case with low control (a > 1) the impact of { on the R&D valuation stays unchanged.
60 A different assumption about the impact of foreign productivity  changes these effects. If additional
productivity shows decreasing additional effects,   with  < 1 then even with low impact of the domestic
rm on the foreign rm, (a > 1) ,{ < 0 with eastern and southern FDI. Thus, FDI increases the valuation of
domestic R&D. Based on the same assumption but with high impact on the foreign rm, (a < 1), in the case
of eastern FDI x > 0 and { < 0 for FDI in the South. In particular, R&D valuation increases with FDI in
the South as technology transfer is facilitated and FDI in the East does not yield additional returns for further
R&D investment.
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With low impact on the foreign rm, the valuation of domestic R&D-investment
decreases with FDI. It does not matter whether FDI would be located in the East or in the
South. If the domestic rm has a high impact on the foreign rm, southern FDI enhances
the R&D valuation. FDI in the East does not change its impact on the R&D valuation. The
technology transfer with horizontal FDI in countries with differing production and cost
structures is rather complicated and depends strongly on the cost structure of the different
countries.61 Therefore, the implementation of new technologies - developed for domestic
production - in the South is only possible with a strong control position or a high impact of
the domestic productivity on the foreign rm. Based only on these conditions, additional
R&D investment induces additional valuation in the case of southern FDI. FDI in the East
does not increase the R&D valuation neither with a high nor with low impact on the foreign
rm. In this case, additional capital is rather invested in FDI production directly than
into domestic R&D-investment. As Home and East are very similar countries, additional
R&D investment accounts for an investment similar to investment in FDI. This FDI implies
additional productivity by adding the foreign productivity to the already existing domestic
productivity. Such a productivity push caused by additional FDI increases the valuation of
FDI and decreases the R&D valuation.
61 Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2003) show that under different cost structures in the observed countries,
rm strategies change from horizontal to vertical FDI and vice versa.
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Home Production As expected from the previous section, home production stays
unchanged again
V dh () = V
d
h () 
1


rhh ()
!

. (2.70)
Substituting equation (2.69) into the marginal valuation of investment in home pro-
duction delivers
V dh () =
1

"
1 +
rhh   rh   !rd
!
  {
#
. (2.71)
The changes in  affect directly the FDI revenue and indirectly the variations of the produc-
tivity of FDI. The reduction of the marginal valuation of the investment in home production
is not as high as under FPI. In the current case, not only does R&D-investment diminish the
capital available for FDI, it also increases the productivity of capital invested in the foreign
rm. Furthermore, the sign of { depends on the FDI location.
FDI To derive the optimality condition for FDI, we differentiate (2.68) with respect
to kd. This yields
V dd () = V
d
d () 
1


rdd + d

. (2.72)
Equation (2.72) shows that the marginal valuation of FDI in case of successful R&D-
investment depends again on the FDI location. If the rm invests in eastern FDI then the
term in the brackets remains positive and hence reduces the valuation. On the other hand,
if the rm undertakes southern FDI, the sign of  changes. But the indirect effect through 
is weaker than the direct effect of the changed revenue. Thus, the valuation is still reduced
but not as much as in the case of FDI in the East. Generally, we nd a decreasing marginal
product of capital either invested in domestic production or invested in foreign production.
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However, a negative correlation between domestic and foreign productivity at hand, the
decrease of the marginal product invested in FDI is dampened.
FDI vs Home
Table (2.7) summarizes the optimality conditions with FDI:
R&D V d () =
1


1 +
!rd rh
!   {

Home V dh () =
1


1 +
!(rdd+r
d
) rhh rh
!   { + d

FDI V dd () =
1


1 +
rhh+!(r
d
 rdd) rh
!   {   d

Table 2.7. Optimality Conditions with FDI
As discussed above, FDI impacts the marginal valuation of R&D-investment (rst
row of Table (2.7)). This effect depends on the impact degree of the domestic productivity
on the foreign revenue. With low domestic impact on rd, FDI decreases the valuation of
R&D in either location. High domestic impact on rd changes the impact of southern FDI
on R&D-valuation. The results of domestic R&D-investment are easily transferred to the
foreign rm. Not only does R&D increase the domestic productivity but it also boosts the
foreign return by increasing the transferred productivity. Furthermore, these effects carry
over to the valuation of investment in home-production with respect to R&D-investment.
From the second row of Table (2.7), it is obvious how the valuation of capital invested in
home production depends on the different effects of FDI. Additional capital invested abroad
decreases the marginal revenue of FDI regardless of the rm undertaking southern or east-
ern FDI. This effect increases the valuation of investment in domestic production. Similar
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to R&D, FDI impacts the valuation of domestic production indirectly by the common vari-
ation of foreign and home productivity {.
The last parameter in the home valuation stands for the variation of one additional
unit capital invested in FDI. Analogue to the FPI scenario, FDI in the East adds further
variations. The valuation of home production increases with further eastern FDI. In this
case, home production is a very close substitute for FDI and even a more secure source for
future capital ows. FDI in the south adds variations not common to the home variations.
Thus, home production is not a close substitute for southern FDI as additional - albeit minor
- gains on risk diversication arise with southern FDI.
The marginal valuation of FDI with respect to R&D (row three, Table (2.7)) equals a
perpetual ow of the difference of changed revenues through additional capital invested in
FDI and R&D, discounted by the probability of successful R&D-investment. The hedging
components impact the FDI valuation in the same way as the R&D-valuation.
Finally, with isolated FDI the preferred location depends on the impact degree of
home productivity on foreign revenue - or rather on the control degree of the investor. High
control investors prefer southern FDI and low control investors are indifferent between
eastern or southern FDI.
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2.3.4 Home and Combined International Investment
Finally, we analyse a combined international investment strategy for the rm. Besides the
usual home activities of the rm, it invests in FPI as well as in FDI at the same time.
Because there are four different investment alternatives for capital, (2.40) changes to
Kt = k
h
t + k
p
t + k
d
t + t. (2.73)
The return functions of the international investments are similar to the return func-
tions under isolated international investment. Hence, the rms' prot function with com-
bined international investment is62
ct (t) = ptt
 
kht
  fh + xht
t
+ t

+ rpt   fpt + rdt   fdt . (2.74)
and the dynamic rm problem is:63
V c () dt = max
kh;kp;kd;
[c () dt+ Et (dV
c)] . (2.75)
The control variables in the dynamic combined optimization problem are the various in-
vestment purposes: investment in domestic production kh, R&D-investment  and the two
international investment alternatives FPI kp and FDI kd. Furthermore, in the combined sce-
nario, the present value of the rms capital ows is a function of the three state variables:
home productivity , productivity of the portfolio investments  and the productivity of the
direct investment  . These three variables summarize all the necessary information for an
optimal investment-decision in the present period. We need the functional equation of the
optimizing problem (2.75) to derive the optimality conditions. Again, the steps are very
62 We have to keep in mind that fd > fp still holds.
63 We will keep the detailed transforming-steps very short, as the necessary steps for the transformation are
similar to the steps undertaken in the previous isolated section.
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similar to the isolated investment strategies and therefore, we neglect them and directly
turn to the functional equation
V c () = max
kht ;k
p
t ;k
d
t ;t
[ct +  [V
c (tt)  V c (t)] + "+ + ] (2.76)
where   V c () (  ) c and c  (dz) (dz ). In (2.76) we have the investment ef-
fects of the isolated international strategies combined. Additionally, the common variation
of the two international investments is included through .
Optimality Conditions with Combined International Investment (CII)
R&D Investment Following (2.76), the optimality condition for R&D-investment changes
slightly in comparison to the isolated scenarios:64
V c () =
1

"
1  r
hc
   !rdc
!
    {   
#
. (2.77)
The rst part of the bracket stays unchanged. Also, the isolated effects of the different
investment possibilities,  and {, are the same as above. But the interaction of FPI and
FDI changes the impact of the isolated investment effects. The only new term is . Its
impact depends on the international investment interaction too. Table (2.8) summarizes the
effects from the isolated strategies and adds the common effects in case of CII.
From Table (2.8), we can emphasize two cases. The rst case is a domestic rm with
low inuence on the foreign revenue (or low productivity). According to Table (2.8), there
is no directly dominant strategy with respect to FDI. FDI in the East has the same impact on
R&D-valuation as FDI in the South. However, combining FDI and FPI effects on the R&D-
64 For simplication, time indices are dropped.
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impact FPI impact FDI impact FDI common
low control high control impact
eastern country FPI / eastern FDI  > 0 { > 0 { > 0  > 0
southern country FPI / southern FDI  < 0 { > 0 { < 0  > 0
eastern country FPI / southern FDI  > 0 { > 0 { < 0  < 0
southern country FPI / eastern FDI  < 0 { > 0 { > 0  < 0
Table 2.8. Impact of different International Investment Possibilities
valuation shows that the combination with FPI in a southern country and FDI in the East has
a slightly higher positive impact on the R&D valuation. With FPI in an unrelated country,
the rm secures risk diversication. Isolated FDI in the East is not better than isolated
FDI in the South, but in combination with southern FPI both investment possibilities are
negatively correlated and this pushes the marginal valuation of R&D-investment further.
The second case is a rm with high inuence on the foreign revenue (or high produc-
tivity). The preferred FPI location stays unchanged, whereas FDI switches to the South.
Now, technology transfer is easily possible via FDI. As in the former case, FPI still serves as
a diversication instrument for domestic risk. It does not hedge FDI-location risk anymore.
But with the increasing domestic productivity and its higher impact on foreign revenue, the
remaining share of FDI location specic risk diminishes.
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Home Production Analogue to the isolated investment possibilities, the impact of
home production does not change
V ch () = V
c
h () 
1


rhch ()
!

. (2.78)
In combination with the marginal valuation of R&D-investment, the impact of CII on the
home production valuation becomes clear:
V ch () =
1

"
1 +
rhch   rhc   rdc
!
  {     
#
. (2.79)
We see from Table (2.8), that the optimal investment combinations with respect to R&D-
investment are the optimal combinations with respect to the valuation of home production
in combination with R&D. But we still cannot generalize this optimal investment combi-
nation.
CII First, we have to examine the effects on the various international investments and
the combination of all effects. As they are all derived similarly from the isolated strategies,
Table (2.9) just summarizes the results
R&D V c () =
1


1  r
hc
  rdc
!     {   

Home V ch () =
1


1 +
rdcd +r
dc
  rhch  rhc
!   {   + "p + d    + d

FDI V cd () =
1


1 +
rhch  rhc +!(rdc  rdcd )
!     {   d      d

FPI V cp () =
1


1 +
rhch  rhc +!(rdc  rpcp )
!   {     "p      p

Table 2.9. Optimality Conditions with CII
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From Table (2.9), we see that each marginal valuation increases with negative correla-
tion of the home industry and the chosen industry for FPI ( < 0). The risk of unsuccessful
R&D-investment at home can be propped up by the short term portfolio-investment.
To detect the preferred FDI location, again we have to distinguish two cases: low and
high impact on the foreign rm. With low productivity and low control, { > 0 reduces
the respective valuation. The positive sign for { arises under eastern as well as south-
ern FDI. Overall, there is no facilitated technology transfer under eastern or southern FDI.
However, FDI in the East is negatively correlated with the chosen FPI location. This vari-
ation effect dampens the direct negative FDI impact on the respective valuations. Hence,
both international investments are mostly favoured with FPI in the southern and FDI in the
eastern country. For FPI, the risk diversication is the stronger effect with the highest im-
pact on the rm decision. In particular, FPI is the more exible investment and can be
adjusted with only minor costs. Therefore, it is the appropriate instrument to diversify a
rm's risk. On the other hand, FDI reacts more sensitive by productivity changes, thus be-
ing the favourable instrument to exploit productivity gains internationally. The additionally
arising negative correlation between the two international investments pushes all valuations
slightly up.
With high domestic control over the foreign rm, the preferred FDI location switches
from the East to the South. High control (low a) reduces the share of location or industry
specic risk and facilitates the technology transfer from home to the South.65 FPI loses
its function of direct-hedging FDI location specic risk. But, FPI still works as hedging
65 A high home productivity  has equivalent consequences.
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instrument for R&D risk. With the increasing domestic control - and therefore higher
impact of  on the FDI revenue, this role even gains more importance. Higher domestic
productivity requires higher R&D-investments and this in turn stipulates a more intensive
risk hedging. Concluding, FPI loses its impact as direct hedging instrument with respect
to FDI but with respect to domestic production, and thus indirectly to FDI, the hedging
necessity increases.
In CII, FPI can prop up the risk from home production and FDI. The relations be-
tween the home country and the recipient countries are unchanged to the isolated invest-
ment scenarios for FPI as well as for FDI. Hence, we expect in CII the share of FPI to
adjust to short-term environment changes whereas FDI stays unchanged. Because of the
complexity of the problem there is no possibility to derive an explicit analytical solution for
the respective international investment shares. The shares of FPI and FDI will be derived
numerically.
2.4 Optimal Investment Strategies
As for both FDI investor scenarios - low and high control on the foreign rm, the results
emphasize that FPI works as a diversication instrument and the rm uses FDI as a tech-
nology transfer channel. These ndings are valid for the isolated strategies as well as for
the combined strategy. To prove or reject these ndings clearly in the following analysis,
we consider FDI in the East and FPI in the South.
Unfortunately, the problem has no traceable closed form solution. Hence, the solu-
tion must be approximated by numerical methods. We break the model down into many
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one-period decisions. We use a recursive policy function iteration.66 We take a given cap-
ital stock and assume a certain choice of the amount of capital the rm invests in home
production. The rm derives the further investment decisions according to the optimality
conditions displayed in the tables (2.6), (2.7) and (2.9). From a given capital stockK = 10
for every period we set the choice for investment in domestic production kh. The remain-
ing decision variables are a result of the optimality conditions. We repeat this procedure
with various values for kh. The initial value of  is set to one and changes according to the
R&D-investment decision. Additionally, we examine different cost structures. The vary-
ing cost structures change the results in terms of their value but they never have an impact
on the bottom line of the results. We test the model with different time horizons: 10; 20;
30; 40; 50 periods. There are some small variations in the absolute investment values but
the length of the time horizon does not change the main results either. The results are only
sensitive to productivity strength and correlation of the international investments. This is
discussed in the following sections. Variations of the success probability of the R&D in-
vestment , the depreciation of capital  and the productivity  and their impact on the
results are examined thourought the analysis.
The rst run computes the solution for the isolated international investment strategies
and determines the cut-offs at which the rm changes from one strategy to another (home,
FPI or FDI). In the second run, we repeat the same steps for the combined international
investment strategy. Precisely, with CII the rm changes its strategy only once: from
isolated home production to FPI and FDI at the same time.
66 For detailed discussion and mathematical background see Adda and Cooper (2003), Judd (1998) and Dixit
and Pindyck (1994).
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We derive a benchmark case with a depreciation of  = 0:3. A higher depreciation
pushes the start of international activity backwards in time and a lower depreciation pulls
it forward. The general results stay the same. Furthermore, the probability for successful
R&D-investment  varies and shows a signicant impact on the rms' decision to invest
internationally or not.
2.4.1 Isolated International Investment
Start of International Activity
The rst international activity of the rm is FPI. As expected, FPI requires lower cut-off
productivity than FDI. However, the rm does not start investing in FPI until the probability
of successful R&D is 0:3 or higher. The gures (2.1) and (2.2) show, for example, the
investment shares of all four investment possibilities over time. The time horizon is set
for 10 periods. In gure (2.1) the R&D-success probability is  = 0:3 and it is  = 0:5 in
(2.2). The rm always starts off with investments in home production and home R&D only.
After some periods of R&D investment, the productivity of the rm is high enough and the
rm starts to invest internationally. In case of gure (2.1) the rst international investment
(FPI) is done in period 5 at a productivity of  = 1:08668. In the following period, the
R&D investment increases and consequently increases as well to  = 1:35727. Then the
rm switches from FPI to FDI.
Even with  = 0:5, the international activity starts very late in time. Figure (2.2)
shows that the rst international investment happens in period 3. With increasing R&D-
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probability, the rm undertakes international investment at an earlier stage in time and with
lower productivity  = 1:07122. Again, with increasing R&D investment and increasing 
the rm then switches to FDI in period 4. All this is very intuitive, as with high success-
probability the productivity increases more quickly. All these results conrm the ndings
in the recent literature. Firms with low productivity, stay isolated at the home market. With
a slight increase in productivity the rst small international steps are made and nally, rms
with a remarkable high productivity invest in FDI.
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Fig. 2.1. Isolated Investment Shares with  = 0:3
Furthermore, the gures (2.1) and (2.2) show that not only is FDI undertaken with
a high productivity, there is also a reversed relationship. As soon as the rm invests in
FDI, the R&D investment increases and this in turn boosts the productivity . Thus, with
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Fig. 2.2. Isolated Investment Shares with  = 0:5
the additional investment abroad, investment in R&D is more valuable than without the
direct investment. The incentive to invest in R&D increases because a higher domestic
productivity now pushes not only the domestic output and return but also the return of
the foreign direct investment. However, this effect diminishes with time. Each additional
investment in R&D adds less productivity for each unit capital invested in home and foreign
production. Consequently, the rm will draw capital from R&D investment and invest it
in additional FDI and later on even in additional home production. Again, the gures (2.1)
and (2.2) show the increasing share of FDI and the late increase in home production in the
rm's total investment.
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Variation of Foreign Productivity
Firstly, we examine changes in the FPI productivity. Table (2.10) shows that neither the
productivity cut offs nor the cut-off time change with variations in FPI productivity.67 One
might have expected that with higher foreign productivity the rm engages earlier in in-
ternational investment. This is not the case. The rm rst secures the home production
process and then goes abroad.
Switch-Period Productivity Share of Switch-Period Productivity Share of
FPI of FPI FPI FDI of FDI FDI
 = 0; 3 5 1,087 0,352 6 1,36 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 5 1,087 0,84 6 1,36 6,0
 = 0; 4 4 1,086 0,36 5 1,38 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 4 1,086 0,85 5 1,38 6,0
 = 0; 5 3 1,07 0,41 4 1,35 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 3 1,07 0,92 4 1,35 6,0
 = 0; 6 3 1,09 0,37 4 1,59 5,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 3 1,09 0,86 4 1,59 5,0
 = 0; 7 2 1,05 0,5 3 1,21 7,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,05 1,04 3 1,21 7,0
 = 0; 8 2 1,06 0,48 3 1,36 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,06 1,01 3 1,36 6,0
Table 2.10. Productivity Cut-Offs and Changing Investments with varying FPI Productivity
Furthermore, the rm does not reduce or increase its share in FDI. Only the FPI
shares increase with higher FPI productivity. This might seem intuitive, as only the FPI-
productivity changes. Hence, the FDI shares are independent of the FPI productivity. A
67 In Table (2.10) the Switch-Period is the period in which the rm engages in FPI or FDI for the rst time.
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closer look on FDI-productivity changes shows whether this independence also holds in
the opposite direction and we can conrm FPI as the more exible instrument.
Table (2.11) compares the rms' international investment with high and low FDI
productivity.68 It shows that the rm engages in international investment earlier in time with
a high FDI-productivity than with a lower FDI-productivity. Furthermore, the productivity
cut-off is lower than with the benchmark productivity. The only exceptions are the cases
with a very high success probability of R&D investment. For these cases the cut-offs are
the same as for the benchmark case and the high FDI-productivity.
Switch-Period Productivity Share Switch-Period Productivity Share
FPI of FPI of FPI FDI of FDI of FDI
 = 0; 2 x x x x x x
low fdi x x x x x x
high fdi 2 1,01 0,6 3 1,28 8,0
 = 0; 3 5 1,087 0,352 6 1,36 6,0
low fdi x x x x x x
high fdi 2 1,02 0,58 3 1,04 8,0
 = 0; 4 4 1,086 0,36 5 1,38 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,03 0,56 3 1,06 8,0
 = 0; 5 3 1,07 0,41 4 1,35 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,04 0,54 3 1,07 8,0
 = 0; 6 3 1,09 0,37 4 1,59 5,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,04 0,52 3 1,09 8,0
 = 0; 7 2 1,05 0,5 3 1,21 7,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,05 0,5 3 1,21 7,0
 = 0; 8 2 1,06 0,48 3 1,36 6,0
low fpi x x x x x x
high fpi 2 1,06 0,6 3 1,36 6,0
Table 2.11. Productivity Cut-Offs and Changing Investment Shares with varying FDI Pro-
ductivity.
68 In Table (2.11) the Switch-Period is the period in which the rm engages in FPI or FDI for the rst time.
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Finally, with varying FDI-productivity both international shares change in compari-
son to the benchmark case. In particular, the FPI shares do not only vary in comparison to
the benchmark case. They also change between the various cases of high FDI-productivity
while the FDI shares stay almost the same. Again, only with the high R&D-probability the
FDI shares change between the different cases, but they do not change with respect to the
benchmark case. So, we nd again FPI as the exible instrument adjusting to short-term
changes while FDI reacts more sluggishly. Note that these are only results for the isolated
investment scenario.
2.4.2 Combined International Investment
In contrast to the isolated international investment strategy, in the combined investment
scenario the rm starts its international activities with both investment alternatives FPI and
FDI at the same time. In Figure (2.3) the rst international acitivities of both investment
scenarios are compared. For the isolated investment strategy, the rst international activ-
ity is FPI. For the combined investment strategy, the rst international activity is FDI. Both
international investments are compared in dependence of the R&D success probability .
The pink dots depict the period in which the rm switches from only home production to
its rst international investment in the isolated investment scenario - FPI. The blue dots
show the period in which the rm takes its rst international steps in the combined interna-
tional investment scenario - FDI. Figure (2.3) shows that even with a low R&D-probability,
the rm engages in its rst international investment. However, we have to distinguish be-
tween the rst international investment and the investment in FDI. In both cases, the rst
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international activity under CII (CII FDI and FPI vs isolated FPI) takes place at an earlier
date in time than the rst international rm activity under an isolated international invest-
ment strategy. Additionally, the rst international activity requires a lower R&D success
probability under CII than for the isolated international investments.
At a moderate probability, the rm switches from home to international investment
(isol. FPI and combined FPI-FDI respectively at the same time). With increasing probabil-
ity, the isolated investment even dominates the combined strategy in time. It is important
to keep in mind that in the current situation a rm starting isolated FPI is compared with a
rm starting combined FPI and FDI at the same time.
0
1
period
switch cii
switch iso fpi
0
l
Fig. 2.3. First International Investment
Now, we turn to the comparison of isolated FDI and the combined international in-
vestment. For the switch to FDI the picture changes as shown in Figure (2.4). In Figure
(2.4) the rst investment in FDI for the isolated and the combined international investment
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Fig. 2.4. First isolated international investment vs combined FDI
are compared. Both investments are depicted in dependence of the R&D success probabil-
ity . Again the pink dots stand for the period in which the rm switches from only home
investment to FDI in the isolated investment scenario and the blue dots show the period of
the switch for the combined international investment scenario. Under CII the rm switches
from home production to international investment at a lower R&D-probability and at an
earlier stage in time. Furthermore, with increasing success-probability, CII still dominates
the isolated investments in time.
However, CII does not always dominate isolated FDI in productivity. Particularly,
the productivity cut-offs for FDI under CII do not always lie below the cut-offs for isolated
FDI. The productivity cut-offs are analysed according to the value of  at which the rm
switches from one strategy (for example home) to another strategy (for example FDI). We
compare the marginal impact of  on the different discounted capital ows under a given
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productivity level. The gures (2.5) and (2.6) show the different productivities for FDI cut
off with isolated FDI (iso) and CII-FDI (cii) in dependence of various R&D success prob-
abilities. The pink line resembles the various cut offs in the isolated investment scenario
and the blue line displays the cut-offs for the combined international investment scenario.
In Figure (2.5) productivity of the rst FDI for the isolated and the combined international
investment strategy are compared. The R&D success probability varies and a positive cor-
relation between FDI and FPI is assumed. In Figure (2.6) productivities of the rst FDI for
the isolated and the combined international investment are compared. The R&D success
probability varies and a negative correlation between FDI and FPI is assumed.
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Fig. 2.5. Isolated vs Combined FDI Productivity with positive FDI - FPI Correlation
The dominance of the isolated investment strategy might be unexpected. In the case
of the positively correlated foreign productivities, FPI cannot prop up the FDI variations
directly. But FPI absorbs the variations of the domestic productivity. The rm only invests
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Fig. 2.6. Isolated vs Combined FDI Productivity with negative FDI - FPI Correlation
in southern FDI if it has a high impact on the foreign productivity, hence  inuences sig-
nicantly the foreign direct return. This in turn transfers the domestic variations into the
foreign productivity. These variations constitute a high share of the foreign variation as the
impact of  is high. Since FPI is an effective instrument to dampen the domestic variation
resulting from , FPI indirectly smoothes variations in the foreign direct return. The incen-
tive to invest in domestic R&D is enhanced by this mechanism and the productivity cut-off
is higher than without the combined investment possibility.
In the case of the negative correlation, the productivity cut-offs of both investment
strategies are as expected. The isolated cut-off productivity is always higher than the cut-
off for the combined international investments. Obviously, FPI props up the FDI variations
as well as the variations resulting from domestic productivity uncertainty.
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One should not neglect that with positive as well as with negative correlated interna-
tional investments the combined international investment starts not only earlier in time than
the isolated international investment but also at a lower R&D success-probability. Thus, the
possibility to use FPI as a nancial hedging instrument boosts the value of corporate diver-
sication via FDI. This conrms the results in Table (2.9).
Variation of Foreign Productivity
First of all, minor changes in the foreign productivities relation may diminish completely
any international investment under isolated strategy. If both productivities are very low
or at least the FPI-productivity is very low, then the rm does not invest abroad. On the
other hand, these changes do not reduce totally international investment under CII. The
productivity cut-off changes, as both foreign productivities drift apart (negatively corre-
lated) or move together (positively correlated). The following gures (2.7) and (2.8) show
the variation of FPI and FDI shares in dependence on their productivity relation. In Figure
(2.7) investment shares of FPI in the combined international investment scenario are de-
picted with a negative (yellow line) as well as positive (blue line) correlation between FPI
and FDI. In Figure (2.8) investment shares of FDI in the combined international investment
scenario are depicted with a negative (yellow line) as well as positive (blue line) correlation
between FPI and FDI.
Overall, the share of FPI varies more through the changed productivities than through
the FDI shares. The latter are more stable than the former. Additionally, FPI shares un-
der CII uctuate even more than under isolated international investment. Hence, with CII
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the rm reacts to short-term changes in its environment by adjusting FPI and keeping FDI
stable. Thus, FPI does not necessarily increase with FDI, but adjusts according to R&D-
probability, depreciation and variation in home and both foreign productivities. These re-
sults conrm again the risk-adjusting task of FPI and the more sluggish technology transfer
FDI instrument.
2.5 Conclusion 104
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
R&D success probability
negative correlation
positive correlation
Fig. 2.8. Combined FDI Shares
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows that even though the empirical distinction between FDI and FPI is rather
complicated, a differentiation of a rm's motivation to use these investment instruments is
possible.69 Until now, the existing literature does not take possible effects of the combina-
tion of different investment instruments into account. Furthermore, most analyses are static
and do not emphasize the date at which a rm starts to invest internationally. An early start
in international activities may be important to gain specic market shares and build up in-
ternational reputation before the competitors do. To ll that gap, we examine the relation
of FPI and FDI in a dynamic investment setting. The results indicate that this relation is
rather strategic complementary. Isolated FPI and FDI investments are compared to com-
69 Empirical data for rms' FPI is very hard to obtain. Aggregate portfolio investment data is available on
rm level. The sector or industry of the portfolio investment is not possible to locate because there is no
notication requirement for rms.
2.5 Conclusion 105
bined FPI and FDI investments. The combined investment strategy dominates the isolated
investments always in time. Furthermorew, CII comprises a higher incentive to invest in
R&D. The existing literature does not allow for this combination of FDI and FPI and only
concentrates on isolated FDI. Thus, possible advantages from the combination between dif-
ferent investment instruments are neglected. We nd that the risk diversifying effect from
additional FPI pushes the marginal valuation of R&D investment above the valuation with
isolated investment strategies. As a consequence, home productivity increases much faster
and without smaller relative opportunity costs than under isolated investment strategies. Fi-
nally, this leads to a higher productivity cut off for FDI but at an earlier date in time. The
signicant higher CII R&D investment than isolated FDI R&D investment conrms this
observation. Surprisingly, this is not only the case with a combination of horizontal FDI in
a country with similar structure and FPI in a country with dissimilar structure to the home
country, but also with both international investments in a dissimilar country structure to the
home structure.
Furthermore, we also nd that rms adjust to short-term changes via FPI and keep
FDI stable. FPI can prop up small and medium sized changes and therefore, the valuation
of FDI with combined FPI is higher than of isolated FDI. Hence, a combined FPI and
FDI investment strategy increases the rms' exibility. A combination of both investment
instruments increases the valuation of the respective instruments.
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2.6 Appendix
Derivation of Expected Capital Flow
The value of the rm in the case without international investment is a function of the state
variable  (productivity).
dV h = V h d (2.80)
The state variable follows a Poisson process with q = 1 with prob. dt and q = 0
with probability (1  dt):
) d =

(1  ) 
K

dq: (2.81)
According to (2.80), the expected capital ow of the rm E
 
dV h

depends on . Using
the denition (2.81) of the productivity variation leads to the expected capital ow of the
rm:
) E  dV h =  V h(1  ) 
K



  V ()

dt| {z }
change of capital ow caused by increased  weighted with the probability
(2.82)
+ (1  dt) V h ()  V h ()| {z }
change of capital ow in the case of unchanged  weighted with respective probability
(2.83)
) E  dV h = + V h ()  V h () dt (2.84)
with
 

(1  ) 
K

(2.85)
For a general discussion of Poisson processes in continuous time, see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994).
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Derivation of the Prot Function with Variable Revenue
Domestic consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences for differentiated goods with elasticity
of substitution # = 1
1 ' > 1. The price index for the home country is
P =
Z
j2J
p (j)1 # dj
 1
1 #
(2.86)
and the demand level is
A =
Z
j2J
x (j)' dj
 1
'
. (2.87)
From (2.86) and (2.87) we derive the demand function
xi = Ap
 #
i (2.88)
for each good variety produced by rm i. In the following, the rm index i is neglected, as
we just analyse one representative rm.
According to (2.42) the prot of the rm in period t equals
t (t) = r
h
t   fht  
xht
t
  t. (2.89)
Revenue equals supply multiplied by the price we can rearrange (2.89) to
t (t) = r
h
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1
p
  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Chapter 3
Do Regional Trade and Specialization Drive
Intra-Regional Risk-Sharing?
3.1 Introduction
The question whether increasing trade drives convergence or divergence of business cy-
cles, has severe implications for integration processes between countries and regions. With
increasing trade integration countries become more and more dependent on their trading
partner's economy. Additionally, economic variations may inuence neighbour countries
through various channels. Hence, this issue has been examined via various approaches.
The most prominent ones are the empirical analysis of Frankel and Rose (1998) and the
theoretical study by Krugman (1993). The former conclude that increasing trade leads to
business cycle convergence between the trading partners. By contrast, Krugman (1993) de-
rives that increasing trade implies higher specialization. Consequently, business cycles of
trading partners diverge. Both results have entered the discussions of future possible cur-
rency unions or the choice of exchange rate regimes in different regions.70 Either way, trade
and in particular trade patterns within a region and between regions appear to inuence the
industrial shape of regions. Furthermore, business cycle co-movements depend on the in-
70 For example Reisen and van Trotsenburg (1988) discuss a possible peg of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore
and Taiwan to the Yen. Among others they claim insufcient integration between these countries and Japan as
an argument against the peg. Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann (2004) analyse the implications of the exchange
rate choice on trade integration and appeal of foreign investment ows. They argue in favour of a dual
currency board for Mercusor. In particular, the domestic currencies should be pegged to the US-dollar and
the Euro, i.e. the two main trading partners.
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dustrial specialization and involve different degrees of intra and inter-regional risk sharing.
In turn, risk sharing affects shock transmission between countries and, therefore, impacts
for example monetary policy decisions as well as exchange rate choices.71
The goal of the present chapter is two-fold. First, we explore the impact of dif-
ferent trade patterns on industrial specialization and consequently on business cycle co-
movements between and within different regions. We particularly emphasize industrial
specialization as a result of intra- or inter-industry trade. Second, we analyse the degree of
risk-sharing between and within the regions. In particular, the purpose is to clarify direct
and indirect channels between trade, specialization, business cycle co-movements and risk
sharing.
The empirical analysis is conducted for Europe, Asia and Latin America. We select
Europe due to its high level of integration with its one single market in goods and services.
Asia and Latin America are chosen as these economies rapidly increase their shares on
the world economy.72 Moreover, between these three country groupings the process of in-
ternational integration has taken different forms and different speed. Fishlow and Haggard
(1992) state that the European integration is driven by an intrinsic political motivation. This
development is said to have happened due to the common institutions of the EU. In contrast,
the authors explain that the integration process in Asia or Latin America is mostly driven
by economic aspects, for example to constitute a counterweight to an international hege-
71 For a detailed discussion of risk sharing and shock transmission among U.S. states see Del Negro (2002).
Labhard and Sawicki (2006) provide empirical evidence of higher risk sharing within the United Kingdom
than between the United Kingdom and other OECD countries. Additionally, they analyse different channels
of risk sharing and their varying relevance over time.
72 See IMF (2007).
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mony. Superior institutions to monitor this integration are rather lacking in Asia or Latin
America.73 The various origins of trade as well as nancial integration may have caused
the different manifestation of the present integration within the various regions. This may
result in different degrees of specialization and risk-sharing within these regions.74
Methodically, we follow Imbs (2004) and implement a simultaneous-equation ap-
proach to examine the importance of inter and intra-industry trade and its impact on spe-
cialization and risk sharing between the country groups. The application of 1 digit industry
trade data and total trade data allows for analysing different trade patterns between regions
and within regions. According to the literature, the business cycle convergence or diver-
gence mainly depends on the specialization pattern within the examined region. Hence, we
distinguish between similar specialization and asymmetric specialization within a country
group. It is to be expected that countries within a region with homogeneous specializations
show intra-industry trade. Hence, regional business-cycles converge. Consequently, risk-
sharing within these regions is not possible. These countries tend to be more internationally
nancially integrated than regionally. Inter-industry trade arises in countries within regions
with heterogeneous specialization. As a result, regional business-cycles diverge and coun-
tries can share risk within the region. Regional nancial integration is stronger for these
countries than international nancial integration. Additionally, we study whether the same
patterns create risk sharing also in the means of consumption co-movements between or
within a region.
73 For a detailed discussion on this subject, see also Mukhametdinov (2007) or Eichengreen and Park (2003).
74 See also Eichengreen and Park (2003) for a detailed discussion of the different factors causing dissimilar
degrees of nancial integration for Europe and Asia.
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We follow the recent literature by combining nancial, industry trade data and busi-
ness cycles as the simultaneous explaining variables. In contrast to other studies, our em-
pirical analysis also controls for different levels of risk sharing within a simultaneous equa-
tion model of trade, industrial specialization, nancial integration and business cycle co-
movements. The direct and indirect channels of inter- or intra-regional risk sharing with
simultaneous trade and nancial integration as well as industrial specialization and busi-
ness cycle co-movements are widely unexplored yet. Moreover, we compare not only two
but three large regions exhibiting different motivations and stages of nancial and eco-
nomic integration. As the following literature shows, different country groups like OECD
or non-OECD countries not only react differently to variations in trade structure, special-
ization and nancial integration, but also show differing sensitivity to industry or country
shocks. Thus, with the comparison of three different country groupings, we emphasize
the varying impact of trade, specialization, business cycles and nancial integration. This
in turn might shed some light on the different transmission channels for economic shocks
between these dissimilar country groupings.
The remainder of Chapter 3 is organised as follows. Section 2 links the issue to the
recent literature and derives two hypotheses. Then, we describe the methodology and the
data in section 3. The discussion of the results and their robustness follows in section 4 and
5. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes Chapter 3.
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3.2 Theoretical Foundation
The increasing international integration has lead to an increased importance of business cy-
cle co-movements. The transmission channels especially of shocks between countries and
regions are a feature of the business cycle mechanisms that needs to be considered. Ex-
ploring the impact of trade and specialization on business cycle co-movements between
countries and regions might help to understand how policy makers should react to eco-
nomic shocks in neighbouring countries. Frankel and Rose (1998) suggest in an empirical
approach of twenty-one countries from 1959 - 1993 that, under the assumption of dom-
inant demand shocks and a high share of intra-industry trade, business cycles converge
with increasing trade and nancial integration between trading countries. Heathcote and
Perry (2003, 2004) argument in the opposite manner. The authors state that from 1960 to
2002 the U.S. business cycle has become less correlated with the business cycles in the
rest of the industrialized world.75 They refer this change in business cycle co-movement to
increasing nancial integration and less correlated shocks. Furthermore, the authors disen-
tangle two opposed effects of nancial integration on consumption co-movement between
countries. Firstly, nancial integration increases consumption correlation if nancial mar-
kets are used to smooth the optimal consumption path through time. Secondly, nancial
integration decreases consumption correlation if nancial markets are used to adjust the op-
timal composition of foreign and domestic goods in the consumption bundle. The present
75 "The rest of the world" in the analysis of Heathcote and Perry (2003, 2004) consists of 15 European Union
countries and Japan.
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analysis considers these different aspects. Additionally, we analyse the impact of nancial
market variables on consumption risk sharing as well as on business cycle co-movements.
Campa and Fernandes (2006) analyse the development of country and industry shocks
as impact factors on portfolio returns for 48 countries from 1990 to 2000. The impact of
both factors on portfolio returns depends strongly on the international integration of the re-
spective country or industry. Their main result is that the driving force behind the rise of
global industry shocks is the nancial market integration. On the country level, they nd
a higher correlation between the country's business cycle and the world's business cycle
with higher economic integration. Precisely, for poor countries the importance of coun-
try factors decreases with the degree of international nancial integration. Yet, in general,
the impact of country factors rises with a high degree of specialization and active nancial
markets. Furthermore, with increasing economic integration and trade, the magnitude of
industry shocks increases and that of country shocks decreases. Rose and Spiegel (2007)
state a positive correlation between remoteness from nancial activity, proxied by the dis-
tance to major international nancial centres, and macroeconomic volatility. Even though
their results are sensitive to changes in the country selection, they conclude that nancial
integration as well as geography matter for business cycle behaviour. This again indicates
that identical factors cause different developments in dependence of the country charac-
teristics. Therefore, the major country groups in the present sample, Europe and Latin
America, are each subdivided in two smaller parts: Europe Core and Europe CEEC; Latin
America Central and Latin America South. This approach is supposed to clarify the dif-
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ferent reactions of the different country groups to the impact of trade, specialization and
nancial integration.
The impact of business cycle co-movements on nancial risk-sharing as well as on
consumption risk-sharing between countries might serve as an explanation on how shocks
may be absorbed through these channels, since risk-sharing can substitute for missing
mechanisms like exchange rate volatility or labour mobility. Labhard and Sawicki (2006)
analyse the degree and channels of risk sharing within the United Kingdom and between
the United Kingdom and OECD from 1970 to 2001. They indicate that risk sharing within
the United Kingdom is higher than between the United Kingdom and OECD. Additionally,
they nd that at the regional level, the main fraction of risk is shared through cross-regional
asset holdings. At the international level, risk sharing takes place via borrowing and lend-
ing. One further result of their study is that even though the role of capital markets for risk
sharing has increased, the overall degree of risk sharing has declined over time. Kim and
Sheen (2006) examine the risk sharing channels within Australia and between Australia
and New Zealand from 1960 to 2002. They explicitly distinguish between the different
possible channels like risk sharing via market mechanisms, scal policy or labour mobil-
ity. One result of their study is that capital and credit markets are the main risk sharing
channel. Direct scal policy amplies idiosyncratic shocks across Australian states only to
relatively low degree. However, the increasing importance of capital and especially credit
markets since 1992 might be interpreted as a result of nancial market deregulations of the
Australian government. Shin and Sohn (2005) evaluate the effects of nancial and trade in-
tegration on business cycle co-movements in East Asia over the years 1971 - 2003. They
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compare the integration impact on consumption co-movement in comparison to the impact
on output co-movements. The authors conclude that trade integration enforces output co-
movement but nancial integration does not. Furthermore, they state that increasing trade
does not enhance consumption co-movement or risk-sharing. One of their assumptions is
that trade liberalization tends to take place at the regional level more intensively. In con-
trast, nancial integration is not supposed to be regionally boosted, because nancial assets
are weightless.
One important factor for business cycle co-movement between different countries
is the degree of specialization as a consequence of bilateral trade ows. Rodriguez-Pose
and Gill (2006) distinguish different trade patterns of manufactured and agricultural goods.
Their sample consists of four developing and four developed countries over the period
1980 - 2000. They explore how changes of manufactured to agricultural trade ows in-
crease regional disparities (increasing trade in manufacturing goods, agricultural trade un-
changed).76 For six of seven countries the authors exhibit that regional disparities increase
as agricultural exports became less important than manufacturing exports. According to
this study, regional disparities decreased with increasing manufacturing exports and un-
changed agricultural exports.
Another important factor is the degree of nancial development. In this context
Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) examine the impact of nancial markets and their devel-
opment on industrial specialization for 27 OECD countries. Their results indicate that
nancial development among the OECD countries has had greater impact on specialization
76 Their study includes the countries: Brazil, China, Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Spain and USA.
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than human or physical capital. According to their results, specialization of trading coun-
tries is driven by the nancial sector. Hence, industry specic shocks affect the trading
countries according to their industrial specialization.
Finally, Imbs (2004) examines whether specialization patterns have had a direct im-
pact on business-cycle co-movements of trading countries. He covers 24 countries over
different time periods but mainly 1980 - 2000. The cycles converged with increasing simi-
larity between the countries. Financial integration within a region has boosted the conver-
gence even more.
All these results indicate that the impact of trade, specialization, business cycle-co-
movements and nancial integration is very sensitive to the chosen country or region. Thus
in the present study, three different country groups are examined and two of these country
groups are additionally subdivided. Consequently, the estimated hypotheses should reect
the impact of different country groupings. Furthermore, the literature on risk sharing it-
self does not come to a consentaneous conclusion either, even with considering different
characteristics of the respective countries and regions. The missing link for different direc-
tions of risk sharing might be industrial specialization within one region or country group
respectively. According to the standard trade literature, trade might drive specialization in
different industries and inter-industry trade arises as a consequence of specialization. Fur-
thermore, there might be specialization in similar industries within one country group and
intra-industry trade is the consequence within this country group. These considerations
will be combined with the risk-sharing literature.
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There are two strands of literature arguing in favour of two different directions of
risk sharing within a region: the rst is represented for example by Asdrubali et al. (1996),
Crucini (1999) or Bayoumi and Klein (1997). They all conclude that risk sharing is higher
for regions within a country than between different countries. This suggests that a country
group with synchronized business cycles is supposed to share more risk within the group
than members of a country group with diverging business cycles. Athanasoulis and van
Wincoop (2001) examine risk sharing behaviour among the states of the USA for the years
1963 - 1990. The authors state that regions of a country share more risk among each other
if there are no capital controls or language barriers. Additionally, a common regulatory
framework, common accounting standards and a shared currency enhance the risk sharing
between these regions. These results are supported by the studies of for example Bayoumi
and Klein (1997) and Crucini (1999). Bayoumi and Klein examine the integration process
within Canada and between Canada and the rest of the world. The authors analyse the years
1971 - 1992. Bayoumi and Klein state that national borders matter signicantly for inte-
gration of trade, nancial markets and risk sharing. Crucini covers the years 1970 - 1990.
His results indicate that during this time, the Canadian provinces and the U. S. states shared
more risk among each other than the G-7 countries between each other. Generalising these
results may lead to the assumption that, with successive trade and nancial liberalization,
risk sharing increases between countries. Furthermore, if the countries are endowed with
different factors, then the trading countries specialize in different industries and goods, re-
spectively. These countries may then be more vulnerable to idiosyncratic industry shocks.
As a result, business cycles of the trading partners become less correlated and risk-sharing
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becomes possible between the trading countries. From these considerations, hypothesis 1
can be derived:
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Hypothesis 1 A group of countries with dissimilar factor endowments specialize in the
production of dissimilar goods. Trade arises between industries and drives specializa-
tion. Business cycles of these countries will diverge and risk-sharing is possible within
the respective country group.
In contrast to these approaches, there are others suggesting that regions within a
country do not share a high amount of risk among each other. Regions within a country
are supposed to exhibit a low degree of risk sharing. Hess and Shin (1998) analyse risk
sharing behaviour of U.S. states. They afrm that the states within the US share less risk
among each other than internationally. Hess and Shin (2000) test USA household data
from 1981 to 1987. They conclude that during this period risk sharing among states and
industries of the USA is rather low. Similarly, van Wincoop (1995) concludes that in the
years 1970 - 1989 there is no difference in risk sharing among the Japanese prefectures and
among the OECD countries. More recently, Kim and Sheen (2006) examine the degree
of risk sharing between Australia and New Zealand. For reasons of comparison, they also
study the risk sharing behaviour between Australia and the USA. Even though the business
cycles are more synchronized between Australia and the USA, the degree of risk sharing
is signicantly lower than between Australia and New Zealand. Hence, it is not mandatory
that similar countries share risk. Again, generalising the results for regions of a country
allows for the consideration that countries within a country group specialise in similar
industries. Thus, with proceeding trade integration industries will concentrate and intra-
industry trade arises. This in turn leads to convergence of business cycles between the
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trading partners and vulnerability for the same shocks for one country group. Consequently,
only a low degree of risk sharing among these countries is possible. Hence, the second
hypothesis accounts for the specialization of a country group in similar industries and its
consequences:
Hypothesis 2 Countries within one region specialize in similar industries. The main
share of trade is intra-industry and trade does not drive specialization within the country
group. Business cycles for this country group tend to converge and risk-sharing cannot
take place within the country group.
It is important to note that the conrmation of the hypotheses might be valid for
a region as a whole, but they vary within the region. For example, the European core
countries may display different specialization patterns from the peripheral countries or the
new accession countries. Therefore, we do not only focus on the three major regions Asia,
Europe and Latin America, but we regroup Europe and Latin America into two subgroups:
Europe Core, Europe CEEC, Latin America Central, Latin America South.
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3.3 Methodology and Data
We construct four equations according to the two hypotheses. These equations reproduce
the simultaneous impact of trade, specialization and business-cycle-correlations.
riskij = 0 + 1tradeij + 2specij + 3bcij + a4C1 + "1;ij (3.92)
tradeij = 0 + 1specij + 2C2 + "2;ij (3.93)
specij = 0 + 1tradeij + 2C3 + "3;ij (3.94)
bcij = 0 + 1tradeij + 2spec ij + 3C4 + "4;ij . (3.95)
To evaluate the simultaneous impact of trade, specialization and business-cycle-correlation
on cross-country risk sharing, we estimate the above equation system. The indices i and j
mark the country and the trading partner respectively. The endogenous variables are risk
sharing  risk, bilateral trade intensity  trade, bilateral specialization  spec and bi-
lateral movement of business-cycles  bc. Each estimation equation contains a vector of
exogenous determinants C1; C2;C3;C4. These vectors are specic for every endogenous
variable. In order to identify the system differences between these vectors are required.
C1 includes nancial controls. The nancial controls take into account the nancial depth,
nancial activity, size of the stock market and the activity of the stock market of the respec-
tive country and its partner country. We use the most common proxies for these nancial
controls: nancial depth is indicated by the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of
credit from any nancial institution to GDP is our proxy for nancial activity, the size of
the stock market is measured by the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio and the ac-
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tivity of the stock market by the total value of the stock market to GDP ratio.77 C2 is the
vector for the trade estimation. It controls for the similarity of the two trading countries.
Therefore, distance, GDP, language, religion, ethnic, distance and a dummy for a shared
border are included. C3 consists of proxies for differences in growth and nancial debts
of the two trading countries. C4 depicts differences in nancial growth of a country pair
and also includes industrial dummies. We control in every estimation for time and country
effects.
Risk sharing is the dependent variable in equation (3.92). In view of the proceed-
ing economic integration, it has gained particularly importance. Increased risk sharing
can reduce vulnerability of countries and industries from shocks in neighbouring countries
and regions. Additionally, risk sharing via credit and nancial markets can substitute for
missing governmental adjustment mechanisms.78 Trade is directly included as estimator in
this equation because trade might work as a transmission channel for productivity shocks
between trading partners. The expected effect of trade on risk sharing depends on the un-
derlying theory: hypothesis 1 suggests a negative or insignicant impact of trade on risk
sharing, 1would be negative. Trade transfers shocks only between different industries and
in this case not to the trading partner's industry. Thus, increasing trade does not increase
vulnerability of the trading partner's economy. With regard to hypothesis 2, the sign of 1
is expected to be positive as with increasing trade between countries their dependence on
77 For a detailed discussion of these nancial measures, see Beck et al. (1999).
78 See for example Labhard and Sawicke (2006), Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), Athanasoulis
and van Wincoop (2001). They all show the importance of risk sharing and the increasing vulnerability to
shocks through increasing economic integration. Furthermore, the relevance of different risk sharing channels
changes and hence they can only partly substitute for each other. This is an important fact to be considered
for scal policy settings.
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each other's economies increases and so does their need for risk sharing. Equation (3.93)
measures whether trade is driven by specialization or not. Specialization, spec, is a estima-
tor in the trade equation and Spec is high for countries with very different specialization
patterns. A negative 1 indicates that trade increases with a decreasing level of dissimi-
larity. Trading partners with related industrial characteristics combine a positive 1with a
negative 1. Even though shocks are transferred more easily from one country to another
country through increased trade, due to similar industry structure between the countries,
risk sharing is reduced. In contrast, trading partners with dissimilar industries combine a
negative 1 with a positive 1. Shock transmission is hindered by increasing inter-industry
trade and additional risk sharing is possible through the varying specialization patterns be-
tween the trading partners. Moreover, 2 impacts risk sharing via tradeij . In C2 various
gravity variables and home and foreign gdp data are included. Thus, the complete effect of
trade on risk sharing consists of 11 + 12.
The second estimator in the risk sharing equation (3.92) is specialization. The di-
rect impact of specialization on risk sharing is expected to be positive. Higher specializa-
tion is accompanied by increasing possibilities to share country and industry specic risk.
However, there are also two indirect effects to consider. The rst factor is trade. In depen-
dence of the underlying theory, trade can boost specialization in various directions between
trading partners as well as drive specialization in similar industries. Consequently, with
hypothesis 1, the effect of 21 is supposed to be positive. A negative effect of 21 is ex-
pected with hypothesis 2. C3 includes specic variables for specialization like differences
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in the development of nancial markets and in country size of the trading partners. The
entire impact of specialization is 21 + 22.
Business-cycle co-movement is the third estimator for risk-sharing in equation (3.92).
The isolated direct effect of business cycle co-movement 3 is expected to be negative.
Convergence of business cycles hinders risk sharing between the respective countries. The
entire impact on risk sharing consists of three components: 31+32+33. Trade can
impact business cycle co-movements in either direction. According to hypothesis 1, the
assumed inuence of trade is negative as with increasing trade business cycles diverge.
Reversely, with hypothesis 2 business cycles between countries converge with increas-
ing trade. The sign of 1 depends on the underlying hypothesis. Specialization always
drives co-movements. However, 2 is not unambiguously signed. Increasing specializa-
tion in varying industries leads to diverging and synchronous specialization to converging
business-cycles between countries. Finally, there are industry and country specic vari-
ables included in C4.
The last estimator 4 in the risk sharing equation (3.92) encompasses in C1 nancial
variables to control for differences in nancial development. These include proxy variables
for the size and activity of the stock market and measures for nancial development, nan-
cial depth and activity of nancial intermediaries of a country and of his trading partner.
The discussion of the estimators claries the simultaneous inuence of trade, spe-
cialization and business cycles. To allow for this two-way endogeneity, we apply a simul-
taneous estimation method analogue to Imbs (2004). Three-stage least squares estimates
the system in three steps and considers the endogeneity between the dependent variables
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of equation (3.93) - (3.95): trade, specialization and business cycle co-movements. In the
rst step, instrumented values for all endogenous variables are developed. In a second
step, the covariance matrix of the estimation disturbances is estimated. Finally, in the third
step by using this covariance matrix a GLS estimation of (3.92) is implemented. Here, the
instrumented values are placed instead of the right-hand-side endogenous variables.79
The analysis includes 60 countries from Asia, Europe and Latin America from 1980
to 2005.80 To account for different stages of integration within a country group, we split
the European and the Latin American countries in two different country groups: for Eu-
rope, CEEC and Core, and for Latin America, Central and South. Hence, the results can
be categorized in differences between the three continents Asia, Europe and Latin Amer-
ica, and regional differences within continents Europe Core and CEEC and Latin America
Central and South. Within every continental country group, we arrange country pairs for
each country with each other country. The results will be presented by comparing all coun-
try groups: Asia, Europe CEEC, Europe Core, Latin America Central and Latin America
South.
Imbs (2004) constructs a measure of risk sharing for country-pairs using the data from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). This measure depends on the net foreign asset positions
of the country-pairs. He argues that countries with different external positions are more
likely to share risk with each other than countries with similar net foreign asset positions.
Analogue to this measure, we use data from theWorld BankWorld Development Indicators
79 For a detailed discussion of simultaneous estimation, see Wooldridge (2002) and 3SLS Zellner and Theil
(1962).
80 A list of the included countries can be found in 3.7 Appendix.
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(WDI) to create a similar index for nancial risk sharing between country pairs in the period
1980 - 200581
risk1ij =
nfaigdpi   nfajgdpj
 .
The measure indicates the difference of the countries net foreign asset position (nfa) as
a share of the respective country GDP. According to Imbs (2004), risk1ij will be higher
the more diverse the net foreign positions of a country-pair are. It will be low for countries
with similar positions. This indicates that these countries do not tend to borrow or lend very
much from each other. As a second measure of risk sharing, we use the consumption corre-
lation between the country pairs. Generally, consumption correlation tends to synchronize
for countries that pool their risks. These countries are not restricted to their domestic output
and cross-country consumption correlation is higher. The development and activity of the
nancial markets also play a major role for risk sharing between two countries. Thus, the
extent of risk sharing and the corresponding consumption correlation depend on the cho-
sen country group and their bilateral nancial integration. This justies the diverse country
groupings between the continents and within a continent. There is no denite consensus
about the effects of risk sharing on the dimension of consumption correlation. Particularly,
the impact of nancial market integration on consumption correlation is twofold.
Feeney and Jones (1994) suggest a differentiated view on consumption. Agents re-
spond differently to aggregate consumption risk or composite consumption risk. The model
of Pakko (1997) suggests that, even with complete asset markets, a low cross-country con-
sumption correlation is possible. This contradicts the ndings of Baxter and Crucini (1995).
81 For sensitivity analysis, we also generate this measure using data from the Penn World Tables 6.2.
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They suggest that asset market incompleteness accounts for low cross-country consumption
correlation. Restrained risk-sharing opportunities tie consumption more closely to domes-
tic output than to world output and hence the cross-country correlation is lower. In line
with these ndings Heathcote and Perry (2003) conclude for the US that nancial integra-
tion can have two different impacts on consumption correlation. First, increasing nancial
integration boosts cross-country consumption correlation because agents use nancial mar-
kets to smooth their total consumption over time. Second, nancial integration decreases
consumption correlation between countries because consumers use nancial markets to re-
duce deviations in their bundle from the optimal composition of home and foreign goods.
Hence, consumption correlation as a measure of risk sharing between different country
groupings can be used as conrmation of the nancial risk sharing measure. Additionally,
it is important to control for nancial integration and development as well. This is done by
the equation specic control variables C1 C4. The consumption data is obtained from the
World Bank's World Development Indicator Data Base (WDI).
We use total trade data from the IMF database total direction of trade and 1 digit in-
dustry trade data from the UN Comtrade database. Both datasets include the 60 countries
from 1980 to 2005. To measure trade intensity, we use a standard measure for trade inten-
sity according to Frankel and Rose (1998). The rst trade measure relates bilateral trade
ows to the total international trade activity of the respective countries:
trade1 =
1
T
TP
t=1
xijt +mijt
xi:t + xj:t +mi:t +mj:t
. (3.96)
xijt denotes the total export of country i to country j at time t. Imports between the coun-
tries at the time t are dened by mijt. The higher trade1, the higher is the trade intensity
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between the countries i and j. The second measure relates trade activity between the trad-
ing partners to their GDP. Trade intensity is connected to country size
trade2 =
1
T
TP
t=1
xijt +mijt
gdpi:t + gdpj:t
. (3.97)
This measure shows the share of trade between the countries divided by their total output:
For all countries the GDP data is taken from the Penn World Tables and for a sensitivity
check we use data from the Worldbank World Development Indicators.
We use a third measure of trade intensity analogue to the one used by Deardorff
(1998). In contrast to the index in (3.97) the trade activities of this third measure are
weighted with world GDP.82
trade3 = 0; 5
1
T
TP
t=1
(xijt +mijt) gdpwt
gdpi:t  gdpj:t . (3.98)
Size effects are eliminated and trade intensity only depends on trade barriers. In particular,
this third trade measure (3.98) takes the value 1 if there are no trade barriers and preferences
are homothetic.83
Specialization is measured by two different indices. However, the measure from Imbs
(2003) is the basis for both indices
specij =
1
T
TP
t=1
KP
k=1
jski   skjj, (3.99)
where ski is the share of industry k in country i. This share is measured by industry output
relative to total country GDP or industry value added relative to total country GDP. Indus-
try data is obtained from the Unido Industrial Database. According to (3.99), the more
82 This measure is constructed with the WDI data only.
83 See Deardorff (1998) for a derivation of these results.
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countries specialize in simultaneous industries, the lower is specij . Country pairs with no
similar specialization display a high specij .
Business cycle co-movements are measured by cross-country correlation of GDP. The
data for the macroeconomic variable is taken from the WDI database. In order to isolate
the cyclical component of the data, we use the Christiano Fitzgerald Random Walk Band
Pass lter described in Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). This lter is a generalization of
the Baxter King Band Pass Fitler.
The data for the nancial control variables in equation (3.92) are taken from the
WDI database. Additional gravity data in equation (3.93) is obtained from the CIA World
Factbook. Distances between capital cities are provided by John Byers' Website "Chemical
Ecology of Insects".
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimations with Total Trade Data
Financial Risk Sharing
Table (3.12) contains the results of the simultaneous estimation of equation (3.92) with the
total trade data.84 Financial risk-sharing is explained by trade, specialization and business
cycle behaviour. The results indicate a signicant negative impact of trade on nancial risk
sharing only for the European CEEC and the central Latin American countries.85
84 In Table (3.12) data is total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by net foreign asset positions.
85 The gravity variables in Table (3.18) in 3.7 Appendix show the expected signs. Only for the European
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Trade -0.2226 -0.2660 -0.0082 -0.0321 -0.2227
(-1.33) (-5.90) (-1.57) (-4.05) (-0.46)
Spec 0.0181 -0.1381 0.0008 -0.0029 -0.2182
(1.34) (-7.59) (5.45) (-1.59) (-1.25)
BC 0.3285 0.0073 0.0012 0.0017 -0.2415
(1.70) (6.81) (2.48) (2.27) (-3.01)
N 2040 1070 202 134 1030
R2 0.41 -0.78 -1.31 0.55 -0.56
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.12. Direct Impact on Risk Diversication separated by Country Groups
Hence, trade is not necessarily a channel for productivity shocks which turn into bilat-
eral nancial risk sharing between the trading countries. Even though trade might increase
a country's vulnerability to its neighbours shocks, these shocks may not be dampened by -
nancial risk sharing between these countries or the respective country group. For the CEEC
and the Central Latin American countries, bilateral nancial risk sharing actually decreases
with higher bilateral trade. For these country groups, trade transfers additional shocks from
one country to another but this additional risk is not dampened within the group. The sig-
nicant negative trade impact on risk sharing might be interpreted as a stronger risk sharing
of the countries within the group with countries outside the respective country group.
Regarding specialization, the results exhibit a signicant impact on risk sharing within
a country group only for the European countries. Interestingly, the direction of the impact
differs for CEEC compared to the European Core countries. For the European Core coun-
tries, the results suggest that with higher specialization in different industries the countries
CEEC and the Central American countries distance is positive but not signicant.
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increase their nancial risk sharing among each other. They exploit the various shock vul-
nerability to dampen possible shocks on their respective main industry. In contrast, for the
CEEC countries risk sharing decreases with higher specialization. Analogue to the signi-
cant negative trade impact on nancial risk sharing, this effect might be caused by stronger
linkages to countries outside than within the CEEC-group. The insignicant inuence of
distance on bilateral trade for the CEEC supports the assumption of a less regional link-
age of these countries, and stronger relations to countries outside this country group.86 The
same holds for the Central American countries. The results also exhibit a negative impact
of bilateral trade on risk sharing. The European CEEC countries as well as the Central
American countries display no signicant impact of distance on bilateral trade within their
country group. This supports the assumption that external relations are stronger than the
linkages within the respective country group. This also impacts the effect of specialization
on risk sharing: with increasing specialization, these countries decrease their "regional"
risk sharing and might increase their international links.
Surprisingly, business cycle correlations affect risk sharing positively in every coun-
try group except Asia, where the coefcient is not signicant, and the southern Latin Amer-
ican countries, where the coefcient is signicantly negative. However, the impact for the
European Core countries is rather low. This supports the results from specialization and
bilateral trade. On the other hand, the CEEC show a higher impact of business cycle corre-
lations on nancial risk sharing. Again, this suggests that the more similar these countries
are, the more risk they share between each other. This supports the decreasing risk sharing
86 Results of the trade control variables are presented in Table 3.18 in the 3.7 Appendix.
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as a consequence of increasing specialization. The insignicant coefcient of business cy-
cle co-movements for the Asian countries is in line with the results of Kim et al. (2006).
The authors conclude that the Asian countries do not use nancial channels as main risk
sharing instrument to smooth cross-country variances of the GDP. Kim and Sheen (2007)
study the risk sharing behaviour between Australia and New Zealand. Their results indicate
that Australia and New Zealand mainly use credit markets to smooth their income shocks
between each other. As in the current analysis, the East Asian Countries are grouped with
Australia and New Zealand, the insignicant impact of business cycle co-movements is not
surprising. The signicance of business cycle correlations for the European core countries
is also in line with the existing literature. The results of Sorensen and Yosha (1998) suggest
that until 1990 borrowing and lending between the European countries was not the main
channel to smooth risk between them. These results hold also for the OECD countries. The
previous intuition that a country group will pool its risk within the country only if the coun-
tries are dissimilar seems not denitely supported. The disaggregation of the total impact
might help to clarify some of these effects.
These results might support the second strand of risk sharing literature by indicating
that diverging business cycles between the members of a country group open additional
opportunities for risk sharing within the respective group.
To disentangle the above effects, we turn to the analysis of the direct and indirect
channels through which risk sharing is affected by the three main variables: trade, special-
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ization and business cycle co-movements. Table (3.13) presents the results from equations
(3.93) - (3.95).87
87 In Table (3.13) data is total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by net foreign asset positions.
3.4 Results 134
Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Trade
Spec -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0150 0.0041
(-18.96) (-0.04) (-5.15) (-3.69) (9.55)
GDPi 0.0265 -0.0178 0.4210 -0.5900 0.0785
(1.88) (-0.56) (3.96) (-2.64) (5.83)
GDPj -0.0154 -0.0261 -0.2130 -0.5760 0.1420
(-3.57) (-3.71) (-2.66) (-2.95) (10.49)
Spec
Trade -0.5329 -0.0073 -0.1408 -0.0258 0.0304
(-9.32) (-2.28) (-3.41) (-6.94) (3.88)
Size -0.0049 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(-3.20) (2.27) (-0.18) (0.21) (0.50)
Finance -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0001 0.0001
(-3.25) (1.85) (-2.42) (-0.64) (1.44)
BC
Trade 0.0271 0.2139 0.0493 -0.0141 0.0005
(6.62) (10.32) (5.81) (-1.29) (0.09)
Spec -0.0034 0.5020 -0.0026 -0.0435 -0.0671
(-11.94) (7.73) (-0.99) (-1.65) (-11.16)
Finance -0.0415 -0.1880 -0.7500 -0.0156 0.0521
(-3.84) (-5.89) (-3.92) (-0.18) (1.64)
N 2040 1070 202 134 1030
R2 Trade 0.01 0.35 0.41 0.47 -0.09
R2 Spec 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.01
R2 BC 0.26 -0.44 0.30 -0.01 -1.28
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.13. Indirect Impact on Risk Diversication separated by Country Groups
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The total trade impact on risk sharing can be decomposed in two direct effects:
intra-industry (11) and geographical (12) trade. There are also two indirect chan-
nels, through which trade affects risk sharing, namely through specialization (21) and
business cycle co-movements (31).
In comparison to the other country groups, for Asia the negative impact of trade on
risk sharing is driven by a high share of intra-industry trade, as the results for Asia indicate
that specialization impacts trade signicantly negatively. A high share of the trade impact
on risk sharing can be attributed to trade between countries with similar specialization
patterns. This increases the vulnerability to similar shocks within the country group and
thus the need for risk sharing. However, the opportunities of risk sharing decrease within
this group. This is reected by the negative sign of the indirect channel of the trade impact
via specialization. Yet, these results for the Asian country group should be interpreted with
caution, as the explanatory power for trade is very weak within this country group.
In contrast to the Asian countries, the trade coefcient in (3.93) for the European
CEEC countries suggests no signicant impact of intra-industry trade. Additionally, the
geographical trade variables indicate a rather weak trade and risk sharing link between the
CEEC countries. As a consequence, increasing bilateral trade does not boost nancial risk
sharing between the CEEC countries. Intra-industry trade seems not to be a major link be-
tween the European core countries either. Yet, according to Table (3.18) in the Appendix,
within this country group the coefcients of the geographical variables are signicantly
positive (except the distance variable). Hence, trade appears to arise between close coun-
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tries and similar countries. Even though the trade link within this country group is strong,
the impact on risk sharing is not signicant.
Similar to the Asian countries, Central America indicates a high impact of intra-
industry trade on risk sharing in comparison to the rest of the country groups. Intra-industry
trade appears to enhance the sensitivity within the Central American country group for sim-
ilar industry shocks thus raising the need for risk sharing. The geographical trade variables
indicate a weak "regional" link for Central America. Hence, increasing bilateral trade does
not seem to increase the possibilities for bilateral risk sharing within this country group.
The only countries with a negative impact of intra-industry trade on risk sharing are the
Latin American southern countries. Within these countries, trade appears to transfer barely
similar productivity shocks. Furthermore, the coefcients of the geographical variables dis-
play a weak link between these countries. Thus, the need for risk sharing does not seem to
increase very much through bilateral trade. The weak regional connection implies low risk
sharing within the group.
One further effect should be noted: all country groups- expect the southern Latin
American countries - show negative trade impact on specialization and vice versa. Intra-
industry trade is denitely present within these respective country groups and only the
degree varies and so does its impact on intra-group risk sharing. Unlike the direct trade or
specialization impact, these indirect channels are all signicant. South Latin America is
the only country group that has no obvious appearance of intra-industry trade at all.
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The control variables for the nancial activity, depth and development have the strongest
impact on risk sharing for Asia.88 For Latin America south, none of the respective coef-
cients is signicant for the risk sharing activity within this group. Again, this supports
the weak linkage within and a stronger connection outside this country grouping. The Eu-
ropean CEEC group shows higher sensitivity to the nancial development and activity of
the partner country than to its own nancial market. For the European core countries, as
well as the Central Latin America countries the development of their own nancial market
and the nancial status of the partner country indicate similar impact on risk-sharing within
the respective country group. Generally, the signicance of the nancial variables for both
groups is low.
Overall, the results indicate that intra-industry trade is very dominant among the
analysed country groups. This result is supported by the estimation results of equation
(3.93) - (3.95). Business cycle co-movements signicantly converge with trade except for
the Latin American countries. Yet, no clear-cut picture emerges for the effects of spe-
cialization on business cycle co-movements. For the Asian and southern Latin American
countries specialization is supposed to lead to diverging business cycles and for the CEEC
to converging business cycles. For the two remaining country groups, the European Core
and Latin American central countries, no signicant impact of specialization on business
cycle co-movements is found. Consequently, the ambiguous inuence of business cycle
co-movements on nancial risk-sharing is likely to be caused by diverse indirect effects
that vary between the country groups.
88 Table (3.19) in 3.7 Appendix presents these results.
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The results for nancial risk sharing are not always as expected. Yet, the measure of
risk sharing used in this estimation is just one possible channel of nancial risk sharing,
namely for risk sharing via credit markets. Even though the importance of this channel
increased in the various regions, it is ambiguous. In order to check the robustness of the
results, the analysis is repeated for consumption risk sharing within the various country
groups.
Consumption Risk Sharing
According to different approaches in the literature, for example Crucini (1999), consump-
tion is supposed to converge for regions that pool their risk. Following from this, consump-
tion correlation is used as a proxy variable for risk sharing. This general assumption can
be split in two parts. Risk sharing via nancial markets reduces variations in the total con-
sumption over time. Hence, risk sharing or nancial integration should increase consump-
tion correlation within a country group. The countereffect is that nancial risk sharing
reduces deviations from the optimal consumption composition. As a consequence, con-
sumption correlation within a country group diverges with increasing risk sharing. Table
(3.14) contains the respective estimation results of equation (3.92) - (3.95)with consump-
tion correlation as proxy for risk sharing.89
There are three obvious differences compared to the estimation results of nancial
risk sharing: trade has a signicant and positive impact on consumption correlation for the
Asian, European core and southern Latin America countries. The signicant negative trade
89 In Table (3.14), data is total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by consumption correlation.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Trade 0.0668 -0.0876 0.1329 -0.0081 0.0776
(10.59) (-3.09) (7.26) (-1.11) (8.48)
Spec 0.0059 -0.6000 0.0075 -0.0386 -0.0082
(11.95) (-4.67) (1.40) (-2.28) (-0.31)
BC 0.0392 0.0334 -0.0092 0.0210 0.130
(5.55) (3.99) (-0.53) (3.15) (9.50)
N 2040 1070 202 134 1030
R2 0.01 -0.19 0.43 0.55 -0.56
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.14. Direct Impact on Risk Diversication separated by Country Groups
effect for the European CEEC is conrmed, whereas for the central Latin America the coef-
cient drops to insignicant. In view of the previous ndings, the change of the trade coef-
cient with respect to the signicance level and its magnitude does not surprise: according
to the rst estimation, the Latin America southern grouping is the country group with the
lowest, rather non existent, intra-industry trade link. Hence, increasing consumption cor-
relation induced by rising bilateral trade conrms this result. If trade is not intra-industry
then the main trading goods are consumption goods of the respective industries in the trad-
ing countries. Consequently, the trading countries assimilate their consumption behaviour
by exchanging the available goods. The change of the trade impact for the European core
group can be partially referred to a similar trading behaviour as for the southern American
countries. The amount of intra-industry trade on total trade of the European core group is
not very high in the rst estimation for nancial risk sharing. Hence, a reasonable part of
bilateral trade within this country group consists of nal goods. In turn, increasing trade
of consumption goods of differing industries in the respective countries enhances the con-
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vergence of consumption between these countries. Even though the nancial risk-sharing
estimation indicates a higher amount of intra-industry trade for the Asian countries, the
now positive trade impact might be based on similar arguments. More precisely, the pos-
itive impact of trade on consumption correlation is positive and highly signicant, but at
a very low level. In general, with increasing trade the respective countries are not tied
to their domestic production anymore, and the composition of their consumption bundles
synchronize among their trading partners.
In comparison to nancial risk sharing, the effect of specialization on consumption
risk sharing never changes its sign. The effect of specialization on risk sharing between
the European core countries drops to insignicant. Within the European CEEC grouping,
the impact of specialization does not change at all. Business cycle co-movements is now
positive for Asia, Europe CEEC and Central Latin America. The impact of business cy-
cle co-movements changes its sign for the European core and the southern Latin American
group. For the former, the negative effect is not signicant, whereas for the latter, business
cycle co-movements affect consumption correlation signicantly positively. The positive
relation between business cycle co-movements and consumption correlation for countries
within one group is not surprising at all. With increasing correlation of their business cycles
these countries have the possibility to synchronize the composition of their consumption
bundle. The business cycle co-movements are partly driven by increasing trade between the
respective countries. The only signicant exception for this explanation is again the south-
ern Latin American country group. Their trade share in the business cycle co-movement is
negative and signicant. Hence, there is need for another explanation of the positive impact
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of business cycle co-movements and consumption correlation. A further explanation for a
positive impact of business cycle co-movements and consumption correlation might be the
income correlation. With increasing business cycle convergence the income in the coun-
try group converges as well. This in turn is a strong driver for consumption convergence
within this group.90
90 Crucini (1999) shows very clearly how cross-regional consumption correlation follows cross-regional
income growth correlation for the USA, the Canadian Provinces and the OECD countries.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Trade
Spec -0.0044 0.0000 -0.0141 -0.1250 0.0443
(-19.10) (0.00) (-5.44) (-3.11) (10.00)
GDPi 0.0281 -0.0117 0.446 -0.736 0.107
(1.99) (-0.36) (4.26) (-3.35) (8.92)
GDPj -0.0157 -0.0263 -0.256 -0.692 0.161
(-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.23) (-3.61) (12.73)
Spec
Trade -0.5284 -0.0076 -0.1422 -0.0257 0.0311
(-9.25) (-2.36) (-3.43) (-6.90) (4.00)
Size -0.0042 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(-2.80) (1.94) (0.11) (0.24) (0.46)
Finance -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0021 -0.0000 0.0001
(-3.23) (1.82) (-2.31) (-0.76) (1.32)
BC
Trade 0.0271 0.2041 0.0491 -0.0146 0.0002
(6.62) (10.24) (5.80) (-1.34) (0.04)
Spec -0.0034 0.406 -0.0032 -0.058 -0.07
(-11.97) (6.32) (-1.23) (-2.20) (-11.31)
Finance -0.0416 -0.192 -0.769 -0.0056 0.0498
(-3.85) (-6.04) (-4.02) (-0.07) (1.57)
N 2040 1070 202 134 1030
R2
Trade -0.01 0.35 0.39 0.47 -0.09
Spec 0.22 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.01
BC 0.26 -0.26 0.29 -0.01 -1.28
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.15. Indirect Impact on Risk Diversication separated by Country Groups
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Table (3.15) presents the results of decomposition effects for consumption risk shar-
ing.91 The results of the decomposition of the effects derive from the former estimation
mainly in three aspects: in the European CEEC grouping, specialization as driving force of
trade changes from negative insignicant for the nancial risk sharing estimation to positive
insignicant for consumption risk sharing. The second change is visible for the European
core countries. Market size differences are now positive insignicant and were negative
insignicant as explanation for specialization. However, both are minor changes and al-
most negligible. The third change is more severe than the previous two. The trade impact
on business cycle co-movement is no longer insignicant but negative and highly signi-
cant. Based on the almost non visible share of intra-industry trade, this change might just
reect inter-industry trade with nal consumption goods. Therefore, the results indicate
that increasing trade leads to divergence of business cycles in the southern Latin American
group.
Financial integration can increase as well as decrease consumption correlation be-
tween two countries. The composition of the consumption bundles and the consumption
path are sensitive to the conditions of the nancial markets. In dependence of the domi-
nating consumption target, nancial integration boosts or reduces consumption correlation.
Therefore, we turn to the impact of the nancial framework of the home and the partner
country. The results for the nancial control variables are presented in 3.7 Appendix Table
(3.21).
91 In Table (3.15) data is total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by consumption correlation.
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Most obviously is the change for the Latin American countries. Both groupings react
more sensitively to the nancial conditions. In particular, the results indicate that the size
and activity of the stock market and the degree of nancial development of the home as
well as of the partner country are important factors for the consumption correlation within
both groups. However, the respective direction of the impact is not always identical for
both groupings. The Asian country group now reacts relatively stronger to the nancial
status of the partner country. Furthermore, the own nancial framework loses impact in the
Asian group. In contrast to the nancial risk sharing, the nancial controls lose their total
impact for the European CEEC countries. No signicant effect is found for these countries
with respect to consumption correlation. The European core countries shift their sensitivity
towards the nancial framework of the partner country. The stock market activities espe-
cially of the partner country impact the bilateral consumption correlation highly negatively.
Overall, the results do not provide a clear-cut picture and the role of the nancial markets is
not obvious, neither for the nancial risk sharing nor the consumption risk sharing estima-
tion. Only a slight tendency in importance towards the Asian and Latin American countries
is perceptible. The results lead to the assumption that the importance of nancial markets
may increase with risk sharing, not within but between the various country groups.
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3.4.2 Estimations with Industry Trade Data
Financial Risk Sharing
To analyse whether the effects are different for different industries, the estimation of equa-
tions (3.92) - (3.95) is repeated with disaggregated industry trade data.92 To estimate equa-
tions (3.92) - (3.95) with disaggregated industry trade data for the European and Latin
American countries requires some changes to the country groups. The two European
groups are merged together because of lacking data for the CEEC. Consequently, some
European countries are dropped. Furthermore, the time period is shortened to the years
1999 - 2004 because of the data availability.93 The same pooling procedure is applied to
the two Latin American country groups.94 The pooling of the two European and the two
Latin American data might dilute the estimation results.
The direct estimation results deviate slightly from the previous results. Table (3.16),
column 1 shows the results for Asia, industry 0, "Food and Live Animals".95 The coef-
cients of the direct variables on risk sharing for the Asian countries have the same signs as
the coefcients of the estimation utilizing the total direction trade data. Yet, the coefcients
of trade and business cycles now turn out to be highly signicant. With respect to the in-
92 We use data from ve industries separately: S3-7 Machines,Transport Equip; S3-6 Manufactured Goods,
S3-5 Chemicals, Reltd. Prod.Nes; S3-3 Fuels, Lubricants, Etc. and S3-0 FOOD and Live Animals. In the
text the results are exemplarily shown for the S3-0 group only. We discuss if the results differ between the
industries.
93 Malta, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and
Czech Republic are the dropped countries for the estimation with 1dig industry trade data.
94 The Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Uruguay are dropped from the
Latin American country group.
95 In Table (3.16) data is disaggregated industry trade data. Risk sharing is measured by net foreign asset
positions.
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direct effects, the results indicate that specialization is now a main drive for trade between
the Asian countries. Hence, with diverging specialization this might reect an increase of
"Food and Live Animals"-trade. This specic intra-industry trade is a rather small part
of the general trade impact on risk sharing, since trade consists mainly of inter-industry
trade of nal goods. The transferred shocks through trade do not affect each country to the
same extent. Consequently, the need of risk sharing is not enforced by trade. The coef-
cients of the geographic variables exhibit the expected sign and indicate existing bilateral
trade ows of these industry-products within the Asian group. This conrms the low intra-
industry trade share. Not surprisingly, industry trade is a strong driver for specialization
between these Asian countries. For these countries, the relation between trade and spe-
cialization - and vice versa - is the same for each analysed industry. Also, the estimation
results of (3.95) remain almost the same. All the coefcients are robust across the various
analysed industries.
The 1dig "Food and Live Animals" results of the European countries differ substan-
tially from the total trade estimation. The second column of Table (3.16) presents the results
for the industry estimation. The coefcient of the trade impact is insignicant. With re-
spect to the total trade estimation, the effect of the trade impact on nancial risk sharing
is insignicant for Europe Core but signicantly negative for Europe CEEC. Firstly, after
the aggregation of the two European groups, the effect of disaggregated industry trade on
nancial risk sharing turns out to be insignicant. Secondly, the missing data for many of
the CEEC decreases the signicance of the trade impact. The indirect impact of special-
ization through trade is signicantly positive. Thus, the inter-industry trade increases the
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nancial risk sharing within the European country group. However, the direct specializa-
tion impact on nancial risk sharing is negative. This is consistent with the specialization
impact of the CEEC, but contradicts the specialization impact of the core countries in the
total trade estimation. The effect stays the same for each separate industry estimate. This
might indicate a weak regional link between the countries.
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Asia Europe Latin America
Risk
Trade -0.1093 0.0017 0.0716
(-4.34) (1.27) (1.83)
Spec 0.0020 -0.0021 0.0053
(1.83) (-2.73) (1.31)
BC 0.174 -0.0000 0.0007
(7.40) (-0.02) (0.13)
Trade
Spec 0.0965 0.264 0.0425
(15.36) (7.57) (6.50)
GDPi 0.1339 0.1677 0.2207
(0.17) (5.52) (5.20)
GDPj 0.0074 0.1048 0.2454
(0.06) (3.64) (5.71)
Spec
Trade 0.6511 0.1255 -0.0713
(5.77) (3.10) (-1.00)
Size -0.327 -0.0125 0.0012
(-1.14) (-0.56) (0.03)
Finance -0.0992 -0.0010 -0.0026
(-2.88) (-0.65) (-0.34)
BC
Trade 0.0241 0.144 0.104
(5.66) (3.63) (2.40)
Spec -0.0002 -0.0086 -0.0015
(-5.85) (-4.32) (-2.71)
Finance 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0001
(14.84) (-0.59) (0.11)
N 711 631 731
R2 Risk 0.36 -1.1653 0.10
R2 Trade -3.44 -0.68 0.19
R2 Spec 0.29 0.01 0.01
R2 BC 0.11 -2.13 -0.03
t statistics in parenthesesp < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.16. Direct and Indirect Impact on Risk Diversication separated by Country
Groups
However, the impact turns positive if the number of industries in the analysis is en-
larged. Thus, the weak regional link is not caused by a weak European link generally, but
by a weak link between the respective industries. The business cycle co-movements show
the expected impact on risk sharing. With diverging business cycles, the risk sharing be-
tween the European countries increases. The signicance of this impact increases with the
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number of industries in the analysis. In contrast to the total trade estimation, dissimilar
countries are included in the European group. Thus, risk sharing in dependence of diverg-
ing business cycles is more likely to occur. The change of the business cycle impact is even
more accounted for by the new country grouping, as the indirect effects of business cy-
cle co-movements stay almost unchanged. Only specialization affects the co-movements
now differently than in the total trade estimation. The negative specialization impact differs
from the CEEC effect with total trade data with respect to the sign and from the core coun-
tries with respect to the signicance. However, with total trade the CEEC specialization
impact is positive and highly signicant; it is the exception of the specialization impacts of
all country groupings. Therefore, the transformation into a negative signicant impact for
the whole European group is not surprising but rather intuitive. None of the impacts varies
by the different industry estimates. Only industry three "Fuels, Lubricants, etc" has some
changes in signs, but just for insignicant impacts.
The Latin America countries now show no signicant direct impact on risk sharing at
all. The estimation results for the 1dig "Food and Live Animals" industry are shown in col-
umn 3 of Table (3.16). Analogue to the European countries, the aggregation of both Latin
American country groups dilute the results. This is valid for all tested industries. The in-
direct channels are also very weak. Particularly specialization seems to be unaffected by
any link between the Latin American countries. Trade, on the other hand depends signif-
icantly on specialization patterns within the group as well as on the geographic variables.
Only distance loses its signicance. Again, this supports the missing linkages between the
Latin American countries. The inuences on business cycle co-movements depend on the
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industry. Specialization drives the divergence of diverging business cycles signicantly for
"Food and Live Animals", "Beverages and Tobacco", "Crude Materials" and "Fuels, Lubri-
cants, etc". For "Chemicals, relatd. Prod. NES", "Manufactured Goods" and "Machines,
Transport Equip." specialization still impacts business cycle co-movements negatively. The
inuence is not signicant anymore. However, trade drives business cycle convergences
signicantly for all industries but "Beverages and Tobacco".
Overall, the diverse impact of trade and specialization on business cycles indicate
that business cycles diverge by proceeding specialization and converge with increasing
trade integration. This supports the results of Frankel and Rose (1998) who state that
demand shocks and intra-industry trade cause business cycles to converge. Additionally,
further results show that the impact of specialization on trade is always signicant, whereas
trade does not affect specialization in all cases. The trade impact on specialization turns
signicant if the number of specialization possibilities is extended. These ndings conrm
Fidrmuc (2004). He stated that not only trade intensity but also trade composition affect
business cycles behaviour.
Trade and specialization drive bilateral consumption correlation for all country groups.
Hence, trade integration uncouples consumption from domestic production and increases
the share of foreign goods in the consumption composition. The positive impact of spe-
cialization on consumption correlation emphasizes this effect additionally. However, a
signicant trade impact is present only for the Latin American countries and specialization
is signicant for Asia and Latin America. Again, the results stay the same for each tested
industries. The direct impacts change with the number of industries. Analogue to the -
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nancial risk sharing estimation the composition of trade and specialization is the crucial
factor.
Consumption Risk Sharing
The results for consumption risk sharing in Table (3.17) emphasize the indirect channels.96
The coefcients of most of the variables are robust across estimations, especially for the
European countries. In particular, the strength of the indirect impacts stays comparatively
unchanged for the European as well as for the Latin American countries. The consistent
indirect inuence is no surprise: changing the measure for risk sharing does not alter the
channels between the three main variables: trade, specialization and business cycle co-
movements.
96 In Table (3.17), data is disaggregated industry trade data. Risk sharing is measured by consumption
correlations.
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Asia Europe Latin America
Risk con_I
Trade 0.0000 -0.0000 0.000002
(1.16) (-0.19) (2.53)
Spec 0.431 0.0000 0.0000006
(8.55) (1.62) (8.17)
BC 0.0895 -0.0600 0.1015
(7.37) (-3.13) (9.83)
Trade
Spec 0.0442 0.256 0.0534
(14.57) (7.25) (7.74)
GDPi 0.4919 0.1707 0.1465
(4.39) (5.50) (3.54)
GDPj 0.0427 0.1080 0.2050
(0.40) (3.65) (4.91)
Spec
Trade 0.1355 0.0119 -0.0052
(12.21) (2.87) (-0.73)
Size 0.2182 -0.0121 -0.0275
(0.45) (-0.52) (-1.00)
Finance -0.5617 -0.1016 -0.2609
(-0.18) (-0.59) (-0.34)
BC
Trade -0.0173 0.133 0.110
(-3.69) (3.40) (2.53)
Spec -0.0248 -0.692 -0.00171
(-9.07) (-3.40) (-0.03)
Finance 0.368 -0.0843 0.171
(2.67) (-0.44) (0.37)
N 711 613 731
R2 Risk -0.56 -0.84 -1.76
R2 Trade -0.54 -2.16 0.04
R2 Spec -0.05 -0.01 -0.01
R2 BC -0.31 -0.46 -0.03
t statistics in parenthesesp < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.17. Direct and Indirect Impact on Risk Diversication separated by Country
Groups.
However, the direct channels show a different impact on consumption correlation
than on nancial risk sharing. The most obvious change of the trade impact occurs for the
Asian countries. In the case of consumption correlation, the inuence of trade turns in-
signicant. This might be intuitive as Kim et al. (2006) point out that the credit market is
not an important channel for risk sharing between the Asian countries. However, the results
indicate that there is risk sharing between the Asian countries. Risk sharing also increases
with trade between these countries but the credit market is not used for risk sharing activ-
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ities. These considerations are conrmed by a moderate positive impact of business cycle
co-movements on risk sharing. For the European countries, the effect of trade on consump-
tion correlation remains insignicant. One notable change is the insignicant coefcient
for the specialization impact on risk sharing. With increasing specialization between the
countries, the composition of their consumption bundles adjusts more and more. The ef-
fect of business cycle co-movements remains signicantly negative. For Latin America,
increasing trade, specialization and business cycle co-movements boost the consumption
correlation within the group. Again, none the industry estimation results varies between
the analysed industries, indicating the robustness of these results.
3.5 Robustness
As a check for the robustness, we run the estimation with varying explanatory variables. For
trade we implement two additional trade measures according to (3.97) and (3.98). More-
over, we construct measure (3.96) with different datasets. We also include two different
specialization indices. For this purpose, we use value added industry data and data from
two different data sets for measure (3.99). Business cycle co-movements are presented by
current GDP correlation as well as GDP growth correlation. To all these alterations in the
explanatory variables the results are robust. The only exception is the Asian country group
with respect to the business cycle co-movement. Precisely, in the nancial risk sharing es-
timation the correlation of the pure GDP data is dropped with any trade measure in the
estimation. However, correlation of GDP growth can be used without difculties with any
trade measure.
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We applied a second check for the explained variables. As a measure of consumption
correlation we also used pure consumption correlation and the correlation of consumption
growth. Again the results were all robust. Above all, with the consumption risk sharing,
the Asian results with regard to business cycle co-movement do not display the dropped
trade measure.
Finally, we switch the estimation method from 3sls to 2sls, and equation by equation
estimation, as further tests of robustness. In both cases, the results are mostly robust for
all country groups. Yet, specialization changes its impact on risk sharing in three country
groups and the effect of business cycles on risk sharing for one group. The results are least
robust for the Latin American countries.97
According to these sensitivity analyses, the results are robust. Only the results for the
Latin American countries should be interpreted with caution.
97 In addition to the 2sls and equation-by-equation estimation, we run the regression with a panel-corrected
standard error method and a pooled linear standard method.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyse the impact of increasing trade, specialization and business cycle
co-movements on risk-sharing within three country groups. Additionally, we study the
simultaneous effects between these three explaining variables by allowing for endogeneity
among them. In order to account for different stages of integration within a country group,
we split the European and the Latin American countries in two different country groups:
for Europe, CEEC and Core, and for Latin America, Central and South.
The results indicate that more similar countries share more risk with each other.
These results are valid for the nancial risk-sharing as well as for the consumption risk-
sharing estimation. The impact of trade and specialization on risk sharing differs for each
country group. The Asian and European Core countries increase their risk-sharing among
each other the more diverse their industrial specialization is. In contrast, the CEEC and both
Latin American country groups tend to increase their intra-group risk-sharing the more syn-
chronized their industrial patterns are. Furthermore, trade always increases business cycle
co-movements with the exception of the Latin American countries. On the other hand, spe-
cialization leads to diverging business cycles except for the CEEC. The mutual trade and
specialization relations imply a noticeable impact of intra-industry trade in each country
group. Again, the southern Latin American countries march to a different drummer and
show a positive trade impact on specialization and vice versa.
Overall, the results imply that there is a tendency for synchronized countries with
respect to industry patterns and business cycles to share their risk with each other. Within
these respective country groups, intra-industry trade accounts for a noticeable share in total
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trade. The Latin American country groups present an exception. Also, they also do not
show the same share of intra-industry trade and they show a much weaker intra-group
link.98 Hence, there might be scope and need for further integration and risk sharing among
the Latin American countries. This is a subject of growing importance, especially in course
of a proceeding decoupling process from the USA.
98 Interestingly, these "hard" fact results are supported by the Latinobarómetro (2007). This survey nds
a rather weak will for integration among the Latin American population. Furthermore, the willingness for
integration and bearing of possible concessions is lower in the southern than in the central Latin American
countries. These ndings again support the present results with more integrated and connected central Latin
American countries than Latin American south.
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3.7 Appendix
Countries
Asia
Australia
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
India
Japan
Korea, South
Malaysia
Myanmar
New Zealand
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Taiwan
Vietnam
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Europe
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithunia
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
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Europe, Core
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Europe, CEEC
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
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Latin America
Argentina
Bahamas, The
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Latin America, Central
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
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Latin America, South
Argentina
Bahamas, The
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
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Control Variables
Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
GDPi 0.0265 -0.0178 0.421 -0.590 0.0785
(1.88) (-0.56) (3.96) (-2.64) (5.83)
GDPj -0.0154 -0.0261 -0.2130 -0.5760 0.1420
(-3.57) (-3.71) (-2.66) (-2.95) (10.49)
Language 0.5430 0 0 0 0.0375
(24.51) . . . (3.66)
Border 0.0571 0.1350 0.1110 0.0807 0.1510
(3.58) (16.74) (3.29) (1.76) (19.25)
Religion -0.0044 0.0003 0 0.1605 -0.0200
(-4.48) (0.58) . (4.43) (-6.47)
Ethnik 0.2540 0 0 -0.1690 0.0916
(11.59) . . (-3.71) (9.56)
Democracy 0.0056 0.0626 0 0 0
(0.52) (6.89) . . .
Distance -0.0834 0.0183 -0.7670 0.7080 -0.1252
(-4.00) (0.93) (-2.76) (0.98) (-3.71)
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.18. Trade Controls for Financial Risk Sharing
In Table (3.18) trade data is total trade data. Financial risk sharing is measured by net
foreign asset positions.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Financial Depth 0.18841 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0011 -0.0027
(8.34) (-2.36) (1.56) (2.51) (-0.32)
Activity Int. -0.2167 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0006
(-9.44) (0.70) (-2.13) (-2.38) (-0.12)
Size Stock-Market 0.0250 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0011
(2.73) (0.74) (-0.49) (-0.40) (0.44)
Financial Development -0.0505 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0073
(-2.38) (1.18) (-1.99) (-0.65) (-0.70)
Activity Stock-Market 0.0021 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0095
(0.23) (1.02) (-0.84) (0.44) (-0.78)
Fin. Depth Partner 0.0701 0.0033 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0043
(6.40) (12.36) (0.24) (2.52) (-1.41)
Activity Int. Partner -0.1440 -0.0030 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0004
(-9.85) (-8.64) (-0.68) (-2.35) (-0.09)
Size Stock-M. Partner 0.010 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0023
(1.69) (-0.44) (-0.06) (-0.40) (0.91)
Fin. Dev. Partner 0.0029 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0080
(0.25) (-5.63) (-6.12) (-0.75) (-1.61)
Activity Stock-M. Partner -0.0100 0.0013 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0201
(-1.39) (6.95) (0.43) (0.36) (-1.84)
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.19. Financial Controls for Financial Risk Sharing
In Table (3.19), trade data is total trade data. Financial risk sharing is measured by
net foreign asset positions.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
GDPi 0.0281 -0.0117 0.446 -0.736 0.107
(1.99) (-0.36) (4.26) (-3.35) (8.92)
GDPj -0.0157 -0.0263 -0.256 -0.692 0.161
(-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.23) (-3.61) (12.73)
Language 0.545 0 0 0 0.0416
(24.60) . . . (4.12)
Border 0.0577 0.136 0.0715 0.100 0.167
(3.61) (16.64) (2.16) (2.23) (21.87)
Religion -0.0453 0.0038 0 0 0
(-4.55) (0.64) . . .
Ethnic 0.255 0 0 -0.192 0.0550
(11.64) . . (-4.25) (6.17)
Democracy 0.0046 0.0635 0 0 -0.242
(0.43) (6.63) . . (-8.74)
Distance -0.0073 0.0014 -0.110 0.021 -0.0006
(-3.49) (0.67) (-4.05) (0.29) (-0.19)
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.20. Trade Controls for Consumption Risk Sharing
In Table (3.20), trade data is total trade data. Consumption risk sharing is measured
by consumption correlation.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Financial Depth -0.00550 -0.174 0.403 -0.193 0.0462
(-0.06) (-0.92) (0.90) (-0.50) (0.40)
Activity Int. -0.0375 0.0207 -0.474 0.716 -0.0097
(-0.45) (0.11) (-1.10) (2.17) (-0.12)
Size Stock-Market -0.0109 0.0677 -0.0160 -0.489 0.0542
(-0.33) (0.33) (-0.11) (-1.97) (1.53)
Finanical Development 0.0076 0.136 0.448 -0.964 -0.0656
(0.09) (0.51) (0.84) (-4.33) (-0.46)
Activity Stock-Market 0.001 0.0031 -0.017 0.233 -0.109
(0.29) (0.23) (-1.18) (3.40) (-5.16)
Fin. Depth Partner 0.239 0.0876 0.660 -0.288 -0.0648
(6.00) (0.46) (2.54) (-0.75) (-1.22)
Activity Int. Partner -0.208 -0.323 -0.514 0.749 0.0298
(-3.91) (-1.32) (-2.35) (2.30) (0.37)
Size Stock-Market Partner 0.0840 -0.118 0.138 -0.472 0.0779
(3.81) (-0.61) (1.11) (-1.87) (1.77)
Fin. Dev. Partner -0.0743 -0.0612 0.524 -0.919 0.0842
(-1.78) (-0.38) (1.70) (-4.05) (1.05)
Activity Stock-M. Partner 0.0008 0.0082 -0.0523 0.230 -0.134
(0.30) (0.61) (-4.33) (3.28) (-7.32)
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.21. Financial Controls for Consumption Risk Sharing
In Table (3.21), trade data is total trade data. Consumption risk sharing is measured
by consumption correlation.
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Results of Robustness Check
Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Central Central South
Risk
TradeCvW -0.1684 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0103
(-10.57) (-7.58) (2.05) (-2.87) (-3.74)
Spec -0.0475 -0.1950 0.0011 -0.0013 -0.4246
(-3.11) (-8.74) (7.98) (-0.76) (-2.48)
BC 0.2652 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0365
(9.71) (4.59) (-0.36) (2.88) (-4.26)
Trade
Spec -0.0018 -0.320 -0.001 -0.0769 -0.0071
(-15.61) (-8.86) (-9.65) (-4.36) (-3.26)
GDPi 0.0012 -0.0175 0.0089 -0.207 -0.0128
(0.23) (-0.31) (2.35) (-2.15) (-1.86)
GDPj -0.0001 -0.022 0.0009 -0.173 0.0021
(-0.12) (-1.57) (0.32) (-2.05) (0.31)
Spec
TradeCvW -0.4933 -0.0011 -0.5091 -0.0071 -0.0208
(-22.08) (-6.24) (-5.66) (-8.96) (-4.36)
Size -0.0554 0.0007 -0.0110 0.0001 0.0004
(-4.37) (2.60) (-0.84) (0.05) (0.28)
Finance -0.004 0.0001 -0.0159 0.0002 0.0007
(-2.96) (1.89) (-1.95) (-0.75) (1.35)
BC
TradeCvW 0.0502 0.0107 0.145 -0.0042 -0.0062
(22.17) (8.23) (6.61) (-1.59) (-1.67)
Spec 0.0021 0.663 0.0056 -0.0467 -0.0699
(5.69) (8.90) (1.89) (-1.66) (-11.36)
N 2011 1063 196 134 1030
R2 Risk -0.78 -1.73 -2.12 0.65 -1.54
R2 Trade -0.2 -0.58 0.47 0.38 -0.01
R2 Spec -0.56 0.06 0.25 0.20 -0.14
R2 BC -1.14 -0.53 0.30 0.05 -1.33
Table 3.22. Direct and Indirect Impact on Financial Risk Sharing
In Table (3.22), trade is measured by the third trade index analogue to Deardorff
(1998). Trade data is total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by net foreign asset posi-
tions.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
nfa_ij
Risk
Trade -0.2241 -0.0403 -0.0017 -0.0023 -0.0373
(-1.30) (-7.50) (-3.78) (-2.73) (-0.93)
Spec 2 0.0903 -0.6631 -0.0063 0.0005 0.01
(0.98) (-9.48) (-3.96) (0.11) (1.61)
BC 0.3115 0.0115 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.2584
(1.59) (9.90) (-0.44) (3.18) (-4.48)
Trade
Spec 2 -0.0172 0.253 0.0281 -0.486 -0.0001
(-14.91) (1.51) (0.60) (-6.08) (-0.02)
GDPi 0.0227 -0.0179 0.553 -0.202 0.0938
(1.66) (-0.54) (4.94) (-0.97) (6.86)
GDPj -0.0021 -0.0110 -0.275 -0.191 0.154
(-0.56) (-0.90) (-3.13) (-0.92) (11.04)
Spec 2
Trade -0.1234 -0.0024 -0.0035 -0.0146 0.0051
(-11.59) (-2.69) (-1.04) (-8.85) (1.27)
Size -0.110 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.0097
(-3.72) (0.95) (0.06) (0.04) (1.14)
Finance -0.1113 0.0043 0.1203 0.0033 0.0068
(-4.16) (3.06) (1.61) (0.29) (0.28)
BC
Trade 0.0198 0.2901 0.0285 -0.0283 -0.0150
(4.62) (9.96) (1.87) (-2.33) (-3.23)
Spec 2 -0.0021 0.466 -0.0777 -0.0186 0.0003
(-11.70) (15.27) (-17.76) (-2.80) (0.54)
Finance -0.0478 -0.349 0.205 -0.0170 0.0031
(-4.35) (-7.49) (0.61) (-0.20) (0.11)
N 2040 1070 202 134 1030
R2 Risk 0.42 -1.73 -0.4 0.64 0.09
R2 Trade 0.22 0.39 0.48 0.18 0.49
R2 Spec 0.21 0.1 0.35 0.09 0.01
R2 BC 0.22 -3.9 -5.74 -0.21 0.04
t statistics in parenthesesp < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.23. Direct and Indirect Impact on Financial Risk Sharing
In Table (3.23), business cycle co-movements are measured by gdp growth correla-
tions. Trade data is total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by net foreign asset positions.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Risk
'Trade -0.2578 -0.0297 -0.0008 -0.0032 -0.0216
(-1.51) (-6.18) (-1.56) (-3.95) (-0.44)
Spec 0.0140 -0.1597 0.0008 -0.0029 -0.2169
(1.05) (-8.77) (5.58) (-1.60) (-1.25)
BC III 0.3551 0.0078 0.0011 0.0017 -0.2406
(5.79) (2.65) (2.26) (-3.03)
Trade
Spec -0.0443 -0.0543 -0.134 -1.50 0.410
(-19.07) (-0.27) (-5.18) (-3.69) (9.56)
GDPi 0.0264 -0.0165 0.421 -0.588 0.0786
(1.87) (-0.52) (3.95) (-2.63) (5.84)
GDPj -0.0161 -0.0282 -0.211 -0.574 0.142
(-3.75) (-4.02) (-2.63) (-2.95) (10.49)
Spec
FR_I -0.536 -0.0072 -0.1411 -0.0259 0.0303
(-9.38) (-2.26) (-3.42) (-6.95) (3.88)
Size -0.0050 0.00007 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(-3.26) (2.10) (-0.21) (0.21) (0.50)
Finance -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0001 0.0001
(-3.19) (1.85) (-2.41) (-0.64) (1.44)
BC III
Trade 0.0338 0.2226 0.0474 -0.0179 0.0085
(8.31) (10.59) (5.57) (-1.65) (0.16)
Spec -0.0025 0.614 -0.0027 -0.0469 -0.0670
(-8.76) (9.72) (-1.01) (-1.79) (-11.13)
Finance -0.0370 -0.210 -0.717 -0.0167 0.0519
(-3.43) (-6.52) (-3.73) (-0.19) (1.64)
N 2040 1070 202 134 1030
R2 Risk 0.42 -1.19 -1.32 0.62 -0.32
R2 Trade -0.01 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.01
R2 Spec 0.22 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.01
R2 BC III 0.28 -0.78 0.31 0.01 -1.18
t statistics in parenthesesp < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.24. Direct and Indirect Impact on Financial Risk Sharing
In Table (3.24), business cycle co-movements are measured by gdp growth correla-
tions. Trade data is total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by net foreign asset positions.
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Asia Europe Europe Latin America Latin America
CEEC Core Central South
Risk nfa_ij
Trade -0.7803 -0.0109 -0.0015 -0.0098 -0.9814
(-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.71) (-1.63) (-4.02)
Spec -0.2008 0.0754 0.0007 -0.0194 0.6729
(-3.37) (2.67) (2.00) (-1.28) (5.72)
BC 0.5674 0.0017 -0.001 0.0009 0.0294
(6.58) (3.58) (-4.29) (1.76) (1.48)
Trade
Spec -0.0024 0.482 -0.0411 0.0078 0.0360
(-2.78) (10.48) (-2.36) (0.02) (2.95)
GDPi 0.0029 -0.0016 0.0573 -0.111 0.0091
(1.95) (-0.45) (4.40) (-4.86) (6.47)
GDPj 0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0332 -0.104 0.0151
(0.78) (-3.32) (-3.38) (-4.97) (10.82)
Spec
Trade -0.2024 0.0118 -0.0661 -0.0133 0.0147
(-4.55) (6.94) (-1.71) (-3.63) (2.43)
Size -0.1448 0.0008 -0.0032 0.0010 0.0014
(-7.84) (1.74) (-0.15) (0.28) (0.81)
Finance -0.0076 0.0004 -0.0155 -0.0004 0.0009
(-4.87) (0.76) (-1.55) (-0.98) (1.73)
BC III
Trade 0.234 0.846 0.315 0.304 -0.147
(7.77) (8.19) (4.16) (3.07) (-4.15)
Spec -0.0119 0.262 0.0196 0.199 -0.0211
(-8.01) (1.42) (1.23) (0.75) (-1.14)
Finance -0.0287 -0.121 -0.486 0.0003 0.0058
(-2.71) (-4.19) (-2.48) (0.00) (0.20)
N 2040 1070 202 134 1030
R2 Risk 0.43 0.59 0.53 0.68 0.27
R2 Trade 0.56 0.42 0.51 0.60 0.50
R2 Spec 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.02
R2 BC III 0.34 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.03
t statistics in parenthesesp < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 3.25. Direct and Indirect Impact on Risk Sharing with OLS
In Table (3.25), trade is measured by total trade data. Risk sharing is measured by
net foreign asset positions.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
In this work, we have presented the impact of international integration from vari-
ous perspectives: workers, rm owners and countries. We emphasized the dependence of
trade integration and nancial integration for these three groups. The results indicate that
integration has not one large impact but consists of many small effects.
The rst link between trade integration and nancial integration for individuals can
already be found in 1846. The importance of trade opening is shown in the repeal of the
corn laws in Great Britain. Additionally, the possible gains from nancial diversication
and the independence of one specic production factor are emphasized. However, until to-
day the insurance issue of tariffs is still an argument for protectionism. On the other hand,
the role of nancial markets as insurance instrument for individuals is mainly underesti-
mated.
For rms, international integration tightens their possible gains on the home market.
International investment becomes more important in order for rms to survive. Therefore,
various international investment instruments are needed, and continuing R&D to increase
productivity and competitiveness are crucial for prospective rms.
Finally, the conditions in one country and the economic landscape are important im-
pact factors for individual and rms' behaviour. Furthermore, as a consequence of pro-
ceeding integration countries have to take spillovers and impacts into account from the
neighbouring countries and trading partners. Economic changes in neighbouring countries
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impact the home country through various channels and affect individual and rm behav-
iour.
To handle these issues, we diveded the work in three main chapters.
Firstly, we addressed the impact of trade protection on the investment behaviour of
a working individual. On the one hand, trade liberalisation increases uncertainty for the
worker due to higher competition and increasing imports. On the other hand trade, liber-
alisation stimulates the workers' asset market activities and thus asset markets can act as a
substitute for the diminished insurance caused by reduced trade protection. However, the
results depend strongly on the industry structure of the respective country.
Secondly, the rm perspective and the arising investment possibilities were studied.
According to the results, FPI can dampen small and short-term environment changes of the
long-term FDI. Consequently, FPI and FDI can act as strategic complements. Thus, the
combined investment of FDI and FPI increases the valuation and the expected cash ow
of the respective instrument. Again, the country conditions are the crucial factor for the
location decision of either international investment instrument.
As the rst chapter shows, country structure seems to be a decisive factor for different
investor groups. Thus, in Chapter 3 we presented the impact of international integration
through various direct and indirect channels on the industrial patterns, trade and business
cycle behaviour on three large country groups. Our results indicate that countries with
synchronized industry patterns and business cycle share more risk with each other. For
these countries trade consists of a high share of intra-industry trade.
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Obviously, increasing international integration facilitates international risk sharing.
Individuals in integrating countries might still face additional uncertainty due to the inte-
gration process but they also have an increased possibility to share their risk through various
channels. One condition may not be neglected: proceeding liberalization of asset markets
in various regions is a driving force for risk sharing and should be further advanced.
The results of the present work suggest that there is no possibility for countries, rms
or individuals to refuse the further process of international integration. There are too many
channels through which various effects impact countries, their industries and their people.
However, there are also additional instruments arising to use international integration for
each individual advantage. The only task to undertake then is to identify these instruments
and to be willing to use them even if they are new and unfamiliar.
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